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Foreword
This publication signals the closure of IIASA’s “Radiation Safety of the Biosphere”
Program that started in 1995. The goal of the Program was to assess the world
radiation legacy after the end of the Cold War. As such, it was a typical IIASA
program: interdisciplinary, independent, and involving East–West collaboration.
The Program aimed to investigate the accumulation over the past 50 years of
vast quantities of radioactive waste and numerous radioactively contaminated sites
resulting from the production and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as from nu-
clear accidents, in several countries, particularly Russia and the United States.
While it was not possible for the Program to provide a complete inventory of all
sites and remediation options, it did select the most signiﬁcant examples. Studies
of Russian sites, a comparison of these to similar sites in the United States, and
ongoing studies in China helped to provide a greater perspective on the problem.
The Program carried out one of the ﬁrst unclassiﬁed studies of the local prob-
lems related to radioactive contamination in areas of the former Soviet Union. This
led to the publication of the book Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex,
which presented the ﬁrst authoritative and detailed information available outside
the former Soviet Union about the nuclear inheritance of the past half-century.
The Radiation Safety of the Biosphere Program also attracted the attention of
policy makers to the problem of the nuclear legacy in urban areas. The directorate
of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow requested IIASA to start an international
study to assess the radiological risk and resulting public impact from past waste
management practices at the Institute.
Responding to this request, the Radiation Program performed a scoping analy-
sis of the environmental and social impacts of the radioactive waste disposal sites
on the premises of the Kurchatov Institute which, because of the growth of the city
of Moscow over the last 50 years, had actually become a part of downtown Moscow.
This case study, which is reported in this Research Report, is an illustration of the
general problem of the nuclear legacy in urban areas.
With this report IIASA ﬁnalizes a successful program, which was not only an
example of the Institute’s collaborative work across the East–West political divide
but also of IIASA’s commitment to addressing issues of global change.
Leen Hordijk
Director
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Since the ﬁnal quarter of the twentieth century there has been a signiﬁcant growth
in urbanization throughout the world. It is expected that by 2015 half of the world’s
population will live in big cities and about 0.5 billion will inhabit megacities, each
of more than 10 million people. Such megacities will include Beijing, Buenos
Aires, Cairo, Calcutta, Dacca, Lagos, Mexico City, Moscow, Mumbai, New York
City, Shanghai, and Tokyo.
The expanding residential areas produced by this urbanization and by the
growth of megacities have resulted in waste disposal facilities now being located in
densely populated urban areas. This represents a global problem in that past waste
management facilities and practices are a potentially serious threat to the public
now and in the future. Such waste disposal sites can be of chemical, industrial,
municipal, or mixed origin. Many sites are now obsolete, and in many cases waste
is stored under inadequate conditions, with potentially negative consequences for
people living close to the sites.
Obviously, there is a need not only to prevent any direct impact on those living
in the immediate vicinity of a waste disposal site, but also to rehabilitate and make
good areas that are of value to the city.
The location of radioactive waste storage sites in what are now urban areas is
an extreme example of this phenomenon. There are a number of reasons why the
nuclear legacy in the urban environment has only recently come to the attention of
environmental specialists and to the population as a whole. The ﬁrst reason is that
the urban nuclear legacy in countries with developed nuclear industries is less than
1% of the total nuclear legacy. Moreover, it was natural, after the end of the Cold
War, for studies of the global nuclear legacy to focus mainly on nuclear weapons
production sites, which contain the vast majority of accumulated radioactive waste.
As a rule, for secrecy reasons, these sites were commissioned in scarcely populated
areas and most of them remain in areas of low population. Only later was it widely
recognized that, although the nuclear legacy in the urban environment was a small
fraction of the total, other factors, such as urban population density and proximity
to operational or obsolete nuclear facilities, increase the importance of this legacy
and perhaps even give it priority in terms of social considerations.
xi
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Results
Section 1, Generic Problems of the Nuclear Legacy in Urbanized Areas, can be
considered as an extended introduction to the case study of Moscow.
It describes the nuclear legacy in the urban environment that was created mainly
by nuclear facilities, such as experimental nuclear reactors for research and testing
and educational centers, built between the 1940s and 1970s. Most of these nuclear
centers were in the vicinity of big cities and are now within the city limits. After
decades of operation the research reactors of the nuclear centers have produced
millions of Curies of radioactivity in spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. As,
in many cases, the spent fuel of the research reactors was “non-standard,” it could
not be reprocessed by standard reprocessing technologies and even required special
storage conditions. In some cases this spent nuclear fuel, or a substantial part of it,
is stored at the nuclear center itself (i.e., in the host city).
An additional input to this legacy is the radioactive waste generated during the
operation of research reactors, their decommissioning, etc. The radioactive waste
was often put into so-called temporary storage at the nuclear center sites. The
radiation protection norms when these storage sites were created were not always
as strict as those in place now. Moreover, in many cases they were not even properly
implemented, either because of the nuclear arms race or just through negligence.
Nuclear facilities in the urban environment are not only a source of radioactive
waste, often stored under inadequate conditions at the facility site; they also create
dangerous targets as they have no protection against possible plane crashes or mis-
sile attacks. Recent terrorist attacks in Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States highlight the risk posed by/to urban facilities that contain radioactive
waste or spent nuclear fuel and that may be damaged in accidents or targeted in
attacks. This topic is receiving more and more attention from the nuclear scientiﬁc
community.
The report analyzes world statistics concerning nuclear research reactors. It
concludes that 60% of the world’s research reactors are more than 30 years old and
that many are in, or rapidly approaching, crisis conditions. It states that there is
a lack of attention to decommissioning by political decision makers. This often
results in passive decommissioning strategies and, in the longer term, a variety of
safety concerns.
The former practice of creating nuclear centers in or near large cities can easily
be traced throughout the world. The French nuclear center Sacle is about 20 km
from the center of Paris, and nuclear institutions in, for example, Berlin, Budapest,
Grenoble, London, San Diego, and Soﬁa are in a similar situation. Nevertheless,
the Moscow case seems to some extent to be extraordinary because of the rush
nuclear program to achieve nuclear parity with the United States that began in the
city after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima.
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Section 3, on the Moscow case study of the nuclear legacy, compiles and gener-
alizes results from the Moscow case study carried out by the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Central European University, with
the cooperation of Russian institutions of the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy,
the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Research Center-Kurchatov
Institute (RRC-KI).
As a result of the intensive development of nuclear science and technology in
the former Soviet Union (FSU), Moscow and the Moscow Region have inherited
several nuclear centers and institutions that possess nuclear installations, such as
research reactors, radiochemical laboratories, and thousands of radiation sources,
as well as—almost inevitably—sites for the temporary storage of spent fuel and/or
radioactive waste.
Analysis of the statistics for nuclear facilities in Moscow and the Moscow Re-
gion shows that priority should be given to the nuclear legacy of RRC-KI because of
the amount of radioactivity accumulated at the site and its proximity to the densely
populated areas of downtown Moscow.
RRC-KI is the largest and oldest nuclear center in this megacity. Currently, it
possesses more than nine research reactors (some of which are still in operation),
17 critical assemblies, a hot laboratory for materials testing, spent fuel storage sites,
and, in particular, temporary radioactive waste storage sites, with the inevitable soil
and groundwater contamination around them.
The RRC-KI directorate asked the IIASA Radiation Safety of the Biosphere
(RAD) project to launch an international study to assess the radiological risk and
resulting public impact from past waste management practices at RRC-KI. In re-
sponse, IIASA asked the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (TACIS) program of the European Commission to subsidize an IIASA
study to evaluate information on the history of disposal at RRC-KI and to perform
a scoping analyses of the environmental and social impacts of the radioactive waste
disposal sites there (which have actually become part of downtown Moscow be-
cause of Moscow’s growth in the past 50 years). In parallel, IIASA applied to the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow to subsidize the
gathering of information needed to assess the actual and potential implications of
that nuclear legacy.
In 2003 the project received a TACIS-Bistro grant to perform a study entitled
“Impacts of Radioactive Waste Storage at the Territory of the RRC-Kurchatov In-
stitute in Moscow,” with a major focus on the evaluation of radioactivity migration
from the storage site of RRC-KI via run-off water.
In parallel with the IIASA activity, in 2002 RRC-KI made the ﬁrst practical
steps toward rehabilitating contaminated objects within its grounds (the so-called
Rehabilitation Project). Some of the results of this project were presented at the
International Symposium on Radwaste Management ’03.
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Then, in 2004 IIASA proposed an International Workshop “Solutions to Secu-
rity Concerns about the Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War that Remains in Urban
Environments.” The workshop was held at the Vanderbilt University (Tennessee,
United States), on 14–17 November 2004, and inter alia critically discussed the
results of these Moscow studies.
Section 3, on the Moscow case study of the nuclear legacy, describes the ma-
terials collected within the studies listed above and summarizes the ﬁndings. Data
on the nuclear facilities of RRC-KI responsible for the nuclear legacy have been
collected. They show that spent nuclear fuel storage units now contain over 1,300
spent fuel assemblies of various designs, with a total radioactivity of about 2 MCi.
The spent fuel differs in terms of its chemical composition, its degree of ura-
nium enrichment, and the protective cladding used. Moreover, being in many cases
“non-standard,” it could not be reprocessed by standard reprocessing technology
and even requires special storage conditions. Non-standard spent nuclear fuel con-
stitutes 60% of the total amount, of which 10% is damaged to varying extents.
The time required to transport the spent nuclear fuel of RRC-KI to the Urals or
the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Combine in Siberia is estimated to be not
less than seven years. This estimate relies on technical, ﬁnancial, and political
(decision-making) conditions all being favorable, which is highly questionable at
the moment.
Another important component of the RRC-KI nuclear legacy is radioactive
waste in temporary storage places. Most of this was stored in the 1950 and 1960s
without due attention being given to the environmental consequences. The result is
contamination of both the surface layer of the site and the groundwater under the
site.
Living close to such “neighbors” inevitably gives Moscow’s inhabitants and
visitors cause for concern about the environmental security of their living condi-
tions. Indeed,
• The closest residential building area is only about 100 m from the RRC-KI
radioactive waste storage site.
• The area between the inner concrete wall of the storage site and an adjacent
section of the outer brick wall of RRC-KI is actually occupied by municipal
car parking. Though access to it is limited to people parking their cars, public
access is not really restricted.
• The municipal road along the outer wall of RRC-KI passes at a distance of
several meters from the wall. In the rush hour up to 3,000 vehicles per hour use
this road.
This report summarizes the results of the collection, analysis, and collation of cur-
rently available data regarding the radioactive source term at the radioactive waste
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disposal area within the main boundaries of the Kurchatov Institute. It also gives the
environmental characteristics and human patterns necessary to model radionuclide
migration within and out of the site.
The basic information regarding surface contamination at the storage site used
in the study is a gamma radiation survey of the site surface made in 10 m steps at
a distance of 1–1.5 m from the surface. This provides a ﬁeld of exposure dose rate
that typically varies from 30 μR/h to 3000 μR/h and that in some places is even
higher than 3000 μR/h.
The maps of surface contamination with 137Cs and 90Sr were created by a recal-
culation of the exposure dose rate. The procedure is based on 1) the measurement
of 137Cs concentration in samples taken from nine points at the site and 2) an aver-
age ratio of 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations measured in seven samples taken from
different parts of the site. Although these statistics are not sufﬁcient for a site with
very heterogeneous contamination, they will serve as a ﬁrst approximation.
Another uncertain parameter is the hydraulic conductivity of the soil. The range
of values now available for this parameter is extremely wide. We emphasize that
these data are based on different methodologies: laboratory sample testing, ﬁeld
study of water pumping from observation wells, rate of restoration of created de-
pression zone, etc. No comparative analysis of these results was possible because
of the limited information regarding measurement details. After careful discussion
of this uncertainty, it was recommended that we use an expert judgment, namely,
that the “urbanosem” soil type is, on average, similar to the soil at the site that is
covered in grass.
In general, analysis of the data collected on the environmental and radiological
characteristics of the site conclusively shows that these are far from being com-
prehensive. In these circumstances, run-off modeling was done to give a scoping
analysis rather than a site-speciﬁc analysis. The scoping analysis focused on an
evaluation of the scale of and possible limits to the redistribution and washout phe-
nomena; it was done to provide an initial insight into the seriousness of the situation
with regard to run-off transfer and to provide recommendations for further experi-
mental studies needed to reduce the uncertainties. Consequently, the study, while
hopefully scientiﬁcally rigorous, was based more upon consequence analysis and
general principles than on very rigorous site-speciﬁc features.
The choice of run-off scenarios examined within the study was made on the
basis of the analysis of three major factors with an impact on the outcome of the
modeling, namely:
• Precipitation rate.
• Soil properties within the site.
• How good a mechanical barrier the inner wall of the site provides against run-
off transfer to outside the radioactive waste storage site.
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Variations of these factors and their combination are shown using 16 different sce-
narios. These considerations for the run-off scenarios were applied to simulate the
run-off erosion. The Limburg Soil Erosion Model (LISEM), a physically based
hydrologic and soil erosion model developed at Utrecht University (Netherlands)
within the framework of the European Union (EU) Spartacus Project, was applied
with small modiﬁcations to account for the peculiarities of the RRC-KI waste stor-
age site.
There are different approaches to evaluating the risk of radioactivity transfer to
outside the allotment area, for instance, a comparison with the acceptable annual
dose limit currently ﬁxed by the ofﬁcial legislative and/or normative documents,
an estimate of the extra lifetime risk caused by exposure, etc. As indicated above,
run-off modeling was done to provide a scoping analysis. We thus decided that it
was not reasonable to discuss the various aspects of the criteria used in each case or
whether the dose limit was likely to change in future, but chose instead the simplest
approach: a comparison with the current ofﬁcial dose rate limit. The data presented
in this report on radionuclide contamination allow specialists to recalculate the risk
in other terms, if they wish.
Uncertainty about the dose calculation is predominantly caused by uncertain-
ties in the run-off erosion calculation. The run-off model (LISEM) used in the study
is a physically based simulation model. Of course, it does apply some empirical
relationships to describing the physical processes that underlie the model. All the
papers we referred to conclude that the LISEM discharge estimate agrees with that
observed to within 15% and that the uncertainty in the input parameters is of greater
importance in assessing the ﬁnal results. That is why we give the results of mod-
eling 16 different scenarios that include variations of the major parameters within
their uncertainty limits, evaluated by expert judgment. Actually, these 16 scenarios
constitute a kind of sensitivity analysis and must produce a feeling for the range of
variations in output data. Therefore, the maximum calculated dose should be con-
sidered as an upper limit obtained within the scoping analysis. In other words, it
demonstrates that the approach is intentionally skewed toward overstating exposure
and dose.
Despite all the limitations that have been introduced into the modeling, the re-
sults deﬁnitely indicate that the potential implications of the run-off transfer of ra-
dioactivity from the RRC-KI waste storage site cannot be ignored for the following
reasons:
• Given the current condition of the inner wall around the storage site, which acts
as a physical barrier to the path of the run-off water, and given the lack of any
speciﬁc drainage system at the site, the site topography does not prevent run-off
washout from the site.
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• Run-off modeling showed that under unfavorable meteorologic conditions (pe-
riods of lengthy drizzle followed by a downpour of the maximum intensity ob-
served in Moscow), the run-off water could transfer contaminated soil particles
outside the perimeter of the storage site and further down to the municipal car
park located between the inner wall of the storage site and the adjacent section
of the outer wall of RRC-KI. This results in surface contamination of dozens of
kBq/m2.
• Such radioactivity in the washout will not signiﬁcantly increase the dose uptake
by critical groups of the population. However, even for the most conservative
scenario (up to 20% of the established dose limit), the increase in radiation
background outside the RRC-KI boundaries may cause public anxiety, espe-
cially if washed-out radioactivity reaches the city street.
• Last, but not least, is the potential redistribution of soil contaminants within
the area of the storage site (about 100 m2 could have contamination twice that
before the run-off event). This should be taken into account when planning the
site rehabilitation program.
Conclusion
As the radiation background in areas adjacent to the RRC-KI radioactive waste
storage site can be noticeably increased by the run-off events, the ﬁrst conclusion
is obvious: these local areas need to be under systematic dosimetric control.
Next, to reduce the uncertainty caused by incomplete source terms and environ-
mental characteristics, further experimental study to enable site-speciﬁc modeling
is advisable.
As for speciﬁc recommendations to reduce the potential run-off washout, the
following points should be considered:
• First of all, the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site should have a special
drainage system, designed to intercept and control run-off waters at the site.
• Repair work to the inner wall around the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage
site, if deemed necessary, should be carried out during the winter months.
• A number of potential mechanical methods to reduce the run-off transfer to
outside the storage site should be carefully evaluated and the optimum method
or methods to achieve this should be chosen. As an example we list the obvious
ones below:
◦ Compaction of the soil to reduce the erosion rate could be considered.
There are a number of technical ways of accomplishing this.
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◦ Chemical stabilization, in which chemicals like cement and polymers re-
tain the soil particles in place, could be considered.
• The need to use international experience to solve technological problems
caused by radioactive contamination is evident.
To cope with the social aspects of the problem, we recommend as a priority the set-
ting up of “round table” meetings to improve the exchange of views between social
groups living near RRC-KI and the RRC-KI administration. We also recommend
that these meetings should include: 1) communication with international experts;
2) provision of up-to-date information about the situation; and 3) information on
how other countries have coped with contamination caused by nuclear activities in
the urban environment. Such comparisons could help to identify the common and
different aspects of coping with the radiation legacy in big cities and to work out
recommendations for further improvements.
Another recommendation is to evaluate the role of the gradual accumulation of
radionuclides through repeated wash-off events over a long period of time. This
point could be of speciﬁc importance in planning a remediation program, as it is
virtually impossible and even less reasonable to remediate to a “zero” level of con-
tamination. Thus, an acceptable level of residual contamination that should pro-
vide no “substantial” release from the site for a long period of time (say, hundreds
of years) should be examined and deﬁned. We therefore recommend that run-off
studies be extended to evaluate the cumulative, long-term consequences of run-off
transfer from a site with residual contamination.
The current study focused on run-off from natural events, but below the storage
site is a complicated network of different pipelines, including a municipal rainwater
pipe that carries rainwater accumulated from an area of about 400 ha (4×106 m2) to
the Moscow River. This is why, in addition to the modeling performed, the effects
of possible infrastructural accidents (e.g., heavy run-off resulting from a failure
of the rainwater pipe and consequent dispersal of water on the site) are worthy of
special study.
Besides natural run-off events, there are several pathways for radionuclide mi-
gration from the radioactive waste storage site to the city, namely, migration with
groundwaters, direct resuspension of dust from the site, and air transfer by strong
winds. The contribution of these processes to the exposure of critical groups of city
people should be a subject of further analysis. Such a study is of particular impor-
tance as remediation measures at the site have already started, including excavation
of the contaminated soil and its separation into fractions of different contamination
levels. Such operations create the pressure to implement this further study without
delay.
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Other contaminated areas in RRC-KI not indicated by the Russian partner of
this study, for example, the enclave located on the bank of the Moscow River, also
deserve attention and analysis.
The report concludes that countries with similar problems of a nuclear legacy in
the urban environment could beneﬁt from sharing their experience and cooperating
in this ﬁeld.

1
Generic Problems of the Nuclear Legacy
in Urbanized Areas
1.1 Growing urbanization and waste disposal facilities
In the last quarter of the twentieth century there was a signiﬁcant growth in ur-
banization throughout the world. It is expected that by 2015 half of the world’s
population will live in big cities and about 0.5 billion in megacities, each with
more than 10 million people. Such megacities will include Beijing, Buenos Aires,
Cairo, Calcutta, Dacca, Lagos, Mexico City, Moscow, Mumbai, New York City,
Shanghai, and Tokyo.
The growth that has taken place in Dacca is an extreme example of the devel-
opment of a megacity. In 1950 its population was 0.4 million; in 2000 it was 12.5
million; by 2015 it is expected to be 17.3 million.
As a result of these expanding residential areas produced by urbanization and
the growth of megacities, some facilities built years ago for the disposal of chemi-
cal, industrial, municipal, or mixed waste are now in densely populated urban areas.
This represents a global problem in that past waste management practices could se-
riously affect current and future public health. Many of the sites are now obsolete,
and in many cases waste is stored under inadequate conditions, with potentially
negative consequences for those living close to the sites.
Obviously, there is a need not only to prevent any direct impact on people living
in the direct vicinity of the waste disposal site but also to rehabilitate valuable land
needed by the city.
The location of radioactive waste storage sites in what are now urban areas is
an extreme example of this phenomenon.
1.2 Radioactive waste in urban environments as a part of
the global nuclear legacy
The problem of radioactive waste storage has its genesis in the global nuclear legacy
of the past 50 years and was created by the global nuclear industry. Until now,
1
2assessments of the global nuclear legacy focused mainly on nuclear weapons pro-
duction sites, as they contain the vast majority of accumulated radioactive waste.
As a rule, these sites were commissioned in scarcely populated areas for secrecy
reasons, and most remain in areas of low population.
This part of the world’s nuclear legacy was the subject of a rather detailed ex-
amination after the end of the Cold War. Summaries of these studies are presented
in US Department of Energy (1997) for US legacies, Egorov et al. (2000) for those
in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and in Pan Ziqiang et al. (1996) for those in
China.
The nuclear legacy in urban environments and densely populated areas results
mainly from nuclear research, testing, and educational centers created between the
1940s and 1970s in the vicinity of big cities. The centers provided a scientiﬁc and
technological base for the development of nuclear power and the nuclear industry.
For countries in the nuclear club, these centers mainly worked to develop a nu-
clear weapons program. They have (or had) nuclear research reactors, which were
the main engines driving the development of nuclear power, basic nuclear science,
materials development, radioisotope production for medicine and industry, and the
education and training of scientists and engineers.
Initially located in the suburbs of cities, they became a part of downtown ar-
eas as a result of growing urbanization. After decades of operation the research
reactors of the nuclear centers produced millions of Curies of radioactivity in spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Being, in many cases, “non-standard,” the spent
fuel of the research reactors could not be reprocessed by standard reprocessing
technologies and even required special storage conditions. As a result, the spent
nuclear fuel from research reactors was often stored at the nuclear center site (e.g.,
in the host city). Naturally, some research reactors used to test new types of fuel,
coolant, and other reactor innovations had operational problems which frequently
produced high-level radioactive waste containing ﬁssion products and also resulted
in radioactivity being deposited on construction materials. At the beginning of the
nuclear era (say, the 1950s and 1960s), these radioactive wastes were often kept at
the nuclear center sites, in so-called temporary radioactive waste storage. Needless
to say, the radiation protection norms at that time were not as strict as those in place
now and, in many cases, were not even properly implemented, either because of the
rush to win the nuclear arms race or just negligence.
This legacy has only recently come to the attention of environmental specialists
and the population in general.
31.3 Why radioactive waste in urban environments is a
serious problem
The radioactive waste generated by research reactors is only a small fraction of the
total amount of radioactive waste generated by the nuclear industry. This is true
at least in the countries of the nuclear club. For instance, in Russia this fraction is
about 1% (Egorov et al., 2000). This is perhaps why the nuclear legacy of research
reactors in the urban environment has not as yet received the attention it deserves.
However, even a preliminary look at the problem indicates the possibly seri-
ous impact of radioactive waste storage in an urban environment because of the
proximity—in some cases, about 100 m—of nearby residential areas (Novikov et
al., 2003).
Indeed, the collective radiation dose caused by a hypothetical accident with a
radioactive source term is proportional to the product of the quantity of the source
term and the population density of the area over which the radioactivity spreads.
Thus, in an urban environment with a population density of about 102 that of a
rural area, a source term that is only 1% that of the rural area will have the same
impact. The ﬁgures are even more impressive for individual radiation doses.
The distance from the radioactive source term in urban areas might be hundreds
of meters, while the distance of a safe protective zone around plutonium production
sites or spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities (where the majority of radioactive
waste has been accumulated) is several kilometers. In the historical example of the
Kystim accident in the Urals in 1957, when a tank with liquid radioactive waste
exploded, 90% of all the radioactivity released fell in the vicinity of the tank, while
only the remaining 10% formed a radioactive cloud that was responsible for long-
distance transfer (see, for instance, IIASA, 1996).
In countries that have no developed nuclear industry, but have nuclear research
centers with research reactors, the nuclear legacy associated with the research re-
actors is dominant.
In addition to this legacy, many radioactive sources from state and private in-
dustrial facilities that produce or use radioisotopes are in an urban environment
where many orphan radioactive sources and contaminated spots have occurred. The
location of these sources is frequently unknown.
1.4 General threat from residual radioactive waste in
urbanized areas
In the same way that current nuclear use can cause the accidental release of ra-
dioactivity and result in environmental contamination, so residual radioactive waste
4in urbanized areas poses a potential threat to the nearby population and environ-
ment. The pathways are actually the same (e.g., air transfer of radioactivity after
atmospheric release, resuspension from contaminated soils into the atmosphere and
further deposition, run-off from contaminated areas, and surface water and ground-
water contamination). Natural events (for example, earthquakes, tornado, ﬂooding)
could also initiate an accidental release, as could the degradation of engineering
barriers that protect the environment from contact with residual radioactive waste.
A speciﬁc threat may emerge because of orphan radioactive sources and con-
taminated spots in the urban environment. If laypeople occasionally obtain such
sources and misuse them, as happened in the 1990s in Brazil, the consequences can
be serious.
1.5 The nuclear and/or radiation threat from terrorism
Nuclear facilities in urban environments not only represent a source of radioactive
waste which is often stored under inadequate conditions at the facility site; they are
also potentially dangerous targets as they have no protection against plane crashes
or missile attacks. Recent terrorist attacks in Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and United States highlight the risk of urban facilities containing radioactive waste
or spent nuclear fuel being targeted in attacks. This topic has already come to the
attention of the nuclear scientiﬁc community. Currently, the following speciﬁc four
aspects of such terrorism are considered in the open literature (see, for instance,
Ferguson et al., 2003).
• Theft and subsequent detonation of an intact nuclear device;
• Theft of ﬁssile material and detonation of an improvised nuclear device;
• Sabotage of nuclear facility;
• Theft of nuclear material or waste and its use in a radiological dispersal device.
The nuclear legacy in the urban environment may be most “useful” as a source
for the last two aspects. International terrorists can bring radiological dispersal de-
vices into different countries by multiple routes and methods; and, of course, an
insider could attempt to acquire nuclear materials to use in radiological dispersal
devices or sabotage a nuclear facility in the urban environment. For instance, re-
search reactors in universities and other civilian institutions might be targeted. The
readiness of terrorists to give up their lives in order to conduct terrorist acts must
change our approaches to countermeasures.
As for the second aspect listed above (theft of ﬁssile material), it was realized
only recently that research reactors using highly enriched uranium are of special
concern in the light of terrorist activity and non-proliferation efforts. Many have
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Figure 1.1. World’s research reactors that are operational.
appealed for a high priority to be placed on the full decommissioning of such facil-
ities or at least that they be converted into reactors that use low-enriched uranium
as fuel. In some cases there is a noticeable reluctance to follow this path. For in-
stance, if such reactors are used within a research program to develop fast-breeder
reactors, decommissioning might threaten the program, even if the reactors with
highly enriched uranium are converted to low-enriched-uranium mode.
In November 2004 the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), and Vander-
bilt University conducted the workshop “Urban Radiological Security” (Kosson et
al., 2004). The workshop emphasized, inter alia, the need for an internationally
coherent and comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon.
1.6 World statistics on nuclear research reactors
The total number of nuclear research reactors commissioned throughout the world
during the second half of the twentieth century is about 650 (IAEA Database,
2004). Of this number, half are still operational in 58 countries. Russia and the
United States have about 20% each, 30% are in industrial countries, and the re-
maining 30% are in the developing world (see Figure 1.1).
As can be seen in Figure 1.2, one-third of operational research reactors have
more than 1 MW of power, and 4% have power comparable, for instance, with that
of a nuclear submarine.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the age distribution of the research reactors in operation.
It can be seen that 60% are more than 30 years old, of which one-third are 40–50
years old. Such statistics certainly give cause for safety concerns.
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Figure 1.2. Power distribution of the world’s research reactors.
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Figure 1.3. Age of the world’s research reactors.
In recent years the original mission of some nuclear facilities has been accom-
plished or has become obsolete. Tight budgets and changing priorities have caused
some governments to cut back on baseline support. Moreover, the stagnation or
even decline of nuclear power use in many industrialized countries has reduced the
demand for nuclear education and training. Furthermore, worldwide computeri-
zation has opened the door to the wide application of simulators for some of the
training of nuclear power plant operators that was previously provided by research
reactors. Thus, the large number of research reactors currently in operation clearly
exceeds the worldwide demand for nuclear science research, reactor services, and
training. Old research reactors will therefore continue to be shut down in increased
numbers. As for those research reactors that it is planned to continue operating,
a strategy must be worked out for their long-term sustainability, in terms of both
ﬁnding customers for their services and providing an acceptable level of safety.
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Figure 1.4. World’s research reactors that are shut down but not decommissioned.
More of these shut-down reactors have to be decommissioned. As Figure 1.4
shows, there are greater delays in decommissioning shut-down reactors than in the
shutdown process itself. The reason seems, in some cases, to be the lack of required
infrastructure, as little attention was given in early planning to the decommissioning
of research reactors.
1.7 Specific problems of decommissioning research
reactors
Unlike nuclear power plant reactors, research reactors come in a large variety of
designs. The main difference is that the fuel elements of research reactors were
specially designed and manufactured to explore the different conceptual approaches
that emerged during the ﬁrst decades of the nuclear era. Some research reactors
were even designed to include such exotic fuels as liquid nuclear fuel—for instance,
water solution, micro-particle suspension, or molten salt (Novikov et al., 1990), or
gas fuel in the form of UF6 (Kikoin et al., 1958). As for solid fuel elements, these
differ in terms of their chemical compounds, the degree of uranium enrichment,
their cladding material, geometry, etc. The fuel elements of nuclear power plants,
unlike those of research reactors, were manufactured for only a number of selected
approaches.
The variety of designs for research reactors poses special challenges for de-
commissioning that require speciﬁc techniques and infrastructure. Furthermore,
research reactors present particular difﬁculties at the back end of the fuel cycle.
These include the need for the special management of experimental and exotic fuel
elements with no reprocessing routes, fuel elements that failed during irradiation in
reactors, and fuel assemblies that subsequently corroded in wet storage. In some of
8the worst cases, fuel assemblies completely disintegrated during experiments and
the circulating coolant spread ﬁssion products to the corresponding loops with de-
position on the inner surface of the conﬁnement. This produced radioactive waste
that was frequently stored either at the site of the research reactor or at a special
storage site within the research center.
2
Nuclear Facilities in the Moscow
Megalopolis
This section summarizes data on the nuclear facilities in Moscow and the Moscow
Region and illustrates how many and what kind of nuclear facilities there are. Such
facilities created the nuclear legacy in the Moscow megalopolis and in some cases
are also part of this legacy. More speciﬁc attention is given to research reactors
in the Russian Research Center-Kurchatov Institute (RRC-KI), the biggest nuclear
enterprise in the area.
2.1 General review
The nuclear research centers of the FSU are used for studies in the ﬁelds of nuclear
physics, solid state physics, radiation materials science, radioisotope production,
and other tasks. Most were constructed in the 1940s and 1950s, and the main facil-
ities became operational in the late 1960s. As a rule, these centers were complex
systems; that is, they involved not only the research reactors, but also “hot” cells for
materials tests, research laboratories, radwaste handling facilities, etc. The research
reactors installed in the nuclear centers are very diverse in their design, power level,
materials used, and operation mode. Brief characteristics of the research reactors
are given in Table 2.1 (Egorov et al., 2000).
In addition to research reactors as generators of radioactive waste, thousands of
orphan radioactive sources and contaminated spots, originating from state indus-
trial facilities that produced or used radioisotopes, occur in the Moscow urban en-
vironment. The location of these sources is frequently unknown. For instance, the
Chief of the Moscow Division of the Ministry of Emergency Situations reported at
the Vanderbilt workshop (Kosson et al., 2004) that 1,500 previously unknown con-
taminated spots have been discovered in Moscow and that the rate of “discovery”
(currently, about 90 spots per year) is proportional to the efforts to ﬁnd them (i.e.,
discovery is far from complete).
9
10
Table 2.1a. Research reactors in Moscow and the Moscow Region.
Date of
reaching Power (MW)
Location, criticality After
Owner, Fyel type (enrichment, and shut- recon-
Department Reactor type composition, form) down Design struction Application
Russian F-1 Natural uranium (metal, 1946 0.024 Calibration of neuron detectors, testing
Research (uranium–graphite) UO2 and U2O8) of new ionization chambers (ICs),
Center- Uranium of 2% Investigation of IC characteristics,
Kurchatov enrichment Certiﬁcation of neutron detectors
Institutea VVR-2 Uranium of 2% enrich- 1954 0.3 3 Nuclear physics investigations
(tank type, ment, UO2 + Al (1983)
water–water) Uranium of 36% enrich-
ment, UAl alloy
10 mm diameter rods
RTF Uranium of 10–90% 1952 10 20 Tests of reactor materials, fuel
(channel-type enrichment (1962) rods, and fuel assemblies for
graphite moderator) U + Mg, UO2 + Mg, power and research reactors
UO2 + Al, tubes Nuclear physics investigations
IRT Uranium of 10–90% 1957 2 8 Nuclear physics
(pool-type) enrichment (1979) Physics of solid-state studies
UO2 + Al, UAl alloy, Neutron-activation analysis
pipes Isotope production
IIN-3M Uranium of 90% 1972 0.01 – Nuclear physics investigations
Gidra enrichment statio- Neutron activation analysis
(homogeneous Water solution of nary; Fuel rod testing under non-stationary
water solution) UO2SO4 2 × 104 conditions
impulse
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Table 2.1b. Research reactors in Moscow and the Moscow Region (continued).
Date of
reaching Power (MW)
Location, criticality After
Owner, Fuel type (enrichment, and shut- recon-
Department Reactor type composition, form) down Design struction Application
Russian Argus Uranium of 90% enrich- 1981 0.02 – Neutron radiography
Research (homogeneous richment (water solution Neutron activation analysis
Center- water solution) of UO2SO4) Production of isotopes and nuclear ﬁlters
Kurchatov OR Uranium of 10% enrich- 1989 0.3 – Investigations and tests of neutron
Institute (tank-type, ment (UO2 + Al) and gamma radiation shields
(cont’d) water–water) Uranium of 36% enrich- Testing of radiation stability of
ment (UAl alloy) equipment for nuclear installations
Romashka Uranium of 90% enrich- 1964 0.04 – Investigation of nuclear power units
(homogeneous) ment (UC2) (1966) for direct energy conversion
Topaz-2 Uranium of 90% enrich- 1973 0.1 – Investigation of space nuclear
(channel-type, ment (UO2) (1986) power units
U–Zr hydride)
SF-1 – 1972 100 W – Investigation of neutron physics of
Critical test facility water–water reactor core
(uranium–water)
SF-3 Uranium of 90% enrich- 1979 100 W – Investigation of neutron physics of
Critical test facility ment (UZr alloy) water–water reactor core
(uranium–water) Uranium of 21% enrich-
ment (UO2)
SF-5 Uranium of 25% and 36% 1990 100 W – Studies of reactor physics of
Critical test facility enrichment (inter- uranium hydride–zirconium fuel
(U–Zr hydride) metallic composition
12Table 2.1c. Research reactors in Moscow and the Moscow Region (continued).
Date of
reaching Power (MW)
Location, criticality After
Owner, Fuel type (enrichment, and shut- recon-
Department Reactor type composition, form) down Design struction Application
Russian Kvant Uranium of 90% enrich- 1990 1000 W – Investigation of neutron physics of
Research Critical test facility ment (uranium inter- water–water reactor cores
Center- (uranium–water) metallic composition)
Kurchatov Critical test facility Uranium of 90% enrich- 1971 100 W – Simulation of and critical experiments
Institute modeling of the richment (UAl alloy) with MR reactor core
(cont’d) MR reactor Investigation of reactor loop
(water–beryllium) experiment parameters
UG Uranium of 2% enrich- 1965 – – Critical experiment and physical
Critical test facility ment (UO2) studies of uranium–graphite
(channel type, channel-type reactor core
uranium–graphite)
Critical test facility Uranium of 2% enrich- 1981 25 W – Critical experiments and physics
of RBMK reactor ment (UO2) study of RBMK core
(channel-type,
uranium–graphite)
ASTRA Uranium of 21% enrich- 1981 100 W – Critical experiments and physics
Critical test facility ment (UO2) study of uranium–graphite reactor
(uranium–graphite) core
EFIR-2M Uranium of 90% enrich- 1973 100 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Critical test facility ment (UO2 + Al) physics study of water–water
(uranium–water) reactor core
MAYAK UAl alloy 1967 10 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Critical test facility physics study of water–water
(uranium–water) reactor core
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Table 2.1d. Research reactors in Moscow and the Moscow Region (continued).
Date of
reaching Power (MW)
Location, criticality After
Owner, Fyel type (enrichment, and shut- recon-
Department Reactor type composition, form) down Design struction Application
Russian NARCIS M2 Uranium of 96% enrich- 1983 10 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Research (U–Zr hydrides) ment (UO2) physics study of reactor with
Center- U–Zr hydrides fuel
Kurchatov GROG Uranium of 7% and 10% 1980 100 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Institute Critical test facility enrichment (UO2) physics study of uranium–graphite
(cont’d) (uranium–graphite) reactor core
P Uranium of 2.0, 2.4, 3, 1987 200 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Critical test facility 3.6, 4.4, 6.5, and 10% physics study of water–water
(uranium–water) enrichment (UO2) reactor core
ISKRA Uranium of 90% enrich- 1996 199 W – Critical experiments and neutron
Critical test facility richment (UAl alloy, physics study of reactor cores
(uranium–water) uranium nitride) of different composition
Institute of TVR Uranium of 80% enrich- 1949 0.5 2.5 Nuclear and solid state physics
Theoretical (heavy water ment (UO2 + Al, (1986) studies
and reactor) tubes) Neutron physics
Experimental Isotope production
Physicsb Experiments on neutron scattering
Radiation tests
Critical test facility Natural uranium 1976 1000 W – Critical experiments and neutron
(uranium–heavy physics study of heavy-water-
water) moderated and cooled reactor core
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Table 2.1e. Research reactors in Moscow and the Moscow Region (continued).
Date of
reaching Power (MW)
Location, criticality After
Owner, Fuel type (enrichment, and shut- recon-
Department Reactor type composition, form) down Design struction Application
Moscow IRT Uranium of 90% enrich- 1967 2 2.5 Reactor physics and engineering
Institute for (pool-type) ment (UO2 + Al) studies of solid state physics
Engineering Material irradiation
Physicsc Radiation physics of semi-
conductors and dielectrics
Nuclear spectrometry
Research IRV-M1 Uranium of 90% enrich- 1974 2 Radiation testing of electronic
Instrumentation (pool-type) ment (UAl alloys, 1990 devices
Institute (NIIP)d tubes)
aRussian Research Center-Kurchatov Institute, Kurchatov Square, Moscow, 123182, Russian Federation.
bInstitute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, B.Cheryomu-shkinskaya, 25, Moscow, 117259, Russian Federation.
cMoscow Institute for Engineering Physics, Ministry for General and Professional Education, Kashirskoye-shosse, 31, Moscow, 115409, Russian Federa-
tion.
dResearch Instrumentation Institute (NIIP), Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, Lytkarino, Moscow Region, 140061, Russian Federation.
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Figure 2.1. RFT reactor. Left: longitudinal section. Right: cross-section.
2.2 Research reactors in the Russian Research Center-
Kurchatov Institute
It is clear from Table 2.1 that the majority of the nuclear installations in Moscow
and the Moscow Region were at RRC-KI. This section summarizes details of the
most important research reactors in RRC-KI, the full list of which is given in the
previous section (for further details, see Goncharov, 1986).
2.2.1 RFT reactor
The 10 MW RFT reactor was put into operation in April 1952 as part of the
ﬁrst experimental materials-testing complex constructed in the FSU (Kruzhilin,
1955; Kurchatov et al., 1955). The RFT was the ﬁrst Russian research reactor
using enriched uranium intended for materials-testing research (Figure 2.1). It was
equipped with ﬁve loop installations, which allowed constructional and fuel mate-
rials to be tested in conditions similar to those in power reactors. At the initial stage
of nuclear power engineering (from 1952), it was used to test the fuel elements of
practically all reactor projects, to search for the best fuel element designs and fuel
compositions, and to explore their operational reliability.
After reconstruction in 1957, the power of the reactor was increased to 20 MW
through the use of better fuel assemblies. The reactor coolant system was supple-
mented by a third circuit. As a result of this reconstruction, the maximum ﬂux
density of thermal neutrons in the reactor core increased from 8 × 1013 n/cm2s to
1.8 × 1014 n/cm2s.
In the structure of the reactor there were three water coolant loops (PVO, PE,
and PVK), one (PG) with a gaseous heat-carrier, and another (PM) with a liquid
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Table 2.2. Basic characteristics of RFT reactor loops.
Flow Max. Max. temp. Max.
rate temp of fuel number
Thermal Working of the of the element of canals
Nickname power pressure coolant coolant surface in the
of loop Coolant (kW) (MPa) (m3/h) (◦C) (◦C) loop
PVO Water 1200 20 25 330 360 3
PVK Water, 1000 10 25 310 325 3
water–
steam
emulsion
PE Water 1000 10 25 300 325 3
PG Helium, 25 9 1.1 (t/h) 500 – 1
CO2
PM Lead– 1000 0.5 2.5 up to – 1
bismuth 620
Note: The abbreviations shown are of the Russian names.
metal heat-carrier (Amaev et al., 1966). Each of the loops represented an analog of
nuclear reactors designed for different applications (Table 2.2). Up to 15 loop-type
experimental canals for testing fuel elements and materials were arranged in the
reactor core and the reﬂector.
In 1962, after 10 years of intensive operation, the reactor was shut down and
partly dismantled, and near to it, in the same building, the more powerful MR loop
reactor (see next section) was constructed. The undismantled part of the reactor,
namely, the graphite from the core of the reactor and the reﬂector, has remained in
its regular steel case. Concrete was laid on top of the case and steel plates placed
above the concrete.
Importantly, some fuel-element cladding failed during testing at the RFT reac-
tor (especially from 1953 to 1957). In some cases these failures were aggravated by
fusion taking place in the claddings and the destruction of the loop and/or working
channels, with fuel being washed out and ﬁssion products, even actinides, being
released into the coolant of the cooling system and the graphite stack (so-called
wet accidents).
Analysis of the operational reliability of working fuel elements for the 10 years
in which the the reactor ran shows that one-third of them were removed from the re-
actor because of damage that occurred during irradiation. Clearly, then, the reactor
operation was accompanied by the generation of a great deal of radioactive waste.
This waste can be divided into two groups: 1) the equipment of the reactor and the
loop installations disassembled during decommissioning and 2) the “operational”
radioactive waste.
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Figure 2.2. MR reactor.
A database of the component composition of both types of radioactive waste
has been developed and includes both historical records and reconstruction results.
Some details of the database are presented in the ﬁnal report of ISTC project No.
2290 (2004). Data analysis shows that the weight and dimensional characteristics
of the second type of radioactive waste are comparable with those of the ﬁrst. The
total mass of the disassembled equipment and the “operational” radioactive waste
is about 200 tons.
2.2.2 MR reactor
The MR reactor, a multiloop channel-type research reactor immersed in a swim-
ming pool ﬁlled with water (Figure 2.2), began operation in 1964 (Goncharov et
al., 1965). The thermal power of the reactor with loop-back installations is 50 MW.
The maximum ﬂux density of thermal neutrons in the nuclear core reached 5×1014
n/cm2s (Ryazantsev et al., 1999a).
As a successor to the decommissioned RFT reactor, the MR reactor specialized
in testing fuel elements and construction materials, but on a much wider scale. It
was also used to produce radioactive isotopes for medical applications. The reactor
was equipped with nine loop-type installations (Table 2.3).
It was the comprehensive program of nuclear materials testing performed in
the 1953–1993 period with the help of the RFT and MR reactors and the “hot”
radiochemical laboratories attached to them that enabled the certiﬁcation of fuel
elements and structural materials for practically all the Soviet-made nuclear power
plants.
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Table 2.3. General characteristics of the MR loop installations.
Max. Max.
Thermal Coolant Coolant coolant number of
Nickname power ﬂow rate pressure temperature experimental
of loop Coolant (kW) (MPa) (MPa) (◦C) channels
PVTs-1 Water and
steam–water 3000 30 10.0 310 7
emulsion
PVTs-2 As above 300 30 10.0 310 2
PVK As above 300 150 20.0 330 6
PVU As above 300 30 20.0 330 4
PVO Water 2000 100 20.0 330 5
PV Water 3000 30 20.0 330 2
POV Water 1000 30 10.0 310 2
PVM Pb–Bi 2000 2.5 0.5 620 1
PG Helium 100 7 10 900 1
During reconstruction of the reactor, some of the constructional elements with
a radiation source that had become exhausted were dismantled and placed in radio-
active waste storage as high-activity waste. Beryllium blocks were also substituted
for some of the reﬂector’s graphite blocks. Contaminated graphite blocks were
unloaded and placed into the radioactive waste storage.
In 1973 the radioactive waste that had accumulated in storage at the MR reactor
and hot laboratory since 1962 was transferred to the radioactive waste storage site
within the grounds of RRC-KI. A major part of this radioactive waste is waste
generated during investigations of fuel elements in “hot cells.” The high-activity
operational waste of the reactor and other such wastes were buried in metal cases.
Other parts (graphite blocks from the MR reactor, offcuts of canal tubes, etc.) were
buried without cases (Ryazantsev et al., 1999b).
2.2.3 WWR-2 reactor
The WWR-2 reactor, a heterogeneous thermal research reactor, began operation in
1954 (Figure 2.3). Modernization in 1957 raised its thermal capacity to 3 MW.
Distilled water was used as coolant, moderator, and also top protector.
The reactor was used to examine design problems in propulsion nuclear power
reactors, such as the radiation impact on isolation, organic and semi-conductor ma-
terials, and also the efﬁciency of radiation protection.
In 1983 the reactor was shut down and dismantled. Currently, the unloaded fuel
and accumulated radioactive waste are in temporary storage units at the reactor site.
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Figure 2.3. WWR-2 reactor.
2.2.4 R reactor complex
From 1963 to 1986 small research reactors were operated to investigate the space
applications of the Romashka and Yenisey series.
2.2.5 Romashka reactor
The Romashka reactor–converter (40 kW) is the prototype for a nuclear power
facility with direct thermoelectric conversion (Figure 2.4). Fuel rods based on UC2
were used (Ponomarev-Stepnoy and Kukharkin, 2000).
In 1969, after the implementation of the research program, the Romashka reac-
tor was shut down and dismantled. Premises at the R complex were reconstructed
for ground tests of the Topaz space nuclear facility with the Yenisey reactor.
2.2.6 Yenisey reactor
The Yenisey reactor is the prototype for a space nuclear power facility with
thermionic conversion of thermal energy into electricity (Figure 2.5). The ther-
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Figure 2.4. Romashka reactor.
mal capacity of the reactor is 100 kW, and the electrical capacity is 5 kW. A liquid
metal eutectic alloy of sodium and potassium was used as coolant.
Four installations were examined between 1973 and 1986. At the end of the
tests they were dismantled, and both fuel and accumulated radioactive waste are
stored at the complex.
2.2.7 Gamma reactor
The Gamma research reactor with a thermal capacity of 220 kW was put into oper-
ation in 1982. Its cooling system is water–water with natural circulation, and it is a
thermoelectric converter of 6 kW electrical output (Figure 2.6).
The research program ended in 2003, and a decision was taken to decommis-
sion the reactor. Now the installation is in shutdown mode with surveillance. Fuel
is still in the active zone of the reactor.
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Figure 2.5. Yenisey space nuclear power reactor.
Figure 2.6. Gamma reactor.
3
The Moscow Case Study of the Nuclear
Legacy
3.1 Study background, statement of needs, and goals
In the second half of the 1990s IIASA’s “Radiation Safety of the Biosphere” (RAD)
project conducted studies on general aspects of the radiation legacy from the Cold
War period. Priority was given to gaining an overview of the radiation legacy of
the FSU and, more speciﬁcally, of related problems within the Russian Federation.
The initial funding for the Russian networking institutions to gather domestic in-
formation was provided by the European Union. The results are published in the
IIASA report, Radiation Inheritance of the Former USSR: Analytical Overview,
which presents a comprehensive picture of the characteristics of accumulated ra-
dioactive materials and radioactive waste for each sector of the nuclear complex of
the FSU, in total and by individual enterprise. The preparation of the report was
funded by the US Department of Energy. The report was also published in 2000 by
Earthscan Press as a book entitled Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex
(Egorov et al., 2000).
In the report particular attention was drawn to the fact that, as a result of the
intensive development of nuclear science and technology in the FSU, Moscow and
the Moscow Region had accumulated dozens of nuclear centers and institutions.
These possessed nuclear installations such as research reactors, radiochemical lab-
oratories, thousands of radiation sources, and also temporary storage units both for
spent fuel and radioactive waste. Details are presented in the next section.
The major contribution to this inheritance is from RRC-KI, the biggest and old-
est nuclear center in this megacity. It was created in 1943 as the leading institute of
the nuclear program in the FSU. RRC-KI not only played a crucial role in the de-
velopment of the ﬁrst FSU nuclear bombs, but also performed numerous scientiﬁc
investigations that substantiated technical decisions on nuclear power and nuclear
industry development in the FSU and Russia. Today, it continues to play a leading
role in nuclear science and technology.
Currently, RRC-KI possesses more than nine research reactors, some of which
are still in operation, 17 critical assemblies, a hot laboratory for materials testing,
spent fuel storage sites, and (particularly) temporary storage sites of radioactive
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Territory of RRC-KI
Radioactive waste storage site
Public e-indicator about radiation background
Figure 3.1. Location of RRC-KI in the Schukino municipality.
waste, with the inevitable soil contamination around them (Ryazantsev et al., 2000,
Ponomarev-Stepnoy et al., 2002a). When founded, RRC-KI was located in an out-
lying part of Moscow. The FSU government decision allotted an area of about 100
ha (106 m2) for RRC-KI nuclear facilities, including a 4 ha enclave located on the
bank of the Moscow River (Figure 3.1). During more than a half century of opera-
tion of nuclear facilities, huge amounts of radioactive waste were generated, some
of which were stored within the boundaries of RRC-KI. The urbanization that has
occurred during the past 50 years means that the boundaries of the Institute are
today surrounded by densely populated residential and business districts, now part
of the Moscow downtown area (Figure 3.2). Living close to such a “neighbor”
inevitably causes Moscow’s inhabitants and visitors concerns about their environ-
mental security.
The RRC-KI directorate asked IIASA’s RAD project to launch an international
study to assess the radiological risk and resulting public impact of past waste man-
agement practices at RRC-KI. In response, IIASA asked the TACIS program to
subsidize an IIASA study to evaluate both the information available on the history
of radioactive waste disposal and the environmental and social impacts of the ra-
dioactive waste disposal sites in RRC-KI. In parallel, IIASA applied to the ISTC in
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Figure 3.2. Location of RRC-KI in Moscow (12 km northwest of the Kremlin).
Moscow for funding to cover the gathering of the information needed to assess the
actual and potential implications of this nuclear legacy.
In 2003 the project received a TACIS-Bistro grant for a study entitled “Impacts
of Radioactive Waste Storage at the Territory of the RRC-Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow,” with a major focus on the evaluation of the migration of radioactivity
from the storage site of RRC-KI via run-off water. Simultaneously, ISTC approved
the Russian application and Project #2290 “The Analysis of Burials of Radioac-
tive Waste in the Territory of the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow and Paths of Supposed Radionuclide Migration in the Environment” then
began. IIASA was a foreign collaborator in this project and used its ﬁndings to
model the environmental impacts.
In parallel with the IIASA activity, in 2002 RRC-KI made its ﬁrst practical
steps toward rehabilitating contaminated objects within its grounds (the Rehabilita-
tion Project). Some results of this project were presented at WM’03 (Ponomarev-
Stepnoy et al., 2002b).
Then, in 2004 IIASA organized the International Workshop “Solutions to Secu-
rity Concerns about the Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War that Remain in Urban
Environments.” The workshop, held at Vanderbilt University (Tennessee, United
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States) from 14 to 17 November 2004, inter alia critically discussed the results of
these Moscow case studies. It was emphasized that the establishment of nuclear
centers in or around big cities throughout the world could be easily traced. The
French nuclear center “Sacle,” for example, is about 20 km from the center of
Paris, and a similar situation exists with respect to nuclear institutions in Berlin,
Budapest, Grenoble, London, San Diego, Soﬁa, etc. Thus, the case study of the
speciﬁc problems in Moscow could serve as an introduction to a more general and
systematic assessment of the potential impact of hazardous radioactive materials
and chemicals in urban settings in many countries.
This section of the paper comprises materials collected within the studies listed
above and summarizes the ﬁndings.
3.2 The nuclear legacy of RRC-KI
The nuclear legacy of RRC-KI mainly results from nuclear research and testing
reactors created from the 1940s to the 1970s. These nuclear research reactors were
the main engines in the FSU of progress in the development of nuclear power,
basic nuclear science, materials development, radioactive isotope production for
medicine and industry, and the education and training of scientists and engineers.
They played a crucial role in the provision of a scientiﬁc and technological base for
the development of the nuclear industry in the FSU and later in Russia. As a result
of more than half a century of operations, a huge amount of radioactive waste has
been generated and stored within RRC-KI’s boundaries, The total radioactivity of
the spent fuel stored there is estimated to be 2 MCi, and the total radioactivity of
radioactive waste at the temporary storage sites is about 0.1 MCi (Ryazantsev et
al., 2000; Ponomarev-Stepnoy et al., 2002a).
3.2.1 Spent nuclear fuel at RRC-KI
Today, spent nuclear fuel storage units contain over 1,300 spent fuel assemblies of
various designs. The spent nuclear fuels differ in terms of chemical composition,
the degree of uranium enrichment, and the protective cladding used. It is important
to note that as the spent nuclear fuel from the research reactors is, in many cases
“non-standard,” it cannot be reprocessed using standard reprocessing technology—
this fuel even requires special storage conditions. It was for this reason that most
of the spent nuclear fuel was not transported to the RT-1 reprocessing plant at the
Mayak, Russian nuclear center in the Urals (where spent nuclear fuel from nuclear
power plants and nuclear submarines was routed) but stored instead on the premises
of the research reactors where it still awaits ﬁnal disposal.
Another important feature of the spent nuclear fuel of research reactors is that
a high fraction of the experimental fuel elements were damaged during testing.
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Figure 3.3. Spent nuclear fuel storage at the MR reactor site.
This also meant that this spent nuclear fuel could not be reprocessed at the existing
reprocessing plant.
According to Ponomarev-Stepnoy and Gorlinsky (2004) non-standard spent nu-
clear fuel constitutes 60% of the total amount, while 10% has suffered varying de-
grees of damage. It is expected that, subject to allocation of the necessary resources,
the spent nuclear fuel that can be reprocessed at the RT-1 factory will be transported
to Mayak, and the spent nuclear fuel with no reprocessing route (non-standard and
damaged) will be packed into tight cases and transported to the Mining Chemical
Combine in Krasnoyarsk for long-term storage. The time necessary to transport
the spent nuclear fuel from RRC-KI is estimated to be a minimum of seven years,
assuming that all the conditions at Mayak and the Mining Chemical Combine are
favorable (Ryazantsev et al., 2000).
The MR reactor, which was the most powerful installation at RRC-KI, pro-
duced most of the spent nuclear fuel now kept in the dry storage site on the MR
reactor premises (Figure 3.3). In addition to the spent nuclear fuel from the core
of the MR reactor, spent nuclear fuel from the RFT reactor and experimental spent
fuel assemblies examined for the WWR and RBMK reactor designs and for the
navy ice-breaker and submarine propulsion nuclear reactors are also stored there.
This location accounts for 70% of all spent nuclear fuel stored on RRC-KI territory.
The rest of the spent nuclear fuels are stored:
• In the pool storage at reactor IR-8 (about 50 spent fuel assemblies).
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• At the site of the WWR-2 reactor, located in the RRC-KI enclave on the bank
of the Moscow River (the so-called Gas Factory; see Figure 3.1). The storage
unit contains about 300 spent fuel assemblies.
• In dry storage at the R reactor complex, there are about 200 kg of spent fuel
assemblies from the Romashka reactor and 200 spent fuel assemblies from the
Yenisey reactor.
• In the active zone of the Gamma reactor, there are 69 fuel assemblies with a
fuel composition based on UAl alloy.
3.2.2 Radioactive waste storage site at RRC-KI
Short history of the site
Research reactors used to test new types of fuel, new types of coolant, and other
reactor innovations naturally face some operational problems. Such problems fre-
quently produce high-level radioactive waste containing ﬁssion products and also
induce radioactivity in construction materials.
Initially, nuclear weapons production in the FSU, as in all nuclear club coun-
tries, was developed in a rush to win the nuclear arms race, and there was insufﬁ-
cient knowledge of the environmental consequences of radiation. At the beginning
of the nuclear era this radioactive waste was often placed in so-called temporary
storage. Radiation protection norms worldwide at that time were not as strict as
they are now and, in many cases, they were not even properly implemented for the
reasons given above.
Before the creation of a specialized enterprise for radioactive waste manage-
ment (Radon) in 1965, all the radioactive waste generated during the operation of
nuclear facilities at RRC-KI was stored in so-called temporary burial sites within
the boundaries of RRC-KI.
Until 1955 solid radioactive waste was put into a natural ravine in the
Sobolevsky Creek, which was in the western part of the RRC-KI grounds, very
close to the Kurchatov Institute’s brick perimeter wall (Figure 3.4). The ravine was
9 m deep with a general slope to the RRC-KI perimeter. The waste was dumped in
the shallow, sandy horizon of the Quaternary sediments.
Dumped wastes were mixed and ﬁlled in with soil or construction rubbish, so
there were no actual mechanical barriers between the radioactivity it contained and
the biosphere. Now the ravine is completely ﬁlled in.
Figure 3.5 illustrates a general view of the area of the site, which was about 2
ha (2× 104 m2).
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Channel of the Sobolevsky Creek 1,2,3...  Observation wells
Figure 3.4. Sobolevsky Creek.
Figure 3.5. Bird’s-eye view of the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site, winter
2003.
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Figure 3.6. Location of the storage tanks (repositories) at the radioactive waste
(RW) storage site.
After 1955, 11 concrete or brick tanks were commissioned for the storage of ra-
dioactive waste at the site. The location of these repositories is shown in Figure 3.6.
Today, only one remains in operation.
In 1973 high-level radioactive waste that had accumulated at the premises of
both the MR reactor and the hot laboratory had to be placed in tanks 4 and 6. High-
level operational wastes were buried in metal cases. Other waste (contaminated
graphite blocks from the MR reactor, channel tube offcuts, etc.) was buried without
cases. In the same year, after additional radioactive waste was buried, the tanks
were filled with cement slurry.
Potential pathways of radioactivity from the site
Before 1955 radioactive waste was buried in an open-trench system. This, together
with leakages from the tanks, resulted in contamination of the surface layer soil and
also of the water-bearing horizon.
The surface of the storage site showed an increased level of radiation. The
exposure dose rate is up to 3000 microR/h at 1 m distance from the surface. In
most of the area adjacent to the storage site, the exposure dose rate is at least twice
the background rate at the rest of the Institute.
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Figure 3.7. IIASA RAD project team at the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage
site, winter 2002.
Thus, in the near-term perspective, under unfavorable meteorological condi-
tions, the contaminated soil could be exposed to erosion transfer by surface water
and to wind transfer in the direction of the nearest residential buildings, which are
only 100 m from the radioactive waste burial site (Figure 3.7).
Sampling from the observation wells showed that soil contaminated by 60Co,
134Cs, 137Cs, 90Sr, 152Eu, 241Am, etc., was observed in water-bearing horizons in
the area of the former trenches (Ryazantsev et al., 2000).
Though most of the radioactive waste stored at the site is in repositories with
concrete or brick walls, even this waste poses a threat of further propagation of the
radioactivity. This is because the bases of some of the tanks are below the ground-
water water table; mechanical degradation of the walls could also create a pathway
for radioactivity from the storage facility. Thus, the threat that radioactivity leach-
ing from the solid waste could be transferred by groundwater beyond the RRC-KI
site should also be examined.
An important point is that the underground medium of the site was disturbed
during building works carried out in this area during urbanization. In the 1960s an
underground heating pipe crossed the site, but is now out of operation. The pipe that
transmits rainwater accumulated from about 400 ha (4×106 m2) of the surrounding
area to the Moscow River is constructed in the lowest part of the Sobolevsky Creek
(see Figure 3.4) and crosses the middle of the site from east to west. The pipe’s
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source is located 1.5 km to the east of the site and its outﬂow is 1.3 km to the west,
on the bank of the Moscow River. The elevation drop of the rainwater pipe is 6 m.
The pipe is enclosed by concrete shielding that has a cross-section at the site of 2.5
× 2.1 m. Failure of the rainwater pipe at the site or below it while there is a high
level of precipitation might cause ﬂooding with a potential transfer of radioactive
contaminants from the site.
Failure of these underground pipe systems is not the only concern. The pipes,
which ﬂow along and around the piping systems, could also act as conduits for
contaminants.
Experimental work at RRC-KI requires plenty of water for technological pur-
poses. This is taken from artesian wells located within its boundaries. A large water
intake from the wells could result in a spatial depression, which, in turn, could lead
to water being pumped from the upper horizon of the site to a deeper one and thus
to the contamination of the lower horizon.
Uncertainties as to the amount and the physicochemical properties of the buried
radioactive waste, uncertainties in the hydrogeological data, and the close location
of the storage site to the residential area outside the Institute mean that the potential
pathways of radioactivity from the site could become actual pathways in the short-
term perspective. The implications of this for environmental security deserve a
careful assessment to identify potential countermeasures, their cost, and how they
could minimize any radiological impact on the population and on the personnel
involved in the remediation and/or stabilization of the site.
Analytical studies performed within the TACIS and ISTC projects were ori-
ented toward a scoping analysis of the different pathways. More speciﬁcally, it was
stipulated that the studies would focus on:
• Collection, analysis, and collation of the currently available data regarding the
radioactive source term and the environmental properties;
• Modeling of radionuclide migration as a result of erosion caused by surface
(run-off) water and assessment of the radiological impact of radionuclide mi-
gration in terms of dose uptake by critical population groups and of a general
reduction in environmental security;
• Scoping analysis and estimates of groundwater and atmospheric transfer.
We emphasize that the study was directed at the radioactive waste disposal area
within the main area of RRC-KI, as indicated by the Russian partner in the IIASA
study. Hence, the possible migration of radioactive contaminants from other points
in the area has not been studied, including the detached area (enclave) located about
1 km from the main territory, on the bank of the Moscow River (see the main
territory of RRC-KI and its enclave in Figure 3.1).
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Surface contamination of the site
Radiation background on the perimeter of RRC-KI
The external gamma radiation background at the perimeter of the RRC-KI site has
been monitored for a number of years. The average value for the dose rates of
gamma radiation at 16 control points for the 1990–1998 period was 8.2 μR/h, which
does not differ from the general background in Moscow. Only near the radioactive
waste storage site was the average dose rate over the 9-year period above this, at
13.7 μR/h.
Thus, the contribution from that technogenic source of radiation to the dose
rates near the site is 5.5 μR/h (Borohovich et al., 1999).
Exposure dose rate over the site
Assessment of the contamination of the surface layer of the ground at the RRC-KI
radioactive waste storage site was based on the data obtained by a gamma radiation
survey of the site and reported in Ponomarev-Stepnoy et al. (2002b).
The gamma radiation survey of the site was carried out with the help of a
portable radiometer—a dosimeter designed for radiation control at industrial en-
terprises. The detection block works on the basis of a microcrystalline organic
scintillator (anthracene), placed as a thin layer on a light conductor made from or-
ganic glass shaped in the form of a truncated cone. Measurements were carried out
in steps of 10 m to a distance of 1–1.5 m from the surface. The dosimeter can reg-
ister a range of exposure dose rates from 10−2 to 3000 μSv/h, with a power range
in gamma radiation from 0.125 to 1.25 MeV. The accuracy of the measurements is
±20%.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results of the gamma radiation survey.
Method used to derive the concentration of the major radionuclides
The maps of surface contamination by 137Cs and 90Sr were created by recalculat-
ing the exposure dose rate ﬁeld, assuming a 15 cm local layer of homogeneously
contaminated surface soil. The recalculation is based on:
• Comparison of the actual exposure dose rate measurements for nine random
points at the site with the calculated values of exposure dose rate obtained from
measurements of 137Cs concentrations in samples taken from those nine points.
This comparison showed reasonable agreement with the supposition that the ex-
posure dose rate is mostly formed by 137Cs contamination at the surface layer.
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Figure 3.8. Exposure dose rate at the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site
(Ponomarev-Stepnoy et al., 2002b).
• The average ratio between 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations measured in seven
samples taken from different parts of the site. This ratio was used to create a
90Sr contamination map.
Though the data are not sufﬁcient for a very heterogeneously contaminated site,
this method is still thought to be useful as a ﬁrst approximation. Details of the
methodology used are given below (Gorlinsky, 2003).
To ﬁnd a correlation between contamination of the ground and an exposure
dose rate of gamma radiation, the geometry of a volumetric source in the form
of a disk was used. The calculation was carried out taking into account the self-
absorption and multiple dispersion of gamma radiation in a source. Moreover,
multiple dispersion of gamma radiation was incorporated with the help of a dose
factor of accumulation, deﬁned according to the model of Tailor (Gusev et al.,
1961).
Calculations for the various sizes of the disk were made, assuming that 137Cs
provides the basic contribution to the dose rate and is homogeneously distributed
over the volume of the disk. Results of the calculations are given in Figures 3.9 and
3.10.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show that if the thickness of a layer of ground is 20 cm
and the radius of the sector of polluted ground is 3 m, factor a, which reﬂects the
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Figure 3.9. Volumetric concentration as a function of radius of a disk. The rate
of gamma radiation from 137Cs at a distance of 1 m along the axis of the disk is 1
μR/h (thickness of the disk is 20cm).
correlation between contamination of the ground by 137Cs and the dose rate at the
center of the polluted territory at a height of 1 m, is 135 (Bq/kg)/(μR/h). When the
thickness of a layer is 10 cm, the error in the deﬁnition of factor a is about 20%,
and when the thickness of a layer becomes more than 30 cm this error does not
exceed 10%. When deﬁning the value of a, the size of a sector of polluted ground
becomes an important factor. Figure 3.10 shows that the spread of values of a is
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Figure 3.10. Volumetric concentration as a function of disk thickness. The rate
of gamma radiation from 137Cs at a distance of 1 m along the axis of the disk is 1
μR/h (radius of the disk is 3 m).
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about ±50% when the radius of a sector of polluted ground varies from 1.5 to 5 m
and more. Thus, the total error of deﬁnition of factor a is about ±60%.
For comparison, let us consider the results of the experimental studies of pol-
luted areas in the Kaluga region (Warner and Harrison, 1993; Petrov et al., 1999).
Contamination of both arable and non-arable lands was investigated. In samples
of ground taken up to 1991, the composition of nuclides of Chernobyl origin was
established as 137Cs (88%), 134Cs (10%), and 106Ru (0.5%). It was noted that the
concentration of 90Sr is about 3% that of 137Cs. It has been ascertained that the
distribution of 137Cs over cultivated lands is uniform down to a depth of 20 cm. At
the same time, the distribution of 137Cs over non-cultivated lands is described by
an exponential law, basically, that it is in the top layer to a depth of about 5 cm.
Strontium is distributed over non-cultivated lands exponentially, but with a ﬂatter
curve than for cesium. This shows that strontium has a better ground-penetrating
ability. Based on a large amount of statistical material, a correlation between local
ground contamination values and the dose rate of gamma radiation of radionuclides
was calculated. For arable lands, this factor a was 2.5 (μR/h)/(Ci/km2) or, express-
ing it in the units used above (for a soil density of 2.0 g/cm3), 150 (Bq/kg)/(μR/h).
The factor a for a 20 cm layer of polluted ground, as Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show, is
135 (Bq/kg)/(μR/h). Thus, the calculated and experimental values of factor a are
in close agreement. This shows that there is sufﬁcient reliability in the calculated
value of factor a = 135 (Bq/kg)/(μR/h) for it to be used to describe the surface
contamination at the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site.
Maps of the surface contamination by 137Cs and 90Sr
The contamination map required as input to the model should contain the levels
in Bq/m2. However, this map was derived from the original contamination map
(which indicated the levels in Bq/kg) received with the information package from
RRC-KI and assumed that all the radioactivity is homogeneously distributed within
the upper 15 cm of the soil layer). The input 137Cs and 90Sr contamination maps
used for the calculations are presented in Figures 3.11 and 3.12.
Soil–water partition coefﬁcients
Experiments to measure the partition coefﬁcients of 137Cs and 90Sr between con-
taminated soil and water were carried out speciﬁcally for samples of dry soil taken
from the site.
A sample of dry soil was placed in distilled water at a weight ratio of 1:2, re-
spectively, and the mix was agitated. Almost immediately after the agitation (i.e.,
after sedimentation of the macro-particles), the liquid phase was separated by ﬁl-
tration (using ﬁlter paper) and the radioactivity of the liquid phase and the deposit
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Figure 3.11. Initial 137Cs contamination of the site in kBq/m2, assuming that all
the radioactivity is located within the top 15 cm of the soil layer.
Figure 3.12. Initial 90Sr contamination of the site in kBq/m2, assuming that all the
radioactivity is located within the top 15 cm of the soil layer.
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Table 3.1. Results of experiments to determine the partition coefﬁcients of 137Cs
and 90Sr.
Duration Radio- Radio- Radio-
Weight Weight Weight of contact activity activity activity
of soil of of deposits of ground of soil activity activity
sample water on ﬁlter with water sample in water of ﬁlter
No Nuclide (g) (g) (g) (minutes) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
1 137Cs 185 370 19.4 10 2.1 × 105 90.0 3.7 × 104
2 190 380 17.6 10 9.2 × 104 64.0 1.8 × 104
3 175 350 18.1 60 2.4 × 105 440.0 5.5 × 104
4 198 400 18.5 60 1.8 × 105 160.0 3.7 × 104
5 90Sr 50 100 3.9 60 211 1.9 74.6
6 50 100 4.3 60 1121 4.3 296
on the ﬁlter were analyzed. 137Cs radioactivity was measured with a Ge(Li) de-
tector (DGDK-63B) of 63 cm3 volume and an analyzer (SBSA-40) connected to a
personal computer. The resolution of the detector for gamma radiation from 60Co
was about 3 keV, with an error of ±20%. The radioactivity of the radiochemi-
cally separated strontium was determined by a β-spectrometer. The accuracy of the
measurements was ±30%.
The results of the measurements of the soil–water partition coefﬁcients for
137Cs and 90Sr are given in Table 3.1.
Contamination of underground medium at the site
Radiation monitoring of soil and groundwater was performed using 92 observation
boreholes sunk in 1975–1992 (Mosinzhproekt Institute, 1986; GSPI, 2002). The
boreholes have a 10–40 m depth and cover the site (see Figure 3.6) and adjacent
area.
The most representative monitoring data obtained in 1991–1992 conﬁrm that
underground soil contamination is primarily caused by 90Sr and 137Cs (Fig-
ure 3.13).
The dose rate of 137Cs and 90Sr at some points exceeded the background tens
of times. The concentration of 137Cs varied from 0.2 to 128,000 Bq/kg, and that of
90Sr from 0.4 to 20,000 Bq/kg. There were local spots of contamination by 134Cs,
60Co, 152Eu, and 241Am, located down to a depth of 5 m.
Radioactive contamination of groundwater caused by the presence of 90Sr was
revealed. For the upper sub-horizon, concentrations of 90Sr ranged from 0.4 to
814 Bq/l; for the lower sub-horizon, from 0.4 to 74 Bq/l. As the base of some
of the tanks and repositories of solid radioactive waste are below the water table,
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Figure 3.13. Distribution of 137Cs and 90Sr against depth of sampling.
it is quite possible that this contamination is caused by the inﬂow of groundwater
through leaks and further leaching and by the radioactivity washing out.
3.3 Environmental characteristics of the radioactive
waste storage site
The information presented in this section is based largely on the work conducted
by the Russian team of experts that participated in the study; most of the informa-
tion is presented in the Russian report (Gorlinsky, 2003). Data in this chapter are
based on this report, which is therefore not cited unless there is a need to identify
a speciﬁc source of information. In addition, a literature review was carried out
to identify other possible sources of information and to compare the information
reported previously with that made available during the study and detailed in the
Russian report (Gorlinsky, 2003). Information derived from the other sources is
referenced when used.
3.3.1 Topography and mechanical barriers to water drainage from
the site
A general view of the radioactive waste site and its adjacent municipal area are
presented in Figure 3.14; this is taken from the Russian report (Gorlinsky, 2003).
Figures 3.15–3.16 give an illustration of several vertical cross-sections. The illus-
trations presented in Figures 3.18 and 3.19 are digital elevation maps based on these
data and provided to the project by RRC-KI experts. The topography of the site and
nearby territory was obtained using altitude measurements at a set of key points at
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Soil covered by grass
Changes of relief on the soil covered by grass
Flattened soil, no vegetation
Debris surface layer (broken bricks)–
duration of cover 1–2 years
Fresh earth - 1 year (no vegetation)
Tree or bush in ground
Steep slope
Cut trees or bushes
(remains of stumps and roots)
Asphalted or covered by concrete
Buildings or erections above the ground surface
Dwelling houses and shops
outside the territory of RRC
Figure 3.14. General view of the radioactive waste storage site and its municipal
surroundings. Lines 1–1, 2–2, 3–3, and 4–4 designate the cross-sections repre-
sented in Figures 3.15 and 3.16.
the site, expert evaluation of the results, and computer interpolation. As is clear
from the ﬁgures, the area of the waste storage site is quite small, about 11,500 m2.
The highest elevation point is 149 m and the lowest is 144.6 m.
The closest residential building area is only 100m from the site. Moreover, the
territory within the contour MLKJIH (see Figure 3.17) is occupied by a municipal
car park. Though access to this is limited to those using the area for car parking,
public access is not really restricted. Thus, a high degree of precision is needed in
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Inner fence Inner fence
Storage of radioactive
waste #8
Building #122
Grass
Cross-section 2–2Cross-section 1–1
Supporting shoe
~0.35m
Figure 3.15. Vertical cross-sections 1-1 and 1-2 (see Figure 3.14) around the inner
concrete wall of the storage site.
Inner fence
Outer fence
Lattice
Earth road in the site
City
road
Inner fence
Cross-section 4–4
Rain water collector
Cross-section 3–3
~0.35m
Broken bricksStumps and roots of
cut trees and bushes
17m 2.5m
Figure 3.16. Vertical cross-sections 3-3 and 4-4 (see Figure 3.14) around the inner
wall of the storage site.
calculating the redistribution of radionuclides in order to evaluate the impact on the
local population of leaching pollutants.
The inner wall that currently surrounds the radioactive waste storage site is not
a perfectly watertight barrier. There are holes of about 5–10 mm within each 2 m
concrete section of the wall in sector CBAKJIHG (see Figure 3.17). The actual
absence of a wall at the eastern part could result in water run-off toward the area of
KI and radionuclide washout from the waste storage site (Figure 3.19). There is an
opening built into the lower part of the outer brick wall for the discharge of run-off
water toward the nearby municipal road. This opening (about 3 dm2) is marked as
point “O” in Figure 3.17.
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Asphalted areas
KI buildings
Municipal buildings
Crusty land
KI fence
Grass within the site
Grass outside the site
Ploughed land
Road
Steep slopes
Areas covered by stony debris
Trees
Figure 3.17. Area of the waste storage site of RRC-KI and its neighborhood. The
contour CBAKJIHG is the inner wall around the waste storage site, which obstructs
the formation of run-off from the site and the radionuclide washout by surface
water.
3.3.2 Soil characteristics
The basic features of the ground and its surface are given in the scheme and expla-
nations in Figure 3.14.
Components of the soil
The original natural relief is no longer present. It began to disappear when the
topography of the area was restructured during the economic development of the
site; this includes an original ravine being ﬁlled in. The absolute height of the
surface of the ground ranges from 145 to 149 m.
Almost all the natural soil in the area of interest has been destroyed. Where it
remains, it resembles the sod–podsolic type or urban soil (Table 3.2).
A layer of development debris (technogenic ground), which has been formed
over several decades, covers the whole area of the site. In some cases it differs
sharply from the natural bedrock that lies below; in others it does not. This ground
is extraordinarily non-uniform in its structure, comprising 10–20% (and in some
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Figure 3.18. Relief of the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site and adjacent area,
and contours of the inner and the outer walls; axes X and Y are in meters; numbers
on the isolines show the elevation in meters.
Figure 3.19. Isometric drawing of the digital elevation map, showing walls, build-
ings, and other constructions. The X and Y axes are in meters.
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Table 3.2. Physical properties of the soil.
Physical properties Urban soil (lawn) Sod–podsolic
Granulometric structure, 5–20 10–50
content (%) of fraction (diameter
of particles <0.01 mm)
Hardness of ground (kg/cm2) 40–45 20–25
Porosity (%) 30–40 50
Density of composition (g/cm3) Up to 1.8 0.9–1.2
Field moisture capacity (%) 5–14 14–20
places 30%) various artiﬁcial materials, such as broken bricks, wood, fragments of
concrete and ferro-concrete items, pieces of metal hardware, and pieces of asphalt.
The thickness of the technogenic layer varies widely—from several centimeters to
several meters, depending on the relief and other factors.
The technogenic ground needs to be investigated thoroughly, as its composi-
tion, condition, and properties have not been quantiﬁed. For most of the area, the
technogenic ground and soil areas are covered by buildings, constructions, con-
crete, and asphalt.
Granulometric structure of the soil
Among the basic parameters of an engineering and geological assessment of sandy
bedrocks are heterogeneity and characteristics of water penetration. In most cases,
the technogenic ground is composed of natural soil and rocks that were dug out
of the trenches and foundation ditches when the construction and planning works
were being carried out. It is thus fair to assume that its condition and properties are
similar to those of the natural ground beneath it.
The natural ground comprises alluvial sand that formed the top layer of an
above-ﬂoodplain terrace. The water permeability of the sand, whose particles
mostly exceed 0.1 mm, is characterized by an inﬁltration coefﬁcient of greater than
1 m per day. Sand with particles that are predominantly less than 0.1 mm have an
inﬁltration coefﬁcient of less than 1 m per day.
In Table 3.3 data are given for the granulometric structure and inﬁltration factor
that summarize the bulk ground bedding in a sublayer of alluvial sands of average
dimension. The contents of the humus and the porosity of the urbanized soil are
given in accordance with literature values.
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Table 3.3. Granulometric structure of the soil.
Inﬁltration
Depth Humus Porosity factor Kf
(cm) Granulometric structure of ground (%) (%) (m/day)
Diameter of particles (mm)
>10 10– 5– 2– 1– 0.25– 0.1– 0.05– 0.01– <0.005
5 2 1 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005
Urbanized soils similar to bulk ground of the site, summarized (%)
0–22 0.2– 0.3– 0.6– 1.5– 5.2– 25.9– 13.6– 1.2– 2.1– 0.4– 1.3 30–40 1–4
1.8 4.0 2.8 7.8 17.2 58.2 39.1 8.1 5.7 5.7
22–40 0.4
40–50 0.4
Natural sod–average podsolic sandy ground literature data (%)
0–20 27 50 7 2 13 2.3
20–28 27 51 7 4 10 1.9
28–35 56 26 8 2 7 0.2
Natural sod–semipodsolic sandy ground literature data (%)
3–8 91 4 2 0 3 3.7
45–55 92 3 1 1 3 0.4
85–95 91 7 0 0 3 not present
210–220 86 9 2 0 5 not deﬁned
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Table 3.4a. Inﬁltration rate from ﬁeld and laboratory studies.
Method of calculation of inﬁltration factor Kf (m/day)
According to From data on
From laboratory Using Hazena’s restoration of the pumping out
Parameter data formula water level water*
Number of 10 10 4 4
measurements
Spread of values 1.8–13.8 5.38–32.97 1.61–6.43 0.2–13.63
0.76–62.57
Average value of Kf 6.78 17.86 4.25 5.21
23.54
*Data for two boreholes shown.
Table 3.4b. Inﬁltration rate from literature search.
Ground Permeability coefﬁcient Kf (m/day)
Sands of average ﬁneness 10–25
Fine Sand 2–10
Sandy loam 0.61–0.67
Loam 0.005–0.4
Organic content in surface soil layer
There is practically no soil cover in the area concerned. There is no layer of soil
buried under the technogenic deposits. No studies of what remains of the soil have
been carried out.
Whether there were organic compounds in the technogenic soil was not sys-
tematically determined. The presence of wood remains has sometimes been noted
in descriptions of the technogenic deposits over boreholes.
Porosity
The porosity of sod–podsolic soil is about 50% and that of urban soil is 30–40%
(Jakubov, 1999). The porosity of the technogenic deposits was not determined, nor
was that of the alluvial sand bedding beneath them.
Permeability of soil surface layer
The water permeability of the technogenic deposits was not studied. The inﬁltra-
tion coefﬁcients of the alluvial sand bedding beneath them vary from 1.8 to 13.8
according to laboratory data and from 1.61 to 6.43 according to data obtained by
pumping out water (Table 3.4a). The results of the literature search for this soil
property are given in Table 3.4b.
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Moisture of the soil
The moisture of the soil was determined qualitatively by analysis of soil samples
taken from the wells at the site. According to reference data (Stroganova et al.,
2000), the following three categories of soil moisture were used depending on the
degree of moisture content (Sr):
Low 0.0 < Sr < 0.5
Normal 0.5 < Sr < 0.8
Saturated 0.8 < Sr < 1.0
3.3.3 Vegetation cover
Figures 3.14, 3.16, and 3.17 present a general scheme of the distribution of vege-
tation cover at the radioactive waste storage site and adjoining area. At the time of
the case study (2003–2004) about 30% of the storage site was covered with grass.
This was mostly over the waste burial places (spots) within the site. The rest of the
general area is occupied by earth roads, buildings, asphalted sites, and storehouses.
Height of vegetation
The overall height of the grass at the site is low (about 20 cm). The grass areas have
a grass coverage of around 70% (see also Figure 3.7). About 20% of the grassed
area is covered with tansy to a height of about 40 cm.
Trees, reaching 4 m in height, were cut down in 2002. Their stumps and the
bushes that have grown up to 2 m occupy the remaining 10% of the vegetated area.
The height of the trees growing on the adjoining city area vary from 4 to 8 m.
The grass cover there is quite poor and of various types, with a height of 15–30 cm.
3.3.4 Geology and groundwaters
The basic mechanism for the spread of radioactive contaminants through an under-
ground medium is radionuclide transport via groundwater (Laverov et al., 1994).
Hence, the analysis of water-permeable structures in the enclosing strata is of spe-
cial importance to an assessment of the ecological hazard caused by the transport
of radioactive contaminants in the underground medium.
As discussed above, the upper layer of the ground below the site was disturbed
during the original urbanization of the area—for instance, the rainwater pipe con-
structed in the thalweg of Sobolevsky Creek (see Figure 3.4) that crosses the site
from east to west and carries the rainwater accumulated from 400 ha of the neigh-
boring area of the city. As also mentioned, failure of the pipe at the site or below it
could cause heavy ﬂooding of the site.
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Geological characteristics of the site
As discussed, almost the whole of the top layer of the site is technogenic. Its thick-
ness varies from several centimeters to several meters. Embedded in these techno-
genic deposits is an aeration zone through which atmospheric precipitation from
rain and snow thaw percolates into the subsoil aquifer. As shown in Figure 3.20,
the bottom of the technogenic deposits actually lies within the water-bearing hori-
zon.
The underlying Quaternary strata clearly comprises three parts (Figure 3.20).
The top part consists of alluvial sandy formations of the third ﬂoodplain terrace,
the middle part of moraine loams of the Dnieper glaciation, and the lower part of
alluvial–ﬂuvioglacial (ﬂuvioglacial) sandy, argillaceous formations. The sands of
Quaternary age are predominantly quartz with feldspar and carbonates. In thin,
powder-like fractions, glauconite is found as rounded grains, and ore minerals are
also found in small quantities. The clay fraction of the sands consists of montmo-
rillonite, hydromica, admixtures of magnesian silicates, halloysite, and oxides of
iron. Moraine loams are spread insularly. In the ground below RRC-KI, the thick-
ness of the loam layer varies from 0.6 to 5.8m. Loams are brownish, ﬁne-grained
sand, and include up to 20% pebbles and detritus. They are hard, supple, wet, and
dense.
Beneath the Quaternary strata are Jurassic deposits, namely, clays of the Oxford
and Callovian layers. In general, the thickness of the Jurassic rocks is 16 m and
more, but at some spots there are no Jurassic deposits.
Below the Jurassic sandy argillaceous deposits (or the Quaternary strata where
there are no Jurassic deposits), there are coal-bearing deposits, represented by for-
mations of the Upper Carboniferous. These are the Ratmirovsky limestones, which
have been reduced to a condition of gruss (fragmented pieces) and clumps (bed
depth is 6–8 m), and Voskresensky clays (bed depth is about 5 m). Below these are
limestones and dolomites of the Podolsk–Myachkov horizon of the Middle Car-
boniferous. They are strongly karstic and broken in their upper zone.
Subsoil aquifers are conﬁned to the Quaternary deposits; in the Carboniferous
limestones there are pressurized, interstitial karstic waters.
Groundwater
The results of experimental studies obtained with the help of wells bored in the
1990s conﬁrm that there are three aquifers under the territory of the site: above
the moraine, beneath the moraine (above the Jurassic deposits), and in the Upper
Carboniferous (GSPI, 2002).
The layer of moraine loams splits the Quaternary horizon into two water-
bearing subhorizons. First, the upper subhorizon, which is found at 4–6 m depths
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Figure 3.20. A diagrammatic geological section of the site. Quaternary system:
1, technogenic deposits; 2, alluvium of the third ﬂoodplain terrace; 3, moraine of
the Dnieper glaciation; 4, ﬂuvioglacial sediments. Jurassic system: 5, Callovian
and Oxford deposits of malm; 6, Bath and Callovian deposits of malm and dogger.
Upper Carboniferous system, Kasimov layer, Krevyakin horizon: 7, Voskresensky,
thick. 8, Middle Carboniferous system. Lithology: 9, bank; 10, sands; 11, gravel
chippings. 12, Loams: a, Quaternary; b, Jurassic. 13, Sandy loams: a, Quaternary;
b, coal. 14, Clays: a, Jurassic; b, coal; 15, marl; 16, limestone; 17, limestone
(disrupted); 18, gravel chippings, gruss, limestone ﬂour; 19, loams with the clays
resized by secondary processes.
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below the surface and within which there is a water-bearing formation with a 6–
10 m waterhead. Second, the lower horizon, which is found at 11–20 m depths, has
a water-bearing formation with a water head up to 20 m and is thicker.
The uppermost aquifer, above the moraine, is free-ﬂow and widespread beneath
the whole area. Moraine loams constitute the water-conﬁning layer. The chemical
composition of this water changes over a wide range from very sweet water with
mineralization of 0.2 g/l to a brackish kind with mineralization up to 2 g/l and
more. Waters at this horizon contain nitrates, chlorides, phosphates, sulfates, and
other substances that indicate contamination. Non-contaminated waters routinely
have mineralization of 0.3–0.4 g/l, which is hydrocarbonaceous calcium.
The presence of the second aquifer—below the moraine and above the Jurassic
deposits—was found in only one-ﬁfth of all the boreholes. This horizon is a head-
pressure one. Moraine loams provide the upper aquiclude, while the Jurassic clays
provide the lower aquiclude, except in sectors where the Jurassic is absent, where
clays of the Upper Carboniferous form the lower aquiclude. The water head in the
horizon changes from 0.1 to 11.5 m. The chemical composition of these waters
depends on their feed sources and is close either to the composition of the surface
horizon or to the composition of the Upper Carboniferous aquifer.
The Upper Carboniferous aquifer is characterized by a high water head that
amounts to between 24.4 and 25.2 m. The chemical composition of these waters
was deﬁned as hydrocarbonate–sulfate or calcium–sodium–magnesium. The de-
gree of mineralization ranges from 0.37 to 0.7 g/l, and the temperature of the water
ranges between 0 and 20◦C.
Groundwater table
The ground surface is an upper boundary to the upper aquifer, and its relief is shown
in Figure 3.18. The roof of the moraine loam is the lower boundary to the aquifer,
and the base of the moraine loam is an upper boundary to the next horizon.
The permeability of the moraine loam that separates these aquifers is low. The
velocities of the groundwater ﬂow in the upper aquifer are such that contaminated
waters ﬂow outside the area where the moraine loam thins (to the northwest of it).
Hence, it can be assumed that the main transfer of contaminants by underground
waters occurs only in this moraine horizon. Thus, the migration of radionuclides
is bounded below by a roof of moraine loams and above by the so-called depres-
sion surface, on which the water head is equal to the atmospheric pressure. The
groundwater table, averaged over time, is shown in Figure 3.20 (dashed line).
That the upper aquifer is open to the atmosphere enables a considerable ﬂuc-
tuation in levels of underground water to take place. The scale of the ﬂuctuation
can be estimated from long-term regular measurements of the water levels taken at
the observation boreholes of the federal system for groundwater monitoring. The
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Figure 3.21. Position of the nearest observation wells of the federal system for
groundwater monitoring: 1, street name; 2, subway station; 3, logging area; 4,
open water reservoir; 5, area covered with grass, bushes, and trees; 6, observation
wells; 7, storage site for the radioactive waste at RRC-KI.
positions of the two nearest federal boreholes are shown in Figure 3.21. Registered
changes of water level are illustrated in Figure 3.22.
These data indicate quite considerable changes in the groundwater table over
time. The causes of this variation could be seasonal (such as the perennial cy-
cling of the amount of atmospheric precipitation), changes in the area of watertight
road coverage, and/or the activities of industrial enterprises and municipal services.
However, comparison of the water level variation in two neighboring wells shows
that, qualitatively, the variations coincide and that the quantitative differences are
not that large. Note, though, that the distance between these two boreholes is about
twice the size of the site. Thus, in any case, the bottom of the contaminated techno-
genic soil at the site is within the water-bearing horizon.
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Figure 3.22. Variation in groundwater table in two federal monitoring wells near
the site.
3.3.5 Weather patterns
Precipitation
Historical data on atmospheric precipitation in the Moscow area are taken from
records of the Timiryazev Agriculture Academy in Moscow. Data for the period
1961–1997 are illustrated below.
Maximum accumulation of water by snow cover
Starting from the maximum height of snow cover, which in some years is up to
0.7 m before the spring thaw, and taking the density of snow to be 0.3 t/m3, the
maximum height of the water level by the beginning of the thaw can be estimated
at about 230 mm.
Maximum air temperature during the thaw
During the thaw, the maximum air temperature can reach 16◦C.
Wind
Information on wind patterns in Moscow is taken from data provided by the
Moscow Center for Hydrometeorology and Monitoring (see Figure 3.23). As part
of the Russian Federal Service of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Moni-
toring, it regularly produces records of measurements at meteorological stations
(Moscow Center for Hydrometeorology and Monitoring, 2002).
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Daily maximum precipitation (mm)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Year
19 35 19 29 34 62 100 45 47 40 27 26 100
Average daily maximum precipitation (mm)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Year
8 9 9 12 14 24 27 21 17 16 13 10 37
Number of days with various amounts of precipitation
Month Amount of precipitation (mm)
≥0 ≥0.1 ≥0.5 ≥1.0 ≥5.0 ≥10 ≥20 ≥30 ≥50 ≥80
Jan 26.4 20.2 14.6 10.9 2.7 0.3
Feb 22.1 15.4 11.9 8.9 1.9 0.4 0.1 0.03
Mar 19.5 13.8 10.6 8.3 2.0 0.4
April 17.0 12.1 9.9 8.2 2.6 0.9 0.1
May 16.2 12.3 10.3 8.5 3.6 1.4 0.3 0.03
June 17.4 13.7 12.3 10.6 4.7 2.3 1.0 0.3 0.03
July 17.6 14.2 12.6 11.0 5.0 2.6 1.0 0.4 0.06 0.03
Aug 17.4 14.3 12.0 10.5 4.9 2.4 0.7 0.3
Sept 18.6 14.2 12.4 10.6 4.5 2.2 0.4 0.1
Oct 19.9 15.1 12.3 10.4 4.2 1.9 0.4 0.1
Nov 24.3 17.8 14.2 11.3 3.9 1.1 0.1
Dec 27.6 21.6 16.0 11.9 3.4 0.7 0.03
Year 244 185 149 121 43 17 4 1 0.1 0.03
Monthly average duration of precipitation (hours)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Year
291 217 161 100 70 77 75 74 99 137 219 295 1816
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Figure 3.23. Rose diagram of wind patterns in Moscow (% of total observations).
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Table 3.5. Variations in weather conditions, atmospheric stability, and velocity
of wind. (Source: the “Podmoskovnaya” meteorologic station; see, for instance,
Radon, 1999).
Categories of atmospheric stability*
Parameter A B C D E F G
Recurrence of 0.86 7.37 12.72 48.76 3.74 1.61 3.13
weather
conditions (%)
Average wind 1.2 2.35 2.58 2.54 1.54 1.2 0.91
velocity (m/s)
Calm (%) 1.36 1.31 1.51 10.86 2.09 1.02 3.63
*A to G from least to most stable (Energoatomizdat, 2002).
The predominant wind directions are southeasterly (16%), mainly during win-
ter, and northeasterly (19%) during summer.
The variation between these weather conditions is shown in Table 3.5. These
data do not include extreme wind events, for instance, a whirlwind that passed over
the east side of RRC-KI in 1999 (fortunately over an area opposite the radioactive
waste site) that resulted in many trees and branches coming down in the RRC-KI
park zone.
3.4 Human patterns near to RRC-KI
3.4.1 Spatial density of the population around RRC-KI
The average density of the population in the Schukino municipality (RRC-KI is
located in the central part of this area, see Figure 3.1) is about 10,000 persons/km2 .
The perimeter of the area is approximately circular with a radius of about 1.5 km
(Moscow Fund, 2001). The population distribution around RRC-KI is given in
Table 3.6.
3.4.2 Age groups of the population
The age distribution of the local population is given in Figure 3.24.
3.4.3 Average time spent outdoors
The district neighboring RRC-KI (see Figure 3.1) can be considered a zone of
potential pollution because of, for example, run-off transfer of radioactivity from
the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site. The district includes buildings located
within 100 m of the boundaries of the site, namely, 14–16 Maksimova Street, 1, 2,
54Table 3.6a. Distribution of the population within a 5 km  radius of RRC-KI. 
Sectors of wind direction 
Radial zone (m) No. 
I
N
II 
NNE 
III
NE
IV 
ENE 
V
E
VI 
ESE 
VII 
SE 
VIII 
SSE 
IX 
S
X
SSW 
XI 
SW
XII 
WSW 
XIII 
W
XIV 
WNW 
XV 
NW
XVI 
NNW 
100–150 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 163 0 0 
150–200 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 593 99 65 0 0 
200–250 3 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 221 
250–300 4 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 94 0 
300–350 5 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 323 0 106 475 62 0 
350–400 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 364 166 0 90 0 
400–450 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 333 0 0 0 0 0 
450–500 8 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 344 98 6 0 
500–550 9 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 286 168 288 0 0 
550–600 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 401 255 0 81 0 0 
600–650 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 388 0 61 0 0 
650–700 12 66 267 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 273 0 0 0 0 
700–750 13 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 0 0 96 
750–800 14 109 0 0 0 0 0 315 0 0 0 145 311 0 0 0 229 
800–850 15 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 255 0 0 0 0 
850-900 16 400 455 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 465 263 0 00 0 258 
900-950 17 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 222 137 0 0 0 86 
950-1000 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 146 0 0 0 127 0 0 622 0 258 
1000–1050 19 0 0 0 473 0 0 0 0 0 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 
1050–1100 20 0 0 0 496 0 0 0 0 0 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 
1100–1150 21 0 0 0 519 519 0 0 0 0 519 519 519 0 519 519 519 
1150–1200 22 0 0 0 541 541 0 0 0 0 541 541 541 0 541 541 541 
1200–1250 23 0 0 0 564 564 0 0 0 0 564 0 0 0 564 564 564 
1250–1300 24 0 0 0 586 586 0 0 0 0 586 0 0 0 586 586 586 
1300–1350 25 0 0 0 609 609 609 0 0 0 609 0 0 0 609 609 609 
1350–1400 26 0 0 0 631 631 631 0 0 0 631 0 0 0 631 631 631 
1400–1450 27 0 0 654 654 654 654 0 0 654 654 0 0 0 654 654 654 
1450–1500 28 0 0 677 677 677 677 0 0 677 677 0 0 0 677 677 677 
1500–1550 29 699 0 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 0 0 0 0 699 699 
1550–1600 30 722 0 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 0 0 0 0 722 722 
1600–1650 31 744 0 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 0 0 0 0 744 744 
1650–1700 32 767 0 767 767 767 767 767 767 767 767 0 0 0 0 767 767 
1700–1750 33 0 0 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 789 0 0 0 0 789 789 
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Table 3.6b. Distribution of the population within a 5 km  radius of RRC-KI (continued). 
Sectors of wind direction 
Radial zone (m) No. 
I
N
II 
NNE 
III
NE
IV 
ENE 
V
E
VI 
ESE 
VII 
SE 
VIII 
SSE 
IX 
S
X
SSW 
XI 
SW
XII 
WSW 
XIII 
W
XIV 
WNW 
XV 
NW
XVI 
NNW 
1750–1800 34 0 0 812 812 812 812 812 812 812 812 0 0 0 0 812 812 
1800–1850 35 0 0 835 835 835 835 835 835 835 835 0 0 0 0 835 835 
1850–1900 36 0 0 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 0 0 0 0 857 857 
1900–1950 37 0 0 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 0 0 0 0 880 880 
1950–2000 38 0 0 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 0 0 0 0 902 902 
2000–2050 39 0 0 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 
2050–2100 40 0 0 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 947 
2100–2150 41 0 0 970 970 970 0 970 970 970 970 0 0 0 0 970 970 
2150–2200 42 0 0 993 993 993 0 993 993 993 993 0 0 0 0 993 993 
2200–2250 43 0 1015 1015 1015 1015 0 1015 1015 1015 1015 0 0 0 0 1015 1015 
2250–2300 44 0 1038 1038 1038 1038 0 1038 1038 1038 1038 0 0 0 0 1038 1038 
2300–2350 45 0 1060 1060 1060 1060 0 1060 1060 1060 1060 0 0 0 0 1060 1060 
2350–2400 46 0 1083 1083 1083 1083 0 1083 1083 1083 1083 0 0 0 0 1083 1083 
2400–2450 47 0 1105 1105 1105 1105 0 1105 1105 1105 1105 0 0 0 0 1105 1105 
2450–2500 48 0 1128 1128 1128 1128 0 1128 1128 1128 1128 0 0 0 0 1128 1128 
2500–2550 49 0 1151 1151 1151 1151 0 1151 1151 0 0 0 0 0 0 1151 0 
2550–2600 50 0 1173 1173 1173 1173 0 1173 1151 0 0 0 0 0 0 1173 0 
2600–2650 51 0 1196 1196 1196 1196 0 1196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1196 0 
2650–2700 52 0 1218 1218 1218 1218 0 1218 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1218 0 
2700–2750 53 0 1241 1241 1241 1241 0 1241 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1241 0 
2750–2800 54 0 1263 1263 1263 1263 0 1263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1263 0 
2800–2850 55 0 1286 1286 1286 1286 0 1286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1286 0 
2850–2900 56 0 1308 1308 1308 1308 0 1308 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1308 0 
2900–2950 57 0 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1331 0 
2950–3000 58 0 1354 1354 1354 1354 1354 1354 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1354 0 
3000–3050 59 0 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1376 0 
3050–3100 60 0 1399 1399 1399 1399 1399 1399 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1399 0 
3100–3150 61 0 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1421 0 
3150–3200 62 0 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1444 0 
3200–3250 63 0 1466 1466 1466 1466 1466 1466 0 0 0 0 0 1466 0 1466 0 
3250–3300 64 0 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 0 0 0 0 0 1489 0 1489 0 
3300–3350 65 0 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 0 0 0 0 0 1512 0 0 0 
3350–3400 66 0 1534 1534 1534 1534 1534 1534 0 0 0 0 0 1534 0 0 0 
56Table 3.6c. Distribution of the population within a 5 km  radius of RRC-KI (continued). 
Sectors of wind direction 
Radial zone (m) No. 
I
N
II 
NNE 
III
NE
IV 
ENE 
V
E
VI 
ESE 
VII 
SE 
VIII 
SSE 
IX 
S
X
SSW 
XI 
SW
XII 
WSW 
XIII 
W
XIV 
WNW 
XV 
NW
XVI 
NNW 
3400–3450 67 0 1557 1557 1557 1557 1557 1557 0 0 0 0 0 1557 0 0 1557 
3450–3500 68 0 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 0 0 0 0 0 1579 0 0 1579 
3500–3550 69 0 1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 0 0 0 0 0 1602 0 0 1602 
3550–3600 70 0 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 0 0 0 0 0 1624 0 0 1624 
3600–3650 71 0 1647 1647 1647 1647 1647 1647 0 0 0 0 0 1647 0 0 1647 
3650–3700 72 0 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 0 0 0 0 0 1670 0 0 1670 
3700–3750 73 0 1692 1692 1692 1692 1692 1692 0 0 0 0 0 1692 0 0 1692 
3750–3800 74 0 1715 1715 1715 1715 1715 1715 0 0 0 0 0 1715 0 0 1715 
3800–3850 75 0 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 0 0 0 0 0 1737 0 0 1737 
3850–3900 76 0 1760 1760 1760 1760 1760 1760 0 0 0 0 0 1760 0 0 1760 
3900–3950 77 0 1782 1782 1782 1782 1782 1782 0 0 0 0 0 1782 0 1782 1782 
3950–4000 78 0 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 0 0 0 0 0 1805 0 1805 1805 
4000–4050 79 0 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 0 0 0 0 0 1828 0 1828 1828 
4050–4100 80 0 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 0 0 0 0 0 1850 0 1850 1850 
4100–4150 81 0 0 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 0 0 0 0 0 1873 0 1873 1873 
4150–4200 82 0 0 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 0 0 0 0 0 1895 0 1895 1895 
4200–4250 83 0 0 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 0 0 0 1918 1918 0 1918 1918 
4250–4300 84 0 0 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 0 0 0 1940 1940 0 1940 1940 
4300–4350 85 0 0 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 0 0 0 1963 1963 0 1963 1963 
4350–4400 86 0 0 1986 1986 1986 1986 1986 1986 0 0 0 1986 1986 0 1986 1986 
4400–4450 87 0 0 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 0 0 0 2008 2008 0 2008 2008 
4450–4500 88 0 0 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 0 0 0 2031 2031 0 2031 2031 
4500–4550 89 0 0 2053 2053 2053 2053 2053 2053 0 0 0 2053 2053 0 2053 2053 
4550–4600 90 0 0 2076 2076 2076 2076 2076 2076 0 0 0 2076 2076 0 2076 2076 
4600–4650 91 0 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 0 0 0 2098 2098 0 2098 2098 
4650–4700 92 0 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121 0 0 0 2121 2121 0 2121 2121 
4700–4750 93 0 2144 2144 2144 2144 2144 2144 2144 0 0 0 2144 2144 0 2144 2144 
4750–4800 94 0 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 0 0 0 2166 2166 0 2166 2166 
4800–4850 95 0 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 0 0 0 2189 2189 0 2189 2189 
4850–4900 96 0 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 0 0 0 2211 2211 0 2211 2211 
4900–4950 97 0 2234 2234 2234 2234 2234 2234 2234 0 0 0 2234 2234 0 2234 2234 
4950–5000 98 0 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 0 0 0 2256 2256 0 2256 2256 
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Figure 3.24. Age distribution of the local population.
and 4 Gamaley Street, and 2 Rogova Street. The aggregate number of inhabitants
in these buildings was 1,447 as of March 2003, according to the Municipal Council
of Schukino.
The following factors deﬁne the average time spent by the local population
outdoors and in the area neighboring the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site:
• Age structure of the inhabitants of the neighboring houses ;
• Ratio of adults to children, which is about ﬁve;
• Proximity of three restoration areas located outside the zone that could be pol-
luted, namely:
1. October stadium located 0.8 km to the west,
2. Park around the RRC-KI palace of culture located 0.2 km to the south,
2. Park zone located 0.3 km to the north behind 14–16 Maksimova Street.
The average time spent by the local population outdoors in the potentially polluted
area neighboring the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site is about 1.5 hours/day.
The distribution of this period with age is given in Table 3.7.
An assessment of the above data shows that most of the groups that spend time
walking (7–17 years of age and some of the over-60 group) spend their free time in
recreational areas (e.g., outside the potentially polluted zone).
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Table 3.7. Time spent outdoors by age groups.
Age Younger
(years) than 1 1–2 2–7 7–12 12–17 17–60 Over 60
Time spent outdoors 1.5 2 3 1 0.5 0.3 1.5
(hours)
3.4.4 Traffic intensity
In rush hours, up to 3,000 vehicles per hour use the city roads (Maksimova Street
and Gamaley Street) adjoining the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site. Accord-
ing to Russian municipal experts, 3,000 would be the maximum number, while
around 700 vehicles per hour would be the average number in daytime (between
7 A.M. and 9 P.M.).
3.5 Run-off modeling
3.5.1 Choice of main scenarios for modeling
The environmental and radiological characteristics of the RRC-KI radioactive
waste storage site, collected and collated within the TACIS and ISTC projects
and presented above, are far from comprehensive—a reﬂection of the fact that the
exploratory studies of site characteristics were insufﬁcient. Also contributing to
uncertainties in the data used as a basis for modeling the run-off transfer of ra-
dioactivity within the site and the washout of radioactivity from the site are 1) the
incompleteness of the historical records as to what was buried at the site and the
condition it was in and 2) disturbance from the recently started site-rehabilitation
program.
In these circumstances modeling needs to be oriented toward a scoping anal-
ysis rather than a site-speciﬁc analysis. The scoping analysis should focus on the
evaluation of the scale and possible limits of the redistribution and washout phe-
nomenon; it should thus provide a ﬁrst insight into the seriousness of the situation
regarding run-off transfer. It should also produce recommendations for any further
experimental studies needed to reduce uncertainties.
This approach deﬁned the choice of run-off scenarios that were examined
within the Moscow case study. The choice was made on the basis of the analy-
sis of three main factors with an impact on the outcome of the modeling, namely:
• Precipitation rate;
• Soil properties within the site;
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• Effectiveness of the inner wall of the site as a mechanical barrier against run-off
transfer of radioactive waste to outside the storage site.
Precipitation rate
As shown by the meteorological records for the Moscow area presented in Section
3.3.5 on weather patterns, the heaviest rain to occur in Moscow during the past 37
years resulted in 100 mm/day precipitation. This ﬁgure was taken as an upper limit
to characterize any “heavy rain or downpour” that might occur over the site.
The average maximum daily precipitation over a year presented in the same
section is 37 mm/day. Thus, 35 mm of precipitation was taken as the lower limit of
rain considered in the simulation of run-off.
Soil properties within the site
The rate of soil erosion as a result of run-off depends on the role of water inﬁl-
tration of the ground. A crucial parameter for estimating the inﬁltration processes
is saturated hydraulic conductivity. The range of values for this parameter in the
Russian report (Gorlinsky, 2003) is extremely wide—the minimum value given is
0.2m/day, while the highest value is 62 m/day.
After careful discussion of that uncertainty, it was decided to apply an expert
judgment that the site soil covered by grass resembles the “urbanosem” soil type.
According to the data given in Section 3.3.2 on soil characteristics (see Table 3.3),
the range for simulations of the run-off from this part of the site was deﬁned as
150 mm/hour (high hydraulic conductivity) to 40 mm/hour (low hydraulic conduc-
tivity).
According to the land-use maps provided in the Russian report (Gorlinsky,
2003), the rest of the site is characterized by increased human activity that has
resulted in soil compaction and a decrease in hydraulic conductivity. Thus, the
hydraulic conductivity in these areas was assumed to be equal to the minimum of
the considered range, 40 mm/hour, for all scenarios. In Figure 3.17 these areas are
shown as “hard land.”
Saturated soil moisture within the site was deﬁned as being 35% (Gorlinsky,
2003). The preliminary analysis showed that the amount of radioactivity washed
out from the site is strongly related to the initial soil moisture. A higher initial
soil moisture might result in a lower inﬁltration and correspondingly higher rate of
surface run-off. Thus, to explore the impact of the initial soil moisture on radioac-
tivity washout from the site, two limits were considered: a low initial soil moisture
(“dry soil”) and a high initial soil moisture (“wet soil”). The former can occur
naturally when there is rain after a long period of drought. The latter refers to the
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opposite situation in which heavy rain occurs after a lengthy period of drizzle. In
this situation the increased soil moisture should result in decreased inﬁltration and
consequently increased surface water run-off and increased radioactivity washout
and redistribution. Taking into account the physical impossibility for the water to
ﬁll all the possible soil pores, the initial soil moisture for “wet soil” conditions was
accepted as 80% of the saturated soil moisture.
Inner wall as a mechanical barrier to run-off transfer of radioactive waste
outside the storage site
As discussed above, the inner wall (see Figure 3.17) that currently surrounds the ra-
dioactive waste storage site is not a perfect watertight barrier. The wall section CG
is not an obstacle to surface run-off (Gorlinsky, 2003) or to radionuclide transport
toward the area of the institute.
There are tiny holes up to 5–10 mm diameter within each 2 m concrete section
of the wall on the contour KJIHG. However, such small perforations in the wall
could not be considered in the frame of the available run-off codes. Instead, it was
decided to simulate a situation in which a particular concrete section of the wall is
removed, for instance, for repair or because the section bed is totally eroded and
thus does not obstruct water ﬂow at all.
A preliminary analysis of the storm-water run-off ﬁeld on the site and its sur-
roundings reveals that a few sections of the wall are subject to increased water
erosion and, correspondingly, to a higher risk of being destroyed or repaired more
often than other sections. The most vulnerable spots are represented by the letters
“K” and “I” on Figure 3.25. Figure 3.26 also shows the water run-off ﬁeld over
the digital elevation map. Thus, it was decided to consider two scenarios in which
there is a 1 m gap in the inner wall at either point K or I (the “K” scenario and the
“I” scenario).
The case in which the wall on the contour KJIHG is considered watertight is
called the “No hole” scenario. However, the actual absence of the wall on the
eastern part of the wall (sector CG) could result in water run-off toward the area of
RRC-KI and radionuclide washout from the waste storage site area.
Finally, to examine the role of the wall as a simple mechanical barrier the “No
fence” scenario was included in the simulations. This scenario also represents the
case of “no effective wall,” when the wall basement is severely eroded and thus
does not block run-off water.
A scheme of the combination of different features in the full set of scenarios
used for the simulations is presented in Figure 3.27.
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Figure 3.25. Storm-water run-off ﬁeld for the waste storage site of RRC-KI and
its surroundings. Walls around the site are shown as black lines. Letters K and I
indicate the holes in the inner wall for scenarios “K” and “I,” correspondingly.
3.5.2 State of the art of soil erosion modeling and contaminant redis-
tribution
The pathways of radionuclide distribution in the environment are relatively well
studied and described in the literature. The number of software packages and mod-
els that describe these processes is already high and constantly increasing. How-
ever, the particular problem of radionuclide redistribution from nuclear waste sites
within the urban environment has not been studied.
The vast majority of the models developed are devoted to the redistribution
of radionuclides within large natural catchments and ecosystems. This is because
these models are basically modiﬁcations of the models that describe soil erosion
processes for large watersheds or tillage. Among the main soil erosion models
widely recognized and used are EUROSEM, GLEAMS (CREAMS), (R)USLE,
LISEM, WEPP, KINEROS, ANSWERS, AGNPS, MEDALUS, EPIC, etc.
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Figure 3.26. Water run-off ﬁelds over the digital elevation map. The red line over
the landscape shows the location of the inner and outer RRC-KI walls.
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Figure 3.27. Illustration for chosen modeling scenarios.
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Two general approaches to modeling soil erosion are known: empirical and
physical. Models that follow an empirical approach (USLE and RUSLE) require
only a small number of parameters and are easy to apply. However, these empirical
models are lumped and oversimplify the erosion processes that occur at small scales
(OCRWMA, 2000). Physically based models (LISEM, WEPP, EPIC, etc.) require
many more parameters, but physically represent the processes in a more correct
way.
There are two possible ways to model soil erosion over time: continuous and
individual-based, within-storm modeling. Models such as CREAMS and WEPP
use a continuous approach to model the daily seasonal changes in soil character-
istics. In this way the conditions at the start of each rainstorm are predicted. The
problem with continuous simulations is that they require a large amount of input
data on the meteorology and land-use conditions over the year. Thus, they are used
to model a large number of events that produce only small amounts of run-off and
soil loss. Although they can sometimes be run for individual storms, they simu-
late the total storm soil loss only and assume a steady-ﬂow proﬁle along the sur-
face. They do not model the peak sediment discharge or treat the pattern of events
within a storm. On the contrary, within-storm modeling is more compatible with
the equations used in process-based models to describe the mechanics of erosion.
These equations cannot be applied to average conditions but require instantaneous
conditions.
Many of the factors that inﬂuence erosion and sediment redistribution have
considerable spatial variation and cannot be described by a single average value.
Many models treat an area as a single unit or as a limited set of units with uniform
characteristics. If the spatial variation is to be taken into account, a raster- (cell-)
based model must be used. Using this approach the area is divided into a number of
equal cells. Each cell has a number of characteristics, such as elevation, moisture,
slope, etc., according to which the ﬂow and sediment transportation is calculated.
As speciﬁed already, the aim of this study is to model the redistribution of ra-
dionuclides within the RRC-KI storage site, in both their soluble and particulate
forms, and their washout to the municipal area as a result of extreme historical me-
teorological conditions, such as heavy rain. Taking into account the rather speciﬁc
environment around the storage site, the scale and the location of the site, the ne-
cessity of tracing the fate of detached contaminated soil particles, and the need for
high precision in the results, the range of applicable models shrinks drastically. For
instance, many models (RUSLE, USLE, WEPP, etc.) account only for the average
annual soil loss by particular watersheds, while others are not applicable to a single
event or small-scale catchments.
Since the Chernobyl accident many models of radionuclide redistribution have
been developed. However, most of these modeling efforts have focused on the
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transfer from terrestrial to aquatic ecosystems (Monte, 1995; Schnoor, 1996; Bon-
niwell, 1999; etc.) or to their vertical redistribution within the soil (Chibowski
and Mitura, 1995; Slavik, 2000; Panin, 2001). The former consider dissolved ra-
dionuclide transport only. Spatially distributed erosion and sedimentation mod-
els were not widely used to evaluate radionuclide transport from and within wa-
ter catchments. Nevertheless, some radionuclides were widely used as tracers
in many experimental soil erosion studies (Bonniwell, 1999; FAO/IAEA, 2001;
Theocharopoulos, 2003; Walling et al., 2003).
3.5.3 Model description
PCRaster
To combine a detailed spatial analysis with dynamic modeling of the soil erosion
process and radionuclide redistribution, and also to meet the criteria given above,
requires a geographic information system (GIS) software package that not only
enables traditional spatial analysis, but also allows system behavior to be traced
over time. There are two possible options to work with. First is the commonly
recognized and widely used software package, ArcView. The special extension to
this package, called Model Builder, allows a dynamic model using a GIS database
(such as digital elevation map, land-cover map, etc.) to be constructed and run
to observe the possible scenarios of radionuclide redistribution under different en-
vironmental conditions. However, this approach needs the existing mathematical
models of radionuclide redistribution to be transcribed into the special ArcView
script language.
The second choice is to use the raster GIS PCRaster software developed at the
Department of Geographical Sciences of Utrecht University (Karssenberg et al.,
2003). The PCRaster software is a GIS that consists of a set of computer tools
to store, manipulate, analyze, and retrieve geographic information. PCRaster en-
ables us to construct GIS-embedded environmental models by means of an easy-
to-understand, high-level modeling language. The execution of the models within
the raster GIS environment accomplishes a full integration between the geographic
database and the various models and enables a ﬂexible choice of submodels. There
is a bank of existing routines and submodels developed for different environmen-
tal problems. One of the models developed that is appropriate for use within the
current project is LISEM (Limburg Soil Erosion Model), along with a number of
radionuclide redistribution submodels.
Taking into account the speciﬁc requirements for the model imposed by the
site characteristics, LISEM was selected for the modeling stage, along with the
extended data-analysis tools offered by ArcView software.
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LISEM
LISEM is a physically based hydrologic and soil-erosion model that exists in two
versions, one integrated within the PCRaster package and the other a user-friendly,
stand-alone version. However, incorporation of the different submodels is possible
only within the PCRaster version.
The ability of LISEM to cope with soil-erosion modeling has been tested
against experimental data obtained by ﬁeld measurements within the frameworks
of many research projects all over the world (Takken et al., 1999; van der Perk,
2000; Jetten, 2002; Hessel et al., 2003a; Liu et al., 2003). It has been accepted as
giving adequately realistic results, although some limitations to its application were
noticed (Roo and Jetten, 1999). LISEM is a raster-based model and can therefore
simulate detailed spatial patterns of erosion.
LISEM accounts for rainfall, interception, surface storage in micro-
depressions, inﬁltration, overland ﬂow, splash erosion by rainfall, erosion by over-
land ﬂow, and transport capacity of the ﬂow. Figure 3.28 gives a schematic
overview of the processes considered.
Run-off formation in the model begins with raindrops reaching the soil sur-
face. The initial stage of run-off formation includes modeling the kinetic energy
of falling droplets of rain. From Figure 3.28 it is clear that falling droplets are
considered in two different ways: interception and direct throughfall to the surface.
Interception is that part of the precipitation that wets or adheres to the surface of
objects and vegetation above the ground. This variable in the model is calculated on
the basis of information on vegetation cover and leaf area index that corresponds to
the particular type of vegetation. Where vegetation cover is not present, the energy
of falling raindrops detaches soil particles and collects both them and contaminants
deposited on the surface. Soil aggregate stability is used to calculate the rate of
rainfall detachment. The next stage that the falling water should pass through be-
fore it forms the surface run-off is to ﬁll the micro-depressions in the local surface
to form small puddles, which is called depression or surface storage. The ﬁnal
stage, which occurs at the same time as depression storage, is inﬁltration into the
soil. The inﬁltration depends on the permeability characteristics of the soil (soil
hydraulic conductivity) and the soil moisture content.
The ﬂow erosion calculated in the model is divided into two parts: sheet over-
ﬂow (inter-rill) erosion and channel (rill) erosion. The network of possible rills
formed during the rain simulation is calculated on the basis of the digital elevation
map. The channels (or rills) formed can have their own ﬂow and surface char-
acteristics, such as ﬂow resistance (Manning’s N) or soil cohesion along the rill
route.
Although it is possible to choose alternative equations to describe water inﬁl-
tration into the soil, such as the Richardson, Green and Ampt, or Holton equations,
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Figure 3.28. Simpliﬁed ﬂowchart of LISEM (Jetten, 2002): LAI, leaf area index;
Cov, fraction of the soil covered by vegetation; Ksat, saturated hydraulic conduc-
tivity; theta, initial soil moisture; RR, surface random roughness; LDD, local drain
direction; n, Manning’s N, slope derived from the digital elevation map; AS, aggre-
gate stability; COH, soil cohesion; D50, median value of diameter of soil particles
in the top soil layer.
the inﬁltration model implemented in the radionuclide redistribution modiﬁcation
of LISEM is a one-layer Green and Ampt model. This does not limit the applica-
tion of the model to the case under consideration, as, according to the opinions of
RRC-KI experts, the artiﬁcial urban soil within the urban landscape in general and
on the RRC-KI site in particular, is considered to be homogeneous within the ﬁrst
soil layer. This layer of artiﬁcial soil on the site has a depth of more than 2 m.
All the other basic equations that describe the processes of detachment and
transport are identical to the equations used in the European Soil Erosion Model
(EUROSEM), another well-known and widely recognized erosion model (Botter-
weg et al., 1998; Klik, 1998; Morgan et al., 1998).
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The input for LISEM consists of a rainfall time-series and maps of catchment
characteristics, such as vegetation cover, soil characteristics, etc. The total num-
ber of input maps required is 30. The output from the model is a few maps that
present the erosion and deposition processes within the area under consideration
and various time-series for the catchment, such as sediment concentration or water
discharge.
A modiﬁcation of LISEM to model the radionuclide redistribution exists only
in the PCRaster version. This modiﬁcation of the basic LISEM package was devel-
oped by the authors of LISEM, M. van der Perk and O. Slavik, at the Utrecht Center
for Environment and Landscape Dynamics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands,
in cooperation with a number of other European institutions within the framework
of the SPARTACUS project founded by the INCO-COPERNICUS program (Ki-
iva and Zheleznyak 1999; van der Perk, 2000). It calculates radionuclide transport
through a landscape based on sediment transport.
In addition to the basic initial data input for LISEM, the radionuclide modiﬁca-
tion requires a few parameters and maps to clarify the behavior of the radionuclide
under consideration. In particular, maps of both the initial contamination and the
radionuclide distribution coefﬁcients should be provided. Furthermore, the set of
output variables includes maps of deposited particulate activity and of soluble ra-
dioactivity in water bodies, along with a set of time-series, such as soluble and/or
particulate radionuclide concentrations at the catchment outlet and/or suboutlets.
The Appendix contains the applied model code in PCRaster modeling lan-
guage, as used for 137Cs calculations. As all the erosion processes under consider-
ation are exactly the same for both radionuclides, the simulation of 90Sr washout
is the same, except for different distribution coefﬁcients and the map of initial con-
tamination.
One of the characteristic features of any cell-based transport model is the spe-
cial treatment of material movement from one cell to another. All these models
consider this transfer on the basis of a digital elevation map. This leads to ﬂow
concentration within the cells that have the lowest elevation value and the forma-
tion of concentrated water streams. LISEM is not exclusive in this sense. There is
only one possible outﬂow from a particular cell, which leads to the formation of a
narrow (cell-wide) water ﬂow and sedimentation redistribution path. Figure 3.29
illustrates this principle.
A local drain-direction map is one of the inputs to LISEM that is derived from
digital elevation maps. According to this map each cell is connected to its neigh-
boring eight cells in only one way, and this deﬁnes the unique direction in which
the material should ﬂow out in the next time step. Outﬂow to a number of cells is
not possible even if their characteristics are equal. As a result, moving material can
be accumulated from a large catchment area and concentrated to within a narrow
ﬂow.
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Overland flow
Channel flow
Figure 3.29. Overland and channel ﬂow in LISEM based on the local drain-
direction structure.
Uncertainties of the model applied
The selection of hydraulic conductivity as a parameter for sensitivity analysis is also
justiﬁed by other authors. For example, Hessel et al. (2003b) claim that hydraulic
conductivity is one of the most important calibration factors in LISEM.
It becomes clear that LISEM does not work well for environments with rather
steep slopes within the digital elevation map—a speciﬁc feature of the model also
mentioned by Hessel et al. (2003c). The reason for this shortcoming is that some
processes described in LISEM were developed mainly with relatively low-grade
slopes in mind. In particular, grid kinematics wave routing cannot cope with abrupt
changes in ﬂow conditions. For the uncertainties within both the digital elevation
map and initial data, the effect of such an error is ampliﬁed. However, such a
shortcoming is common for all the soil erosion models, as their main goal is to
predict soil loss from ﬁelds.
One of the main problems with the model applied is the concentration of the
ﬂow accumulated from a large catchment area within a narrow ﬂow, the maximum
width of which cannot exceed the cell size. As the cell size in the model selected
is equal to 1 m, the width of the rill formed is also equal to 1 m. This leads to
increased rates of water discharge and, correspondingly, to higher soil erosion and
radionuclide redistribution.
At the same time, the model cannot consider a pond in a local depression larger
than 1 m in diameter. In other words, water accumulated within one cell cannot
spread around other than in the one direction predeﬁned by the local drain-direction
map. As mentioned above, the local drain-direction map is calculated once prior
to the simulation and remains unchanged throughout the simulation. Such an algo-
rithm does not take into account the changes in local elevations caused by erosion
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or the deposition of eroded material in some places. In terms of the simulation
outputs, these features can result in an overestimated deposition within a particu-
lar cell. However, averaging over the adjacent area could signiﬁcantly reduce this
uncertainty. It was this approach that we applied in the study.
However, in principle, this situation can be radically improved only by mod-
iﬁcation of the initial code in a way that ensures recalculation of the local drain
direction at each time step to incorporate changes in the digital elevation map dur-
ing simulations. We hope that this will be done in further studies aimed at a more
site-speciﬁc simulation.
3.5.4 Input data used
A physically based model always requires a wide range of initial data. The same
applies to physically based soil-erosion models. LISEM alone requires at least 24
separate maps that describe catchments, vegetation, soil surface, inﬁltration, and
erosion- and/or deposition-related characteristics.
The initial data should be supplied to LISEM in two different ways. The pa-
rameters that do not have spatial variation, such as soil bulk density, radionuclide
distribution coefﬁcients, or raindrop kinematic energy, are accounted for by chang-
ing values within the shell interface. The spatial input maps for LISEM have to be
organized according to the PCRaster database structure and should be within the
PCRaster GIS format only.
The information package received from RRC-KI experts (Gorlinsky, 2003) con-
tained some maps with separated land-use categories, digital elevation maps, and
contamination maps that were in MapInfo GIS format. The maps received were
converted into ArcView format and a single land-use map was generated on the
basis of the different maps. The derived map was used to create the set of initial
maps for each of the 16 scenarios.
The values for the required parameters obtained either from the RRC-KI infor-
mation package or from the available literature are shown in Table 3.8. The table
also gives short explanations of the parameters used and their ranges, as suggested
by the model authors.
One of the parameters that was not deﬁned in the information package received
from RRC-KI experts is Manning’s N, which is used in the model to describe the
resistance to ﬂow. For a sheet ﬂow (the ﬂow over a plane surface), the friction
value (Manning’s N) is an effective roughness coefﬁcient that also depends on ob-
stacles, such as litter, crop ridges, and rocks, and the erosion and transportation of
sediments, etc. Manning’s N also varies with the depth ﬂow.
The speciﬁc features of the site under consideration and the preliminary cal-
culations enabled us to state that the depth of waterﬂow on most of the site can
be considered as sheet ﬂow. As Manning’s N cannot be measured directly, expert
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Table 3.8a. Parameters used to model the radioactive waste storage site.
Values for different
Parameter Deﬁnition Range, unitsa land-use categoriesb
Leaf area index The total area of all leaves of plants 0–12, – Grass, 1
relative to the ground surface Trees, 4
within a given area Other, 0
Fraction of soil covered 0–1, – Grass, 0.3
by vegetation Trees, 1
Other, 0
Vegetation height Height of vegetation cover on site 0–30, m Grass, 0.2
and neighboring territory Trees, 5.2
Aggregate stability Median number of drops to decrease 0.00001–200 (for the Hard land, 50
the aggregate by 50% ground that, in principle, Non-erodible (road, asphalt), 9999
is subject to erosion) Grass, 10
Soil cohesion (COH) COH is an index of soil resistance kPa Grass, ploughed land, 3
related to the ability to resist Limitations: Steep, 2
external forces COH + COHADD ≥ Hard land, 50
0.196 Non-erodible (road, asphalt), 9999
Additional cohesion by Additional resistance to external kPa Grass, steep, 1
vegetation roots forces by vegetation roots Limitations: Ploughed land, 0
(COHADD) COH + COHADD ≥ Hard land, 0
0.196 Other, 0.02
Manning’s N for the soil Manning’s N is a dimensionless 0.001–10, – Varies from 0.02 (hard land on site)
surface number that deﬁnes the ﬂow resistance to 0.1 (lawn outside the site)
of a unit of bed surface. Resistance is a
function of particle size, bed shape, etc.
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Table 3.8b. Parameters used to model the radioactive waste storage site (continued).
Values for different
Parameter Deﬁnition Range, unitsa land-use categoriesb
Random roughness for Standard deviation of the micro 0.05–20, cm Road, 0.1
the soil surface relief heights Other, 1
D50 value of the soil Median of the texture of the soil 25–300, nm 50
Saturated hydraulic The constant rate at which a 0–1000, mm/h Grass on the site
conductivity saturated soil (or sand) is able low hydraulic conductivity, 40
to transmit water downward high hydraulic conductivity, 150
Lawn outside the site, 40
Hard land on site, 40
Stone debris, 150
Roads, other, 0
Saturated volumetric soil Volume of water in saturated soil 0–1, – 0.35
moisture content divided by the total volume of the soil
Initial volumetric soil Initial volume of water in soil 0–1, – Dry scenario, 0.14
moisture content divided by the total volume of the soil Wet scenario, 0.28
Soil water tension at the Soil water tension measures the force 0–1000, cm 17
wetting front with which water is retained by the soil
Soil depth of ﬁrst layer Depth of the ﬁrst soil layer (needed 0–. . ., mm Grass, land, 200
for inﬁltration calculations) Stone debris, 100
Equilibrium distribution Relationship of the concentration of 0.28–4.6, m3/kg 1.7
coefﬁcient of Cs in water 137Cs in the water to the concentration
and in background soil of 137Cs in the background soil
when in equilibrium
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Table 3.8c. Parameters used to model the radioactive waste storage site (continued).
Values for different
Parameter Deﬁnition Range, unitsa land-use categoriesb
Equilibrium distribution Relationship of the concentration of 0.28–4.6, m3/kg 3.7
coefﬁcient of Cs in water 137Cs in the water to the concentration
and in suspended soil of 137Cs in the suspended soil
particles particles when in equilibrium
Equilibrium distribution Relationship of the concentration of m3/kg 0.4
coefﬁcient of Sr in water 90Sr in the water to the concentration
and in background soil of 90Sr in the background soil
when in equilibrium
Equilibrium distribution Relationship of the concentration of m3/kg 1.3
coefﬁcient of Sr in water 90Sr in the water to the concentration
and in suspended soil of 90Sr in suspended soil particles
particles when in equilibrium
Thickness of active layer 0–. . ., mm 5 (default value)
of interaction between
run-off water and top soil
Soil density kg/m3 1800
Porosity The total volume of voids per 0.01–0.60, cm3/cm3 0.4
unit volume of porous material
a
‘-’ for dimensionless parameter.
bvalues for the parameters are given according to the land- use categories deﬁned by RRC-KI experts (see Figure 3.19). If the speciﬁc map is not mentioned,
the value is unique for the whole area.
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estimates are needed. The literature available was used to deﬁne this value, but it
gave a wide range of possible values. Moreover, in the manual for EUROSEM,
Manning’s N is considered to be a calibration parameter. In the StormSHED man-
ual (BOSS International, 2001) the values for sheet ﬂow over asphalt ranged from
0.011 to 0.05, while for short lawns the value is 0.15.
Calibrated values of Manning’s N for LISEM are given in Takken (1999). Ac-
cording to this research, Manning’s N values for asphalted roads and buildings
should be about 0.01 and for grassland up to 0.2. While the urban lawn can be
deﬁned to some extent as a grassland, vegetation cover on the site is considered to
be sparse and rare (Gorlinsky, 2003). Given the above considerations, Manning’s N
was accepted as within the range 0.01–0.1, with the minimum assigned to asphalted
surfaces on the site and the maximum to areas covered with the grass outside the
area of the site.
Another crucial parameter needed to estimate the inﬁltration processes is sat-
urated hydraulic conductivity. The range of values for this parameter in the Rus-
sian report (Gorlinsky, 2003) is extremely wide. The minimum value presented is
0.2 m/day while the highest value is 62 m/day.
After careful discussion of the uncertainty it was recommended that expert
judgment be applied, according to which the range for simulations should be from
a high hydraulic conductivity of 150 mm/hour to a low one of 40 mm/hour.
Some site areas might have signiﬁcant variation in hydraulic conductivity.
These areas are characterized by grass cover and are hardly affected by human
activity on the site. According to the land-use maps provided by KI, the rest of the
site is characterized by increased human activity, which has resulted in soil com-
paction and a decrease in hydraulic conductivity. Thus, the hydraulic conductivity
in such areas was assumed to be equal to the minimum of the considered range,
40 mm/hour, for all scenarios. In Figure 3.17 these areas are presented as “Crusty
Land.”
Saturated soil moisture of the soil within the site was deﬁned as 35% (Gor-
linsky, 2003). The preliminary analysis showed that the amount of radioactivity
washed out from the site is strongly related to the initial soil moisture. A higher ini-
tial soil moisture might result in a lower inﬁltration and, correspondingly, a higher
rate of surface run-off. Thus, another set of scenarios has to be undertaken to enable
a study of the inﬂuence of the initial soil moisture on the radioactivity washed out
from the site. The ﬁrst scenario corresponds to dry conditions with low initial soil
moisture. Such a scenario applies when extremely heavy rain occurs after a long
period of drought or lack of rain. A second scenario is for the situation in which
heavy rain occurs after a period of continuous drizzle prior to the heavy rain. In this
situation the increased soil moisture (wet conditions) should result in a decreased
inﬁltration and, consequently, an increased surface-water run-off and increased ra-
dioactivity washout and redistribution. As it is physically impossible for the water
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Figure 3.30. Time-series for rainfall intensities for two scenarios: heavy
(100 mm/hour) and average (35 mm/hour) rain.
to ﬁll all the possible soil pores, the initial soil moisture for wet soil conditions was
accepted as 80% of that for saturated soil moisture.
As has already been mentioned, major soil erosion and corresponding radioac-
tivity redistribution occur during single severe storms. Thus, the main set of sce-
narios developed simulates the redistribution of radionuclides caused by the most
severe historically observed single storm in Moscow. According to past meteoro-
logical data, for the 37 years from 1961 to 1997 such a storm happened once and
produced 100 mm of precipitation.
However, it was also decided to estimate radionuclide washout for rain of or-
dinary intensity, which is 35 mm for the region under consideration. On the basis
of typical rain-intensity time-series for this region (Strauss et al., 2001), an input
time-series for rain (Figure 3.30) in the simulations was developed.
In both cases during the ﬁnal 10 minutes there is no rainfall over the area (the
rain intensity is 0 mm/hour). This is to allow all run-off over the area to end by
reaching the outlet or by accumulating in local ponds.
As the area under consideration is relatively small in comparison to the typical
input LISEM map that shows the different rain gauges, the rain gauge over the
considered area is postulated as being homogeneous. This implies that the rain
covers the whole area with the same intensity and duration.
As described above, for qualitative, physically based spatial modeling to be ac-
curate, precise input information is required. One of the parameters that inﬂuences
the ﬁnal result the most is the digital elevation map. The whole set of initial maps,
on the basis of which the level of erosion, direction of sediment transportation, and
sedimentation rates are calculated, is derived solely from the digital elevation map.
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To include the characteristic features of the site, such as buildings and other
major obstacles to run-off formation and movement, the initial digital elevation
map was modiﬁed by adding the buildings and wall. The corresponding isometric
picture based on the actual digital elevation map used is presented in Figure 3.19.
3.5.5 Output of run-off modeling
The PCRaster software used to model the radionuclide redistribution not only en-
ables a numerical estimate of the amount of radionuclide washout from the site to
be obtained, but also shows the spatial redistribution pattern of washed-out con-
taminants. However, the output format for the results of the simulations should be
treated further to obtain the ﬁnal picture of redistribution. Also, the PCRaster envi-
ronment does not enable a quantitative representation of the results obtained. Thus,
the output maps were converted into the ArcView format and the spatial statistics
for these maps calculated. The database that contains the results of the simulations,
the ﬁnal maps in the PCRaster and ArcView formats, and the time-series is archived
on a CD-Rom. Results of the simulations carried out are given in Table 3.9.
The left side of Table 3.9 describes the scenarios considered during the model-
ing and described above in Section 3.5.1 on the choice of main scenarios for mod-
eling. The ﬁrst column deﬁnes the different rain intensities, and the second column
the soil condition in accordance with the initial soil moisture (“dry,” 0.14; “wet,”
0.28) and hydraulic conductivity for the site areas that do not have a compacted
soil surface (40 mm/hour and 150 mm/hour). The third column clariﬁes the wall
condition deﬁned in the same section and assumed within the particular scenario.
Additional details of the scenarios are given in Section 3.5.4 on input data used.
The amount of radionuclides washed out from the site was calculated by inte-
gration of the contaminants discharged through predeﬁned points, called suboutlets
in the LISEM environment. The “No fence” scenario (which is the same as “no
effective wall,” as discussed above) presents the radionuclide discharge through the
whole perimeter of the site. Thus, it is not possible to calculate the amount of ra-
dionuclides washed out in soluble form from the site. The particulate radionuclide
contamination in this scenario was calculated on the basis of the map of contami-
nant redistribution in the GIS package ArcView.
The same technique was used to calculate the sedimentation of contaminated
particles along their pathway in the scenario “No hole.” The territory outside the
site along the redistribution pathway was divided into three subareas. This sub-
division is determined by the different possible radiological implications of the
deposited radionuclides. Area I is that part of the RRC-KI grounds between the
storage site for the radioactive waste and the nearest checkpoint. Area II is the
road between the checkpoint and municipal car park. Area III is the municipal car
park, actually located between the inner and outer walls of RRC-KI. The borders
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Table 3.9. Simulation results for radioactivity washout from the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site. Shaded cells stand for the parameters in the 
"No fence" scenario when there is no code checkpoint indicated on the wall and, correspondingly, no calculation of washed-out material or activity is 
possible. 
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Figure 3.31. The radionuclide washout path for the “No hole” scenario with hy-
draulic conductivity 40 mm/hour, rain intensity 100 mm/hour, and initial soil mois-
ture 0.28, and the areas of radionuclide deposition (1, site border; 2, Institute check-
point; 3, municipal car park). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the
radioactive waste storage site.
of the selected areas are shown in Figure 3.31: line 1 shows the border between
the southwestern part of the waste storage site and the rest of the RRC-KI grounds.
Line 2 separates the grounds of RRC-KI from the road that leads to the RRC-KI
checkpoint, and line 3 shows the border between the road and the car park.
Comparison of Figures 3.31 and 3.32 shows that contamination of the munic-
ipal car park can occur in the “No hole” scenario only with heavy rain and unfa-
vorable soil conditions. The water discharge for scenario “dry 150” is not large
enough to transport the contaminated sediments through the landscape.
From Table 3.9 it is clear that the highest radionuclide washout occurs when
the hole is located near the point “K.” This result is explained by the higher con-
centration of radionuclides in the catchment area near point “K” and also by the
much lower soil cohesion in this part of the site. Moreover, the local elevation in
the middle of the site that faces this (northern) part of the wall has a steep slope.
According to the simulation, the waterﬂow out through hole “K” can have a speed
of up to a few meters per second for the heavy rain scenario. Thus, the deposition
rate near the inner wall is not high (Figures 3.33 and 3.34).
The higher deposition rate and correspondingly higher radioactivity concentra-
tion may be observed near the outer wall close to point “O” (see Figure 3.17). As
described in Section 3.3.1 on topography and engineering barriers to water drainage
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Figure 3.32. 137Cs redistribution for the “No hole” scenario with hydraulic con-
ductivity 150 mm/hour, rain intensity 100 mm/hour; and initial soil moisture 0.14,
and the areas of radionuclide deposition outside the radioactive waste storage site.
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Figure 3.33. 137Cs redistribution for scenario “K” with hydraulic conductivity
40 mm/hour, rain intensity 100 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.28 (80% satu-
rated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the radioactive waste storage
site.
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Figure 3.34. 137Cs redistribution for scenario “K” with hydraulic conductivity
40 mm/hour, rain intensity 35 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.28 (80% satu-
rated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the radioactive waste storage
site.
from the site, the size of the drainage storm-water outlet in the outer wall can ac-
commodate a water discharge of up to 100 l/s only. At the same time, the simula-
tions show that the volume of incoming water is more than 1000 l/s. According to
the digital elevation map, water that enters the car park will accumulate along the
outer wall. This causes a signiﬁcant decrease in the ﬂow speed and, consequently,
increases the sedimentation rate of contaminated particles.
Washout from the hole in the wall located at point “I” is also signiﬁcant because
of the direct water run-off from the top point in the center of the site. Unlike point
“K,” there is no local elevation depression before the hole that provides some space
for water to accumulate and thus increased sedimentation. Moreover, the surface
around hole “I” along the redistribution route is ﬂatter than that at “K.” Thus, the
sedimentation rate is higher along the stream. 137Cs redistributions for scenario “I,
wet 40” for different rain intensities are shown in Figure 3.35 and Figure 3.36.
The spatial patterns of radionuclide redistribution for the “No fence” scenario
for heavy and average rain are presented in Figures 3.37 and 3.38. The areas con-
taminated with 137Cs and 90Sr within a particular scenario are identical. Thus, only
one contaminant, either 137Cs or 90Sr, is presented here.
Figure 3.39 compares water discharges through the hole in the inner wall for
scenario “I” for both rain intensities and both soil conditions. It can be concluded
that variations in the soil characteristics within the speciﬁed ranges and the location
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Figure 3.35. Radionuclide redistribution path for scenario “I” with hydraulic con-
ductivity 40 mm/hour, rain intensity 100 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.28
(80% saturated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the radioactive
waste storage site.
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Figure 3.36. 137Cs redistribution for scenario “I” with hydraulic conductivity
40 mm/hour, rain intensity 35 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.28 (80% of
saturated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the radioactive waste
storage site.
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Figure 3.37. 137Cs redistribution for the “No fence” scenario with hydraulic con-
ductivity 40 mm/hour, rain intensity 100 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.28
(80% of saturated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the storage site
for radioactive waste.
Radionuclide concentration
(Bq/m2)
2e+07
3.7e+06
1.3e+05
4.5e+03
5.4
Scenario 35 ‘No fence’ dry 150
Figure 3.38. 90Sr redistribution for the “No fence” scenario with hydraulic con-
ductivity 150 mm/hour, rain intensity 35 mm/hour, and initial soil moisture 0.14
(40% saturated). Arrow shows the maximum deposition outside the radioactive
waste storage site.
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Figure 3.39. Comparison of water discharges through the hole in the inner wall
for scenario “I.”
of the hole do not seriously inﬂuence water discharge from the site for rain of
average intensity. Moreover, the catchment area for this outlet is covered mainly
by “hard” (compacted) land. This result is in congruence with simulation results
for the amount of leached radioactivity (see Table 3.9). The difference between
scenarios “wet 40” and “dry 150” in terms of washed out radioactivity is negligible
for average rain.
Radionuclide washout in the soluble form was calculated with suboutlet check-
points provided by the LISEM code. In scenarios “I,” “K,” and “No hole” the local
suboutlet is indicated at the hole within the wall for the ﬁrst two scenarios or on
the rill body at the eastern border of the site close to point N (Figures 3.40–3.43).
This technique is possible for scenario “No hole” because the preliminary analysis
of the formed rill structure showed only one water channel that ﬂowed out from the
area of the site along the southern wall through point “N” (see Figure 3.17).
In the process of run-off redistribution of the contamination within the site,
the contaminated particles are eroded mainly from the hill slopes in the middle of
the site and deposited along the wall in places where the rills are formed. However,
such a deposition occurs only where the sediment concentration in the run-off water
body becomes greater than the ﬂow transport capacity. As the transport capacity is
a function of ﬂow velocity, which is in turn a function of the ﬂow bed resistance
and slope gradient, deposition occurs mainly in local depressions or on the land
areas characterized by an increased resistance to ﬂow.
Radionuclide redistribution within the waste storage site was calculated on the
basis of the ArcView GIS package. The output maps from the PCRaster soft-
ware were imported into the ArcView format and statistics for them calculated.
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Figure 3.40. Rills network formed when it rains in the “No hole” scenario. The
suboutlet speciﬁed to calculate the outﬂow is labeled with the number 1.
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Figure 3.41. Rills network in scenario “K.”
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Figure 3.42. Rills network in the “No fence” scenario.
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I
Figure 3.43. Rills network in scenario “I.”
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Figure 3.44. 137Cs redistribution within the site for scenario “100, “I,” wet 40.” d
is the ratio between the ﬁnal and initial activity of 137Cs within the cell.
Table 3.10. The redistribution of radionuclides within the site for scenario “100,
“I,” wet 40,” where d is the ratio between the ﬁnal and initial activity of 137Cs
within the cell.
d intervals Area (m2) Area/total site area
d < 0.9 330 0.033
0.9 < d < 1.1 9600 0.95
1.1 < d < 2 80 0.008
2 < d < 10 50 0.005
10 < d 7 0.0007
Table 3.10 shows the characteristics of redistribution of 137Cs for the scenario
“100, “I,” wet 40” and the corresponding redistribution of 137Cs is presented in
Figure 3.44.
3.5.6 Contamination of local area and public exposure
Public exposure to run-off from the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site is based
on the results of run-off modeling presented in the previous section. To simplify
this section, the scenarios considered are brieﬂy summarized below. Two rates of
precipitation and two sets of conditions for the site soil are considered:
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• Run-off from the radioactive waste site caused by heavy rain (downpour) with
an intensity of 100 mm, the highest measured in Moscow for 40 years. The
conditions of the soil on the radioactive waste site before the rain were consid-
ered as wet (case wet 40) or dry (case dry 150). The numbers in parenthesis
indicate soil inﬁltration rate in mm/h.
• Run-off caused by a rain of average intensity (35 mm), cases wet 40 and dry
150.
Several hypothetical scenarios for the barrier capacity of the inner wall that sur-
rounds the radioactive waste site were considered, in particular:
• “No hole” scenario: a watertight wall around the site, with the exception of the
east perimeter, where the wall is “transparent” to run-off;
• “No fence” scenario: the wall around the radioactive waste site has no resis-
tance to run-off waters;
• Scenarios “I” and “K” assume a watertight wall around the site with the excep-
tion of one aperture 1 m wide at points “I” and “K,” respectively; the locations
of these points are on the run-off water ﬂows (see Figure 3.18).
The “heavy rain” run-off scenario supposes ﬂooding of the radioactive waste site
with large amounts of rainwater and subsequent run-off from the site. It is assumed
that the ﬂow of contaminated water will reach the wall of the site and release it
to the neighboring area between the wall of the site and the outer wall of RRC-
KI; this area is used as a municipal car park. In addition, contaminated waters
partially ooze out to the city street that adjoins the outer wall of RRC-KI; this ﬂow
runs along the street to the lowest local point, which is usually ﬂooded during rainy
periods. The run-off waters reach the ﬂooded part (Figure 3.45) and disperse across
the whole area. After the water has dried up, the ﬂooded area is contaminated with
radionuclides. The scenarios of contamination considered assume that the run-
off event will be followed by dry weather, and thus new rains will not wash the
radionuclides out from the contaminated ground or redistribute them further.
Contamination of local urban area according to run-off modeling results
According to the results of run-off scenarios, the local areas outside the RRC-KI
boundaries that may be contaminated by run-off waters from the storage site are:
• Municipal car park;
• Part of the street ﬂooded by the run-off waters during a rainy period.
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Figure 3.45. Flooded area near to the boundaries of the RRC-KI radioactive waste
storage site during downpours that occurred from 1998 to 2000.
The area of the municipal car park is about 6,200 m2 and the ﬂooded area in the
street about 3,500 m2. The volume of the ﬂooded part in rainy periods is about
2,500–2,700 m3. According to the run-off scenarios, contamination of the car park
forms by sedimentation of the radionuclides in particulate form: the contamination
levels were calculated directly by LISEM (Table 3.11). In contrast, contamination
of the street forms by radionuclides that ooze in soluble form through the hole in
the outer wall (point “O” in Figure 3.17). The residual contamination of the street
area after the contaminated water has entered the sewer via a drain was calculated
on the assumption that the ﬂooding waters remain in the street for several hours (up
to 1 day) before drainage, so that radionuclides are adsorbed into the bottom soils.
With conservative values for the partitioning coefﬁcients (Kd) for 137Cs and 90Sr of
1800 and 110 l/kg, respectively (Thibault, 1990), and a sediment thickness of 1 cm,
the estimated residual amounts of radionuclides in the street after the ﬂooded area
has dried are: 137Cs up to 95% and 90Sr about 70% of the initial contamination.
The average densities of surface soil contamination across the ﬂooded area in the
street are given in Table 3.11.
88Table 3.11. Surface activity of radionuclides in some local areas contaminated by run-off from the RRC-KI radioactive waste
site. Local areas considered: (i) car park situated between the wall of the radioactive waste site and the outer wall of RRC-KI
and (ii) local ﬂooded area along the street adjacent to the outer wall of RRC-KI.
Surface activity Surface activity
Surface activity Surface activity of 137Cs at the of 90Sr at the
Soil of 137Cs at the of 90Sr at the ﬂooded area ﬂooded area
conditions car park car park in the street in the street
Scenario before rain (Bq/m2) (Bq/m2) (Bq/m2) (Bq/m2)
Heavy rain, downpour (100 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 1.01e(+4) 2.01e(+3) 8.9e(+3) 3.7e(+2)
Dry 150 0 0 1.7e(+2) 70
“No fence” Wet 40 1.25e(+4) 2.47e(+3) not calculated not calculated
Dry 150 9.1e(+3) 1.8e(+3) not calculated not calculated
“I” Wet 40 6.7e(+4) 1.34e(+4) 2.2e(+3) 9.3e(+2)
Dry 150 1.71e(+4) 3.4e(+3) 1e(+3) 4.4e(+2)
“K” Wet 40 8.08e(+4) 1.63e(+4) 1.9e(+3) 7.9e(+2)
Dry 150 3.83e(+4) 7.6e(+3) 1e(+3) 4.2e(+2)
Rain of average intensity (35 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 0 0 0 0
“No fence” Wet 40 4.3e(+3) 0.87e(+3) not calculated not calculated
“I” Wet 40 1.8e(+3) 0.36e(+3) 2.3e(+2) 9.4e(+1)
“K” Wet 40 1.3e(+4) 2.6e(+3) 2.3e(+2) 9.6e(+1)
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Estimation of public exposure
In urban conditions, the principal pathways for exposure of members of the public
to radiation are:
• External gamma ray exposure from contaminated ground;
• Exposure from inhalation of resuspended radionuclides.
The local people living in the buildings nearest to the radioactive waste site and
those who use the car park are considered to be critical groups that could potentially
receive higher radiation exposures.
There are different approaches to evaluating the risk caused by radioactivity
transfer outside an allotted area, such as comparison with the acceptable annual
dose limit currently ﬁxed in the ofﬁcial legislative and/or normative documents,
estimation of the excess lifetime-risk through exposure, etc. As indicated above,
run-off modeling was oriented to a scoping analysis. We thus decided not to be-
come involved in a discussion as to which criterion is better and whether a dose
limit is likely to change in the future, but to choose the simplest approach: com-
parison with the current ofﬁcial dose-rate limit. The data obtained and presented in
this report on radionuclide contamination allow specialists to recalculate the risk in
other terms, if they wish.
External exposure of local critical groups of citizens to gamma radiation
External exposures of members of the public to gamma radiation were calculated
for two contaminated local areas: the car park and the contaminated local area in
the street. The exposure from groundshine was associated with a surface contami-
nation of the ground by 137Cs. The effective dose coefﬁcient for this (5.51e [–16]
Sv/s per Bq/m2) used in the calculations includes contributions from progeny, as-
suming secular equilibrium; this value is recommended as the best value available
to date for groundshine assessment (Eckerman and Leggett, 1996; ICRP, 1996a).
A similar value for the groundshine dose conversion factor for 137Cs was used
in Energoatomizdat (1984). The estimated effective dose rates from groundshine
received by members of the public are summarized in Table 3.12.
The scenarios of run-off from heavy rain indicate the following effects of
groundshine external exposure on members of the public:
• At the car park, the effective dose rates from groundshine received by car
drivers when outside their cars vary from about 0.02 μSv/h to 0.12–0.15 μSv/h,
depending on the run-off scenario. At present, the average measured value of
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Table 3.12. External exposure received by members of the public from ground-
shine in some local areas contaminated after run-off from the RRC-KI radioactive
waste site. Local areas considered are given in Table 3.11.
Effective dose rate of
Effective dose rate of external exposure to
Soil external exposure to contaminated ground
conditions contaminated ground in the ﬂooded area
Scenario before rain at the car park (Sv/h) in the street (Sv/h)
Heavy rain, storm (100 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 0.019e(-6) 1.7e(-8)
Dry 150 0 3.2e(-10)
“No fence” Wet 40 0.024e(–6) not calculated
Dry 150 0.017e(-6) not calculated
“I” Wet 40 0.128(–6) 4.2e(-9)
Dry 150 0.033e(-6) 2e(-9)
“K” Wet 40 0.154e(-6) 3.6e(-9)
Dry 150 0.073e(-6) 1.9e(-9)
Rain of average intensity (35 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 0 0
“No fence” Wet 40 8.2e(-9) not calculated
“I” Wet 40 3.4e(-9) 4.5e(-10)
“K” Wet 40 2.4e(-8) 4.5e(-10)
external exposure is about 13.7 μR/h at the car park. Maximum values can eas-
ily be detected by dosimetric control because the additional gamma irradiation
practically doubles the existing radiation background here. The existing back-
ground at the car park is already somewhat higher (by 5 μR/h) than the normal
background in the city. The increased levels of external exposure within the
initial period are expected to continue after the run-off event; in subsequent
periods, weathering and intensive trafﬁc will lead to a gradual decrease in con-
tamination at the car park. Moreover, car drivers usually spend only a short time
at the car park. The highest doses of external exposure will be associated with
the permanent personnel responsible for cleaning and guarding the car park.
• In the street, the effective external dose rates received by members of the pub-
lic within the contaminated local area are very low and hardly detectable by
dosimetric control. The maximum value is about 0.017 μSv/h (Table 3.12).
The scenarios of run-off from rain of average intensity indicate the following effects
of external exposure of members of the public to groundshine (Table 3.12):
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• Rain of average intensity can lead to a small increase in external exposure at
the car park, with a maximum value of 0.02 μSv/h (scenario “K”);
• Normal rain has practically no effect on the external exposure received by the
public within the local area ﬂooded with rainwater.
Inhalation pathway of exposure of local critical groups of inhabitants
After rainfall, run-off from the radioactive waste site will lead to local areas being
contaminated with dried radioactive sediments. The dried solutions form deposits
of very ﬁne particles with an active median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of
about 1 mm and less. These particles are easily suspended in the air to form ﬁne
radioactive dust (see, for instance, Gavrilov et al., 1995; Hollander and Garger,
1996; Garger et al., 1999).
The concentration of radioactivity in the air, Cair (1 m above surface), is
estimated by the formula (Nickholson, 1988; Makhonko, 1992; Goscomecology,
1999):
Cair(Bq/m
3) = Ksusp(t)Cground(Bq/m
2),
where
Cground is the surface density of the radionuclide on the ground;
Ksusp(t) is the resuspension factor (m−1).
Several expressions exist for Ksusp(t) as a function of time t (Sehmel, 1980;
Nickholson, 1988; Makhonko, 1992; Goscomecology, 1999). For an urban area
disturbed by trafﬁc and pedestrians, the initial resuspension factors of about
10−5 m−1 for fresh atmospheric deposits tend to decrease with time, even when
downward migration is inhibited, as on asphalt road (Sehmel, 1980; Till and
Meyer, 1983; Nickholson, 1988). Usually, the resuspension factor drops by two
or three orders of magnitude within 1 month of deposition. In Goscomecology
(1999), the recommendation is to estimate the resuspension factor using the
formula
Ksusp(t) = 10
−5exp[−(λ1 + λ2 + λ)t] + 10−9exp[−(λ2 + λ)t],
where λ1 = 1.26 × 10−2/day, which is the decrease in the rate of resuspension
with time (t1/2 = 55 days for the initial “rapid” phase of resuspension decrease),
λ2 is the decrease in the rate of residual long-term resuspension with time, and
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λ is the radioactive decay constant for a given radionuclide. Given the initial
phase of resuspension from a contaminated dried ﬂooded area and the long-lived
radionuclides (90Sr and 137Cs), a reasonable value for Ksusp from dried deposits
would be 10−5 m−1. However, since the depositions are originally wet and cannot
suspend easily, a more realistic value for the resuspension factor during the initial
period after the run-off is 10−6 m−1. This value decreases to 2 × 10−8 m−1, an
average experimental value under normal conditions over this area. Inhalation
dose rates (Einh) for members of local critical groups of inhabitants are estimated
using the formula (Moiseev and Ivanov, 1990; Goscomecology, 1999):
Einh = DFinh× inhalation of radioactive dust (Bq/h)
Inhalation of radioactive dust was calculated by multiplying the activity in the
air (in the street or building) by breathing rate and period of breathing. Breathing
rates for typical men, women, and children of different ages (both at rest and when
active) are given in Goscomecology (1999) and Moiseev and Ivanov (1990). Dose
conversion factors for inhalation (DFinh, in Sv/Bq) were taken from ICRP (1996b)
and IAEA (1996).
The calculated concentrations of resuspended radionuclides in the air and the
effective dose rates by inhalation of 137Cs and 90Sr are given in Tables 3.13 and
3.14. The run-off scenarios for heavy rain indicate the following effects on air
contamination and corresponding inhalation dose rates to members of the public:
• At the car park, the contamination of the air (1 m above ground) caused by
resuspension of dried deposits varies within the ranges 0.01–0.08 Bq/m3 for
137Cs and 0.002–0.016 Bq/m3 for 90Sr (Table 3.13). These values are higher
than the typical observed activity concentrations in air within the KI boundaries,
which are reported to be about 1 × 10−4 to 2 × 10−4 Bq/m3. The calculated
values show the maximum levels of air contamination, which are expected to
decrease to normal within a few months. The effective inhalation dose rates for
drivers when outside their cars vary within the ranges 5× 10−11 to 44× 10−11
Sv/h for 137Cs and 7.8 × 10−11 to −69 × 10−11 Sv/h for 90Sr, depending on
the run-off scenario. All these dose rates are very low compared with the dose
limit.
• In the street, contamination of the air (1 m above contaminated ground) through
resuspension of dried deposits varies within the ranges 1.7×10−4 to 8.9×10−3
Bq/m3 for 137Cs, and 7 × 10−5 to 9.3 × 10−4 Bq/m3 for 90Sr (Table 3.14).
In the street, the effective inhalation dose rates received by adult members of
the public within the contaminated local area are very low, varying within the
ranges 1 × 10−12 to 4.9 × 10−11 Sv/h for 137Cs and 3 × 10−12 to 4 × 10−11
Sv/h for 90Sr (Table 3.14).
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Table 3.13. Exposure received by members of the public from inhalation of resuspended radionuclides at the municipal car
park.
Effective Effective
inhalation dose inhalation dose
Activity rate received Activity rate received
concentration of by adults from concentration of by adults from
Soil 137Cs in the air resuspended 137Cs 90Sr in the air resuspended 90Sr
conditions at the car park at the car park at the car park at the car park
Scenario before rain (Bq/m3) (Sv/h) (Bq/m3) (Sv/h)
Heavy rain, storm (100 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 0.01 5.5e(-11) 2e(-3) 8.7e(-11)
Dry 150 0 0 0 0
“No fence” Wet 40 0.012 5.5e(-11) 2.5e(-3) 1.1e(-10)
Dry 150 0.009 5e(-11) 1.8e(-3) 7.8e(-11)
“I” Wet 40 0.067 3.8e(-10) 1.3e(-2) 5.6e(-10)
Dry 150 0.017 9e(-11) 3.4e(-3) 1.46e(-10)
“K” Wet 40 0.08 4.4e(-10) 1.6e(-2) 6.9e(-10)
Dry 150 0.04 2.2e(-10) 7.6e(-3) 3.3e(-10)
Rain of average intensity (35 mm)
“No fence” Wet 40 4.3e(-3) 2.4e(-11) 8.7e(-4) 3.8e(-11)
“I” Wet 40 1.8e(-3) 1e(-11) 3.6e(-4) 1.6e(-11)
“K” Wet 40 0.013 7e(-11) 2.6e(-3) 1.1e(-10)
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Table 3.14. Exposure received by members of the public from inhalation of resuspended radionuclides at the ﬂooded area in
the street adjacent to the outer wall of RRC-KI.
Inhalation dose Inhalation dose
rate received rate received
Activity by adults from Activity by adults from
concentration of resuspended concentration of resuspended
Soil 137Cs in air over 137Cs in air over 90Sr in air over 90Sr in air over
conditions ﬂooded street ﬂooded street ﬂooded street ﬂooded street
Scenario before rain (Bq/m3) (Sv/h) (Bq/m3) (Sv/h)
Heavy rain, storm (100 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 8.9e(-3) 4.9e(-11) 3.7e(-4) 1.6e(-11)
Dry 150 1.7e(-4) 1e(-12) 7e(-5) 3e(-12)
“No fence” Wet 40 not calculated not calculated
Dry 150 not calculated not calculated
“I” Wet 40 2.2e(-3) 1.2e(-11) 9.3e(-4) 4e(-11)
Dry 150 1e(-3) 5.5e(-12) 4.4e(-4) 1.9e(-11)
“K” Wet 40 1.9e(-3) 1e(-11) 7.9e(-4) 3.4e(-11)
Dry 150 1e(-3) 5.5e(-12) 4.2e(-4) 1.8e(-11)
Rain of average intensity (35 mm)
“No hole” Wet 40 0 0 0 0
“No fence” Wet 40 not calculated not calculated not calculated not calculated
“I” Wet 40 2.3e(-4) 1.3e(-12) 9.4e(-5) 4.1e(-12)
“K” Wet 40 2.3e(-4) 1.3e(-12) 9.6e(-5) 4.1e(-12)
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The scenarios for run-off from rain of average intensity indicate no effects from in-
halation exposure received by the public in the street. At the car park, the maximum
increase in 137Cs concentration in air was 0.013 Bq/m3 and that of 90Sr was 0.0026
Bq/m3 during the ﬁrst period of resuspension (“K” scenario); the corresponding
inhalation dose rates do not exceed 1.8× 10−10 Sv/h−1.
Annual doses of exposure at contaminated places
The hypothetical annual doses received by members of the public were calculated
based on the pessimistic assumption that the maximum exposure levels at the con-
taminated sites are maintained for a year after the run-off event. In other words,
it was supposed that run-off deposits of radionuclide outside the restricted area
would not be removed nor the contaminated area cleaned within 1 year of the event.
Therefore, the total dose is numerically equal to the total dose rate.
It was assumed that a car driver spends 1 hour per day in the car park throughout
the year, that car park personnel spend 4 working hours per day without protection,
and that pedestrians spend 1 hour per day at the contaminated local spot in the
street. The calculated annual doses to members of critical groups of the public are
given in Table 3.15. These are compared with the annual dose limit for members of
the public in general (1 mSv/year). Car park personnel are expected to receive the
maximum annual doses, that is 1.8–13.3% of the annual dose limit in the “heavy
rain” scenarios and up to 1.7% of the dose limit in the “ordinary rain” scenarios.
External exposure is the dominant pathway in all the scenarios. Car drivers are ex-
pected to receive 0.7–5.4% and up to 0.7% of the annual dose limits in the “heavy
rain” and “ordinary rain” scenarios, respectively. Pedestrians who use the contam-
inated area in the street may receive up to 0.62% of the annual dose limit in the
“heavy rain” scenarios or about 0.017% of the annual limit in the “ordinary rain”
scenarios.
Discussion of the results and their uncertainty
Assessment of the dose uptakes by the critical population groups after the run-off
scenarios from the radioactive waste site shows that natural events, such as average
or heavy rain, are unlikely to cause considerable reduction in environmental safety.
We repeat here the uncertainties in the dose calculation, which are predomi-
nantly caused by uncertainties in the run-off erosion calculation. The run-off model
LISEM used in the study is a physically based simulation model, but, of course, it
applies some empirical relationships to describe the physical processes that un-
derlie the model. All the papers we referred to found that the LISEM discharge
estimate agrees with measured estimates to within 15% and that uncertainties in
the input parameters are the most important in terms of assessing the ﬁnal results.
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Table 3.15. Annual doses received by the critical local groups of inhabitants from
contact with the areas contaminated by run-off from the radioactive waste site of
RRC-KI.
Annual dose Annual dose Share of the
Members from external from Total annual annual dose
of local exposure inhalation dose limit of
critical groups (Sv/year) (Sv/year) (Sv/year) 1 mSv/year (%)
Heavy rain scenarios
Car drivers at 7–55e(-6) 0.046–0.41e(-6) 7.1–54.4e(-6) 0.7–5.4
the car park
Personnel at 17.6–132e(-6) 0.11–1e(-6) 17.7–133e(-6) 1.8–13.3
the car park
Pedestrians in Up to 6.2e(-6) 0.15–3.3e(-8) Up to 6.24e(-6) Up to 0.62
the street
Scenarios with rain of average intensity
Car drivers at Up to 7.3e(-6) 1–6e(-8) Up to 7.4e(-6) Up to 0.7
the car park
Personnel at Up to 17.6e(-6) 2.3–16e(-8) Up to 17.8e(-6) Up to 1.7
the car park
Pedestrians in 1.64e(-7) 2e(-9) 1.7e(-7) 0.017
the street
Hence, we intentionally give the results of modeling 16 different scenarios, which
include variation of the major parameters within their uncertainty range, evaluated
by expert interpretation. Actually, these 16 scenarios constitute a kind of sensitivity
analysis and produce a feeling for the range of variation in the output data. There-
fore, the maximum calculated dose should be considered as an upper limit obtained
within the scoping analysis. In other words, the approach is intentionally skewed
toward overstating the exposure and dose.
The calculated dose rates for the hypothetical exposure of members of the pub-
lic vary from 0.02 to 13.3% of the annual dose limit, established at a level of
1 mSv/year. However, the results from the run-off scenarios show that radionu-
clides can be washed off outside the radioactive waste site and even reach the city
street, which may in itself be a psychological factor that contributes to public anx-
iety. The radiation background in local areas adjacent to the radioactive waste site
can be elevated noticeably by the run-off events. These local areas need to be kept
under systematic dosimetric control. The possibility of the gradual accumulation
of radionuclides through repeated wash-off events over long periods is a subject
for further consideration. Besides natural run-off events, there are several other
pathways of radionuclide migration from the radioactive waste site to the city ar-
eas, such as migration with groundwaters, direct resuspension of dust from the site,
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and so on. The contribution of these processes to the exposure of critical groups
of inhabitants is a subject for further analysis. In addition, the effects of possible
infrastructural failures (e.g., heavy run-off that results from failure of the rainwater
pipe) are worthy of special study.
4
Conclusions and Recommendations
Attention has been drawn to the consequences of the recent signiﬁcant growth in
urbanization throughout the world that has resulted in the de facto siting of waste
disposal facilities in densely populated urban areas. In some cases the expanded
residential areas actually surround these waste disposal facilities. This represents
a global problem as waste management practices previously located in the outer
suburbs of the city could now seriously affect the public. These past waste disposal
sites could be of chemical, industrial, municipal, or mixed origin. The nuclear
legacy, particularly that of storage sites for radioactive waste in what are now urban
areas, is an extreme example of this phenomenon.
For a number of reasons, the nuclear legacy in the urban environment has only
recently come to the attention of environmental specialists and the population. The
ﬁrst reason is that in countries with developed nuclear industries this urban nuclear
legacy is less than 1% of the total nuclear legacy. After the end of the Cold War,
studies of the global nuclear legacy mainly focused on nuclear weapons production
sites, which contain the vast majority of the accumulated radioactive waste. These
sites were commissioned in scarcely populated areas for secrecy reasons and most
remain in relatively underpopulated areas. However, it has now become widely
recognized that, though the nuclear legacy in the urban environment is a small frac-
tion of the total, other factors, such as urban population density and its proximity
to operational or obsolete nuclear facilities, increase the importance of this legacy
and even give it priority in social terms.
Section 1, on generic problems of the nuclear legacy in urbanized areas, de-
scribes the nuclear legacy in the urban environment as having mainly been created
by nuclear facilities built in the past, such as experimental nuclear reactors in re-
search, testing, and educational centers constructed between the 1940s and 1970s.
These centers were largely in the vicinity of big cities but now are within the city
limits. After decades of operation the research reactors at the nuclear centers have
produced millions of Curies of radioactivity in spent nuclear fuel and radioactive
waste. As the spent fuel is, in many cases, non-standard, it cannot be reprocessed
by the usual technologies and even requires special storage conditions. As a result,
this spent nuclear fuel is often stored at the nuclear center site itself, that is, in the
host city.
An additional input to this legacy is the radioactive waste generated during the
operation of the research reactors, their decommissioning, etc. The radioactive
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waste was often placed in “temporary” storage at the nuclear center sites. The
radiation protection norms at the time these were created were not always as strict
as they are now and also, in many cases, they were not even properly implemented,
either because of the nuclear arms race or just through negligence.
Such nuclear facilities are not only a source of radioactive waste, often stored
under inadequate conditions at the site, but they also create dangerous targets as
they have no protection against plane crashes or missile attacks. Recent terrorist
attacks on the Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States highlight
the risk posed by urban facilities that contain radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel
that may be targeted in future attacks. This topic is the focus of increased attention
from the nuclear scientiﬁc community.
The report analyzes world statistics concerning nuclear research reactors and
concludes that 60% of these are more than 30 years old. Furthermore, many are
in, or rapidly approaching, crisis conditions. It states that there is a lack of inter-
est in decommissioning by political decision makers that often results in passive
decommissioning strategies and, in the longer term, various safety concerns.
The former practice of building nuclear centers in or near to large cities can
be easily traced around the world (Berlin, Budapest, Grenoble, London, Paris, San
Diego, Soﬁa, etc.). However, the Moscow case seems to be, to some extent, ex-
traordinary, because of the rush nuclear program that started in Moscow after the
nuclear bombing of Hiroshima to gain nuclear parity with the United States.
Section 3, on the Moscow case study of the nuclear legacy, compiles and gen-
eralizes the results of the Moscow case study carried out by IIASA and the Central
European University in cooperation with three Russian institutions: the Federal
Agency for Atomic Energy, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian
Research Center-Kurchatov Institute.
Analysis of the statistics of nuclear facilities in Moscow and the Moscow Re-
gion shows that priority should be given to the nuclear legacy at RRC-KI because
of the amount of radioactivity that has accumulated at the site and because of its
proximity to the densely populated areas of downtown Moscow. Data on the nu-
clear facilities of RRC-KI responsible for this nuclear legacy show that the stores of
spent nuclear fuel now contain over 1,300 spent fuel assemblies of various designs
with a total radioactivity of about 2 MCi.
The spent fuel at RRC-KI differs in terms of its chemical composition, its de-
gree of uranium enrichment, and its protective cladding. As for this type of nuclear
legacy in general (see above), in many cases it cannot be reprocessed by standard
technology and requires special storage conditions. Another important feature is
that a high fraction of the experimental fuel elements were damaged during testing,
which also means that this fuel cannot be reprocessed at the existing reprocessing
plants in Russia.
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Non-standard spent nuclear fuel constitutes 60% of the total amount at RRC-KI,
of which 10% has varying degrees of damage. The time necessary to transport the
spent nuclear fuel from RRC-KI to the Urals or Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical
Combine is estimated as not less than 7 years, all conditions being favorable, which
is questionable.
Another important component of the nuclear legacy at RRC-KI is the radioac-
tive waste placed in temporary storage. Most of the waste was stored in the 1950s
and 1960s without due attention to the possible environmental consequences. This
has resulted in contamination of the surface layer of the site and the groundwater.
Living close to such a “neighbor” inevitably causes concern for Moscow inhab-
itants and visitors about the environmental security of their situation. Indeed:
1. The closest residential building area is only about 100 m from the radioactive
waste storage site.
2. The area between the inner wall of the storage site and the nearest section of
the outer wall (see Figure 3.16) is occupied by a municipal car park. Though
access to this is limited to people who use the area to park their cars, public
access to the area is not really restricted..
3. The municipal road along the outer wall of RRC-KI passes at a distance of
several meters. At peak times up to 3,000 vehicles per hour use this road.
The report includes the results of the collection, analysis, and collation of currently
available data regarding the radioactive source term at the disposal area for the
radioactive waste within the main boundaries of RRC-KI. It also gives the envi-
ronmental characteristics and human patterns necessary for modeling radionuclide
migration within and out of the site.
Analysis of the environmental and radiological characteristics of the site shows
that these data are far from being comprehensive. This reﬂects the real situation,
as:
• Data from the early years of the site are incomplete and inconsistent;
• Insufﬁcient experimental studies have been undertaken to explore the site char-
acteristics that have to be used in this study;
• The recently begun site-rehabilitation program has introduced further uncer-
tainties into the input data regarding surface contamination.
The basis of the information on surface contamination at the storage site applied in
the study is the gamma radiation survey of the site surface made in 10 m steps to a
distance of 1–1.5 m from the surface. This provided the exposure dose rates, which
typically vary from 30 μR/h to 3000 μR/h, and at some places are even higher than
3000 μR/h.
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The maps of surface contamination by 137Cs and 90Sr were created by recalcu-
lating the exposure dose rates under the supposition of a 15 cm surface soil layer
that is homogeneously contaminated. The recalculation procedure was based on
the following:
• The actual measurements of the exposure dose rate at nine points on the site
were compared with the exposure dose rates calculated from the measurement
of 137Cs concentrations in samples taken from those nine points. This compar-
ison showed reasonable agreement with the supposition that the exposure dose
rate is mainly caused by 137Cs contamination at the surface layer.
• The average ratio between 137Cs and 90Sr concentration measured in seven
samples taken from different parts of the site. This ratio was used to create a
90Sr contamination map.
Though these statistics are not sufﬁcient for a very heterogeneously contaminated
site, they may still serve as a ﬁrst approximation.
Another uncertain parameter is the soil hydraulic conductivity, for which the
range of values now available is extremely wide. These data, however, are based
on different methodologies: laboratory sample testing, ﬁeld study of water pump-
ing from observation wells, rate of restoration of a created depression zone, etc. No
cross-comparison of these results was possible because of the limited information
available on the details of the measurements. After careful discussion of this uncer-
tainty, it was decided to use an expert judgment that the site soil covered by grass
is similar to the so-called urbanosem type of soil.
In these circumstances, the run-off model was oriented toward a scoping anal-
ysis rather than a site-speciﬁc analysis. The scoping analysis focused on an eval-
uation of the scale of and possible limits to the redistribution and washout phe-
nomenon and thus provided a ﬁrst insight into the seriousness of run-off transfer;
it recommended that further experimental studies were needed to reduce the uncer-
tainties. Consequently, the study, while hopefully scientiﬁcally rigorous, was based
more upon consequence analysis and general principles than on exact site-speciﬁc
features.
As the run-off model was, in essence, a scoping analysis, we did not analyze
which criteria are best for evaluating the risk or whether the dose rate limit currently
ﬁxed in the ofﬁcial legislative and/or normative documents is likely to change in the
future. Instead, we chose the simplest approach: comparison with the current ofﬁ-
cial dose rate limit. The data on radionuclide contamination obtained and presented
in the report allow specialists to recalculate the risk in other terms, if they wish.
Uncertainty in the dose calculation is predominantly caused by uncertainties in
the run-off erosion calculation. The run-off model LISEM used in the study is a
physically based simulation model. However, of course, it applies some empirical
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relationships to describe the physical processes that underlie it. The literature we
refer to agrees that the LISEM discharge estimate is within 15% of that observed
and that, in assessing the ﬁnal results, it is the uncertainties in the input parameters
that are the most signiﬁcant. Hence, we intentionally give the results of modeling
16 different scenarios, which include variations of the major parameters within
their uncertainty, evaluated through expert discussion. These 16 scenarios provide,
in effect, an approximate sensitivity analysis and give a feel for the range in the
variation of the output data. Therefore, the maximum calculated dose should be
considered as an upper limit obtained within the scoping analysis. In other words,
this shows that the approach intentionally overstates both exposure and dose.
Despite all the limitations introduced in modeling the potential implications of
the run-off transfer of radioactivity from the RRC-KI waste storage site, the anal-
ysis indicates that the potential run-off transfer of radioactivity cannot be ignored
because:
• Given the current condition of the inner wall around the storage site, which acts
as a physical barrier to the path of the run-off water, and given the lack of any
speciﬁc drainage system at the site, the site topography does not prevent run-off
washout from the site.
• The model results show that under unfavorable meteorological conditions (pe-
riods of lengthy drizzle followed by a downpour of the maximum intensity
observed in Moscow), run-off water could transfer contaminated soil particles
outside the perimeter of the storage site and further down to the municipal car
park located between the inner wall of the storage site and the adjacent sec-
tion of the outer wall of RRC-KI. This would result in surface contamination of
dozens of kBq/m2.
• Though such radioactivity washout will not signiﬁcantly increase the dose up-
take by critical population groups, even in the most conservative scenario (up
to 20% of the established dose limit), the increase in background radiation out-
side the RRC-KI boundaries may cause public anxiety, especially if washed-out
radioactivity reaches the city street.
• Last, but not least, is the potential redistribution of soil contaminants within the
storage site (about 100 m2 could incur contamination twice that in existence
before the run-off event). This should be taken into account when planning a
site-rehabilitation program.
Thus, modeling the run-off transfer of radioactivity at the RRC-KI radioactive
waste storage site shows that the way radioactive waste was managed in the past
at nuclear centers in urban environments could result in radioactivity being washed
out from the boundaries of the site now and in the future. Though, in this particular
case, the natural events causing run-off, such as average or heavy rain, are unlikely
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to substantially reduce environmental security, the potential run-off transfer out-
side the storage site could create a constant and growing concern for people living
in nearby residential areas.
An outcome of this study is the recommendation that the role of the gradual
accumulation of radionuclides through repeated wash-off events over a long period
of time should be evaluated. This point could be of speciﬁc importance in plan-
ning a remediation program, as it is hardly possible and even less reasonable to
remediate to a “zero” level of contamination. Thus, an acceptable level of residual
contamination that should provide no “substantial” release from the site for a long
period of time (say, hundreds of years) should be examined and deﬁned.
Moreover, other contaminated areas that are part of RRC-KI but were not iden-
tiﬁed by the Russian partner for this study, like the enclave located on the bank of
the Moscow River, deserve attention and analysis. Thus:
• Our ﬁrst recommendation is to extend run-off studies to evaluate the cumula-
tive, long-term consequences of run-off transfer from sites with residual con-
tamination.
• Next, in order to reduce the uncertainty caused by incomplete knowledge of the
source term and environmental characteristics, further experiments are advised
to enable site-speciﬁc modeling.
• This study focused on the run-off caused by natural events, but beneath the stor-
age site is a complicated network of different pipelines, including a municipal
rainwater pipe that transmits rainwater accumulated from an area of about 400
ha. Hence, in addition to the modeling performed, the effects of possible in-
frastructure failures, such as heavy run-off from a failure of the rainwater pipe
and consequent site ﬂooding are worthy of a special study.
• As the background radiation in the areas adjacent to the storage site for the
RRC-KI radioactive waste can be noticeably elevated by run-off events, these
areas need to be under systematic dosimetric control.
• Besides natural run-off events, there are several pathways of radionuclide mi-
gration from the radioactive waste storage site to the city areas, namely, mi-
gration within groundwater, direct resuspension of dust from the site, and air
transfer by strong winds. The contribution of these processes to the exposure
of critical groups of inhabitants should be a subject for further analysis. This
is particularly important because of the remediation measures that have already
started at the site, which include excavation of the contaminated soil and its
separation into fractions of different contamination levels. Such operations ne-
cessitate further study without delay.
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The results of such an assessment make it possible to identify potential counter-
measures, and their cost, and to minimize the radiological impact on the population
and personnel involved in the remediation and/or stabilization of the site.
As for speciﬁc recommendations to reduce the potential run-off washout, the
following points should be considered:
• First of all, the RRC-KI radioactive waste storage site should have a special
drainage system designed to intercept and control run-off waters at the site.
• Should repair work of the inner wall around the storage site be deemed neces-
sary, it is recommended that this be carried out during the winter months.
• A number of potential engineering methods to reduce the run-off transfer from
the storage site should be evaluated carefully and choices made as to the opti-
mum method or methods of achieving this. As an example we list below what
is more or less obvious:
◦ Compaction of the soil, for which there are a number of technical possibil-
ities, to reduce the erosion rate;
◦ Chemical stabilization, perhaps with cement and polymers, to keep the soil
particles in place;
◦ Reduction of the amount of precipitation that falls on the storage site using
a cloud-seeding technique.1
• The need to use international experience to solve problems caused by radioac-
tive contamination is self-evident.
As for the social aspects of the problem, one of the ﬁrst efforts recommended for
coping with this situation is to set up “round table” meetings to improve the ex-
change of views between the RRC-KI administration and social groups living near
RRC-KI. These meetings should also include communication with international ex-
perts as well as discussion of up-to-date information regarding the situation and of
the solutions being used in other countries where contamination caused by activi-
ties at nuclear complexes in the urban environment has occurred. Such comparisons
could help to identify common issues and differences in coping with the radiation
1There are reservations in some publications about the reproducibility of this technique and its
effectiveness in controlling rainfall, and the idea that it could work on a small area is even more
questionable. However, we know at least two events in which cloud-seeding techniques were suc-
cessfully used to reduce the amount of precipitation: in 1980 during the Olympic Games in Russia
and in 1997 during the 850th anniversary of the founding of Moscow. In both cases cloud seeding
forced precipitation outside the perimeter of the city of Moscow and provided good weather in the
city. In principle, if necessary, the technique could be applied to an expanded area that includes the
radioactive waste site and its environs.
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legacy in large cities and to work out recommendations for future improvements.
Timely and deeper attention to these aspects is recommended.
The report concludes that countries with similar problems of a nuclear legacy in
the urban environment could beneﬁt from sharing their experience and cooperating
in this ﬁeld.
Appendix: Initial Code for the
Radionuclide Redistribution Model in
PCRast Modeling Language
Example of Cs-137 redistribution
######################################################################################
#  Cs-137 REDISTRIBUTION MODEL  Version 2.0A 
#
#  Version 19 July 2001 
#
#  by M. van der Perk,
Utrecht Centre for Environment and Landscape Dynamics – UCEL, Faculty of 
Geographical Sciences, Utrecht University, Netherlands. 
e-mail: m.vanderperk@geog.uu.nl 
#
#  and 
#
#  O. Slávik, VUJE Trnava a.s., Slovakia. 
   e-mail: slavik@vuje.sk
#
#
#  Runoff and Sediment transport model based on LISEM 5.1 
#  original LISEM script by A.P.J. de Roo, V.G. Jetten, and B. Iversen 
#  modified by M. van der Perk, 
#  extended by a Cs-137 interaction and transport module by O. Slávik and M. van der 
   Perk
#
#  MODEL FEATURES
#
#
#
#  Model calculates Cs-137 transport through a landscape based on sediment transport. 
#  It accounts for soil detachment by splash erosion and flow detachment and 
   Deposition from overland flow. The Cs-137 module requires a Cs-137 soil
   contamination map (Bq/m2).
#  Using a standardized depth distribution (negative exponential or part of Cs-137
   equally distributed over top soil layer), the Cs-137 activity concentration of the 
   active topsoil layer is calculated. The dissolved Cs-137 activity concentration in
   the runoff water (rainfall - interception) is calculated from the Cs-137 activity 
   concentration in the active layer of the top soil using a Kd distribution
   coefficient and the suspended sediment concentration. The particulate Cs-137
   activity concentration is also calculated using a distribution coefficient. It is
   assumed that the equilibrium between Cs-137 in top soil, water and suspended
   sediment is reached instantaneously. Subsequently, the water and sediment is mixed
   with water and  sediment from upstream cells. 
######################################################################################
binding
#***************************************************************************
#*************************** input maps ************************************ 
#***************************************************************************
 # drainage basin morphology maps 
   RainGauge=id.map;                  # area covered by raingauges 
   LDD=ldd.map;                       # LDD map 
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   Gradient=grad.map;                 # slope gradient 
   OutFlowPoints=outlet.map;          # Boolean map with outflow points 
   RoadWidth=roadwidt.map;            # width of roads 
 # soil and landuse maps; 
   LAI=lai.map;                       # leaf area index 
   VegetatFraction=per.map;           # fraction of soil covered by vegetation 
   RandomRoughness=rr.map;            # random roughness of the soil surface 
   CropHeight=ch.map;                 # vegetation height 
   AggregateStab=aggrstab.map;        # aggregate stability 
   SoilCohesion=coh.map;              # cohesion of bare soil 
   SoilAddCohesion=cohadd.map;        # additional cohesion by vegetation roots 
   N=n.map;                           # Manning's n for the soil surface 
   D50=d50.map;                       # d50 value of the soil 
   StoneFraction=stonefrc.map;        # fraction of soil covered by stones 
   WheelWidth=wheelwid.map;           # width of wheeltracks 
 # channel maps 
   ChannelGradient=changrad.map;      # channel slope gradient 
   ChannelN=chanman.map;              # Manning's n for the channel 
   ChannelCohesion=chancoh.map;       # cohesion of the channel bed 
   ChannelWidth=chanwidt.map;         # width of channel 
 # infiltration maps 
 # 1 layer Green/Ampt 
   Ksat1=ksat1.map;                   # saturated hydraulic conductivity
   ThetaS1=thetas1.map;               # saturated volumetric soil moisture content 
   ThetaI1=thetai1.map;               # Initial volumetric soil moisture content 
   PSI1=psi1.map;                     # Soil water tension at the wetting front
   SoilDepth1=soildep1.map;           # Soil depth of first layer (mm) 
 # Radiocaesium maps 
   Csinit=Csinit.map;                 # Soil contamination by Cs-137 (Bq/m2) 
#***************************************************************************
#************************** input timeseries ******************************* 
#***************************************************************************
   RainTSS=pre.tss;                    # timeseries with rainintensity (mm/hour) 
#***************************************************************************
#**************************** constant ************************************* 
#***************************************************************************
Fcumini=0;                            # initial cumulative infiltration 
Beta=0.6;                             # kinematic wave parameter for sheet flow 
Vmax=2.0;                             # maximum flow velocity (m/s) for
                                      # transportcapacity calculation 
CriticalStreamPower=0.4;              # critical unit stream power, in cm/s! = 0.4,
                                      # according to Govers, 1990 
SplashDelivery=0.1;                   # splash delivery ratio determines the fraction 
                                      # of splash detachment on non-ponded sites that
                                      # enters the overland flow (0-1) 
DT=2;                                 # duration of timestep (s) 
F=0.92;                               # factor to limit the transport to F*cell length
                                      # per time step 
# Radiocaesium parameters 
 ActiveLayer=5.0;                     # Thickness of active top soil layer of
                                      # interaction between runoff water and top soil
                                      # (mm)
 BulkDens=1300;                       # bulk density of the soil and top soil (kg/m3) 
 Porosity=0.4;                        # porosity of the top soil (active layer) (-) 
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 Mo=0.8;                              # Median coefficient (cm/sqrt(year)) for
                                      # calculation of depth distribution 
 Ti=20;                               # days after deposition for calculation of depth 
                                      # distribution 
                                      # value does not matter if ploughed is 'true' 
 Ploughed=boolean(0);                 # soil ploughed (1) or not ploughed (0) after
                                      # initial deposition 
 PloughDepth=0.25;                    # ploughing depth (m) 
 PartPlough=0.9;                      # part of Cs-137 that is in the plough layer if
                                      # CsSoil = CsMax (areal maximum -Perk teraz
                                      # vypnute)if CsSoil is below CSAverage then all
                                      # Caesium is assumed to be in the plough layer
                                      # the part of Cs-137 is scaled between the
                                      # average CsSoil (part=1)and CsMax 
(part=PartPlough)
 Kdb=1;                               # equilibrium distribution coefficient CsWater
                                      # and CsSoil  (m3/kg) 
 Kds=3.0;                             # equilibrium distribution coefficient CsWater
                                      # and CsSuspMat (m3/kg) 
#***************************************************************************
#****************************** reported maps ****************************** 
#***************************************************************************
 Erosion=eros.map;                    # reported map for produced 
                                      # erosion (tons/ha) 
 Deposition=dep.map;                  # reported map for produced 
                                      # deposition (tons/ha) 
#***************************************************************************
#**************************** reported timeseries  ************************* 
#***************************************************************************
 DischargeTSS=dischar.tss;            # reported timeseries with discharge at 
                                      # basin outlet and suboutlets (l/s) 
 SedDischargeTSS=seddisch.tss;        # report timeseries  with Qsedout at 
                                      # basin outlet and suboutlets (kg/s) 
 Arrows=errorw.tss;                   # reported timeseries with water mass balance 
error (%) 
 ErrorSTSS=errors.tss;                # reported timeseries with sediment mass balance 
error (%) 
 ErrorCTSS=errorc.tss;                # reported timeseries with Cs-137 mass balance 
error (%) 
 SedConcTSS=sedconc.tss;              # reported timeseries with sediment 
concentration (mg/l) 
 CsWConcTSS=Cswconc.tss;              # reported timeseries with soluble Cs-137 act 
concentration (Bq/l) 
 CsSConcTSS=Cssconc.tss;              # reported timeseries with particulate Cs-137 
act concentration(Bq/l) 
 CsTotConcTSS=Cstotcon.tss;           # reported timeseries with total Cs-137 activity 
concentration (Bq/l) 
 CsWDischTSS=Cswdisch.tss;            # reported timeseries with soluble Cs-137 
activity discharge (Bq/s) 
 CsSDischTSS=Cssdisch.tss;            # reported timeseries with particulate Cs-137 
act discharge (Bq/s) 
 CsTotDischTSS=Cstotdis.tss;          # reported timeseries with total Cs-137 activity 
discharge (Bq/s) 
 areamap 
 area.map; 
 timer 
 1 4300 1; 
 reportdefault = 200,600,900,1500,4000,5000,7200,12500..endtime; 
# reportdefault = 20+20..1000,1001+1..1019,1020+20..endtime; 
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initial
 # calculation of celllength (m) 
 DX =celllength(); 
 DXL=max(downstreamdist(LDD),DX); 
 # width of stone surface (m) 
 StoneWidth=(DX-RoadWidth-WheelWidth)*StoneFraction; 
 # channel width 
 ChannelWidth = cover(ChannelWidth,0); 
 # map with outflow point 1 (basin outlet) 
 # remaining part of the map becomes 0 
 OutFlowPoint1= if(OutFlowPoints eq 1, scalar(1),0); 
 # map with outflow point 2 (suboutlet 1) 
 # remaining part of the map becomes MV 
 OutFlowPoint2= if(OutFlowPoints eq 2, scalar(1)); 
 # map with outflow point 3 (suboutlet 2) 
 # remaining part of the map becomes MV 
 OutFlowPoint3= if(OutFlowPoints eq 3, scalar(1)); 
 # replaces pixels of zero inclination by a standard low value 
 # (if not division by zero!) 
 Gradient=max(if(cover(ChannelGradient,0) gt 0,ChannelGradient, Gradient), 0.005); 
#***************************************************************************
#************************        W  A  T  E  R       *********************** 
#***************************************************************************
 # maximum interception (mm), Van Hoyningen-Huene (1981), p.46 
 InterceptionWHmax=0.935+(0.498*LAI)-(0.00575*sqr(LAI)); 
 # maximum storage in micro-depressions (Onstad, 1984) (mm) 
 # cannot be less than 0 
 IsolatedWHmax=max(10*(0.112*RandomRoughness+0.031*sqr(RandomRoughness) 
               -0.012*RandomRoughness*(Gradient*100)),0); 
 # net rainfall needed to fill all micro-depressions (Onstad, 1984) (mm) 
 # cannot be less than 0 
 IsolatedWHrain=max(10*(0.329*RandomRoughness+0.073*sqr(RandomRoughness) 
                -0.018*RandomRoughness*(Gradient*100)),0); 
 # threshold net rainfall after which runoff starts (mm) 
 # runoff starts before all micro-depressions are filled 
 PotentialWHstart=max(IsolatedWHrain*(0.0527*RandomRoughness 
                  -0.0049*(Gradient*100)),0); 
 # maximum fraction of surface covered with water (Onstad, 1984) 
 # is assumed not to be less than 0.10, lower values give mass balance error 
 # for steep slopes! 
 WaterFractionmax=max(0.152*RandomRoughness-0.008*sqr(RandomRoughness)-0.008 
    *RandomRoughness*(Gradient*100),0.10); 
 # initial accumulated rainfall (mm) 
 RainWHaccum = 0; 
 # initial actual fraction of surface covered with water 
 # needed her because used in infiltration 
 WaterFraction=0; 
 # initial total rainfall in total catchment area (m3) 
 RainVoltotal=0; 
 # initial stage of total interception in total catchment area (m3) 
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 InterceptionVoltotal=0; 
 # initial stage of total accumulated infiltration (m3) 
 InfilVoltotal=0; 
 # initial surface water storage (m3) 
 IsolatedWH=0.;
 #initial total catchment runoff 
 CatchmentRunoffVol=0; 
 # Constant factor in calculation of Alpha (Manning's equation) 
 AlphaFact = (if(cover(ChannelN,0) gt 0.001,ChannelN, N)/(sqrt(Gradient)))**Beta; 
 # Constant power of Alpha (Manning's equation) 
 AlphaPower = (2/3)*Beta; 
 # Initial waterheight (mm) 
 WH=0.00; 
 # Initial volume of water (m3) 
 Volold=0; 
 Vol=0; 
 # initial discharge (m3/s) 
 Qout=1e-9; 
 Qoutold=1e-9; 
 # Intitial flow velocity (m/s) 
 V=1e-7; 
#***************************************************************************
#***************** initial conditions related to Green/Ampt***************** 
#***************************************************************************
 # conversion of Ksat and SoilDepth to cm/h and cm 
 Ksat1=Ksat1/10; 
 SoilDepth1=SoilDepth1/10; 
 # cumulative infiltration in mm 
 Fcum=Fcumini; 
#***************************************************************************
#************************   S  E  D  I  M  E  N  T   *********************** 
#***************************************************************************
 # total cohesion of soil (kPa) 
 SoilCohesiontotal=if(cover(ChannelCohesion,0) gt 
0,ChannelCohesion,SoilCohesion+SoilAddCohesion);
 # Y is the flow detachment efficiency coefficient 
 # Ugmin = 1.0 cm/s (Rauws & Govers, 1988) 
 # Ugcrit = 0.89+0.56*(COH+COHADD) 
 # SoilCohesion is the soil cohesion (kPa), 
 # which is 9.806*Torvane value (kg/cm2) 
 # SoilAddCohesion is the extra cohesion provided by plant roots 
 # enter high cohesion values (9999) for non-erodible surfaces 
 # thus, Y becomes 0 
 Y=if(SoilCohesiontotal<100,1/(0.89+0.56*SoilCohesiontotal),0); 
 Y=min(Y,1); 
 #enter high ChannelCohesion (9999) for non-erodible surfaces 
 ChannelY=if(ChannelCohesion lt 100,1/(0.89+0.56*ChannelCohesion),0); 
 ChannelY=min(ChannelY,1); 
 Y = cover(ChannelY,Y); 
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 # settling velocity of sediment at 20 C (m/s) 
 # 2650 = particle density kgm-3 
 # 1000 = density of water kgm-3 
 # 9.80 = acceleration of gravity 
 # 0.001 = viscosity of water 
 # Settling Velocity = 0.00080903 m/s for D50 = 30 mu at 20 C 
 # (Stokes' Law) from "Soil Physics" (Marshall & Holmes, '79; p.24/5) 
 SettlingVelocity=2*(2650-1000)*9.80*sqr(D50/2000000)/(9*0.001); 
 #experimentally derived coefficient 
 #depending on D50 (Govers, 1990; EUROSEM, 1992) 
 #CSS fit from EUROSEM manual data: r2=0.9979 
 #CGovers and DGOVERS are calculated from D50, and thus now spatial 
 CGovers=0.015061+exp(-2.33860-0.014059*D50); 
 #experimentally derived coefficient 
 #depending on D50 (Govers, 1990; EUROSEM, 1992) 
 #CSS fit from EUROSEM manual data: r2=0.979 
 DGovers=log10(2.431200+0.027716*D50); 
 # initial TransportCapacity 
 TransportCapacity = scalar(0); 
 # initial Sediment Concentration (kg/m3) 
 SedConc = scalar(0.00001); 
 #initial amount of sediment flow transport (kg/s) and storage (kg) 
 Sedflux=0; 
 Sedst=0; 
 Sedin=0; 
 Sedout=0; 
 # initial total erosion in catchment (kg) 
 Eros=0; 
 # initial total deposition in catchment (kg) 
 Dep=0; 
 # initial soil loss from catchment (kg) 
 CatchmentSoilLoss=0; 
 # initial transported sediment (kg) 
 SedTrtotal=0; 
 # initial total rainfall detachment (kg) 
 RainfallDetachmenttotal=0; 
 # initial stage of total flow detachment (kg) 
 FlowDetachmenttotal=0; 
#***************************************************************************
#************************        C s  -  1 3 7      ************************ 
#***************************************************************************
 CsSoil=Csinit; 
 Totero=0; 
 #Calculation of Initial Cs activity concentration in active layer (Bq/kg) 
 #1. Not ploughed soil 
 MedianDepth=10*Mo*sqrt(Ti/365);   #mm 
 B=ln(2)/MedianDepth; 
 CsTopSoil=CsSoil*(1-exp(-B*ActiveLayer))/BulkDens/(ActiveLayer/1000); 
 C_bgInit= B*Csinit*exp(-B*(ActiveLayer+Totero)); 
 report Cbgini=C_bgInit; 
#2. Ploughed soil 
 CsAverage=areaaverage(CsSoil,nominal(area.map)); 
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 CsMax=mapmaximum(CsSoil); 
 TopSoilFactor=1; 
 #TopSoilFactor=if(CsSoil le CsAverage,1,PartPlough+(1-PartPlough)* 
 # ((CsMax-CsSoil)/(CsMax-CsAverage))); 
 report CsTopSoil=if(Ploughed,TopSoilFactor*CsSoil/BulkDens/PloughDepth,CsTopSoil); 
 C_bs=CsTopSoil; 
 Cbs=C_bs;
 C_bg=if(not Ploughed,C_bgInit,Cbs); 
 Totdep=0; 
 Actdep=0; 
 CsSuspMat=CsTopSoil; 
 CsWater=0; 
 Csst=0; 
 Cwst=0; 
 Csup=0; 
 CsTotalInit=maptotal(CsSoil*sqr(DX)); 
 CatchmentCsLoss=0; 
 CsCatchmentLoss=0;
 CsCatchmentLossQ=0; 
 CatchmentSoilLossQ=0; 
 CsWloss=0; 
 dynamic 
#***************************************************************************
#************************        W  A  T  E  R       *********************** 
#***************************************************************************
#***************************************************************************
#************************** rainfall & interception ************************ 
#***************************************************************************
 # rainfall intensity (mm/h) 
 RainIntensity=timeinputscalar(RainTSS,RainGauge); 
 # amount of rainfall in each time interval (mm) 
 RainWH=RainIntensity*DT/3600; 
 # amount of rainfall in each time interval (m3) 
 RainVol=RainWH*DX*DX/1000; 
 RainVoltotal+=maptotal(RainVol); 
 # total rainfall amount in a  point (mm) 
 RainWHaccum+=RainWH; 
 # amount of interception in each time interval (mm) 
 # according to Aston (1979), based on Merriam (1960/1973) 
 # 0.046*LAI = k = (1-p) <=> p = 1-0.046*LAI 
 # the cumulative interception at time = t-1 is subtracted 
 # from the cum. interception at time = t (RainWHaccum) 
 # note: LAI is not a pixel average, but the average for VegetatFraction! 
 InterceptionWH=VegetatFraction*(InterceptionWHmax*(exp(-(0.046*LAI)* 
                (RainWHaccum-RainWH)/InterceptionWHmax)-exp(-(0.046*LAI)* 
                RainWHaccum/InterceptionWHmax))); 
 # no interception on roads and channels 
 InterceptionWH = if (ChannelWidth != 0, 0, InterceptionWH); 
 # total interception (m3) 
 InterceptionVol = InterceptionWH*(DX-RoadWidth)* DX/1000; 
 InterceptionVoltotal+=maptotal(InterceptionVol); 
 # Waterheight after rainfall and Interception (mm) 
 WH = WH + RainWH - InterceptionWH*(1-RoadWidth/DX); 
#***************************************************************************
#**************************** infiltration ********************************* 
#***************************************************************************
113
 # depth of wetting front (cm) 
 # Fcum in mm, but needed in cm, therefore division by 10! 
 L1=if(ThetaI1 lt ThetaS1,(Fcum/10)/(ThetaS1-ThetaI1),SoilDepth1); 
 # (cm) 
 # ADR/VJ: included water height at the surface as positive pressure 
 Delta=(ThetaS1-ThetaI1)*(PSI1+WH/10); 
 #DeltaF is maximum infiltration in cm (from Li 1978: Modeling of Rivers) 
 #maximize is to obtain only the positive root: the negative root 
 #has no physical significance 
 DeltaF=max(-(2*Fcum/10-Ksat1*DT/3600)/2+((2*Fcum/10-Ksat1*DT/3600)**2 
        +8*Ksat1*(DT/3600)*(Delta+Fcum/10))**(0.5)/2,0); 
 # infiltration (mm) per time interval 
 # maximum infiltration is equal to WH 
 # no infiltration into stones, roads, and channels 
 FiltSize = if(ChannelWidth != 0,0, min(WH,DeltaF*10)*(DX-StoneWidth-RoadWidth)/DX); 
 # if wetting front depth is equal to the soil depth, 
 # infiltration is zero --> saturation overland flow 
 FiltSize = if(L1 lt SoilDepth1,FiltSize,0); 
 # Accumulated infiltration (mm) 
 Fcum+=FiltSize; 
 # Amount of infiltration (m3) 
 InfilVol = FiltSize*(DX-StoneWidth-RoadWidth)*DX/1000; 
 InfilVoltotal+=maptotal(InfilVol); 
 # Waterheight after infiltration 
 WH = max(WH-FiltSize*(DX-StoneWidth-RoadWidth)/DX,0); 
#***************************************************************************
#***************** surface storage in micro-depressions ******************** 
#***************************************************************************
 # potential surface runoff (mm) 
 # equal to the sum of all water minus the storage in depressions 
 # WH is the available amount of water (mm) 
 # PotentialWHstart is the net amount of water needed 
 # for starting overland flow (mm) 
 # IsolatedWHrain is the total amount of net rainfall needed 
 # to fill all depressions (mm) 
 # IsolatedWHmax is the maximum amount of depression storage (mm) 
 # between PotentialWHstart and IsolatedWHrain 
 # a linear relationship is assumed 
 IsolatedWHold = IsolatedWH; 
 PotentialWHin=if(WH gt (PotentialWHstart) and ((IsolatedWHrain 
               -PotentialWHstart)*(IsolatedWHrain-IsolatedWHmax)) gt 0, 
               ((WH-PotentialWHstart)/(IsolatedWHrain-PotentialWHstart) 
               *(IsolatedWHrain-IsolatedWHmax)),0); 
 PotentialWHin=if(WH gt (IsolatedWHrain),(WH-IsolatedWHmax),PotentialWHin); 
 # isolated water storage in micro-depressions (mm) 
 IsolatedWH=max(WH-PotentialWHin,0); 
 # no isolated water in channels 
 IsolatedWH=if(ChannelWidth != 0,0,IsolatedWH); 
 # amount of water in isolated depressions (m3) 
 SurfaceStorageVol=(IsolatedWH-IsolatedWHold)*DX*(DX-RoadWidth)/1000; 
 SurfaceStorageVoltotal=maptotal(IsolatedWH*DX*(DX-RoadWidth)/1000); 
 Surfst =SurfaceStorageVol; 
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 # width of overlandflow (m) 
 FlowWidth=if(WH gt 1e-9,DX*max((WH-IsolatedWH)/WH,0),0); 
 FlowWidth=if(ChannelWidth gt 0,ChannelWidth,FlowWidth); 
 # Waterheight after surface storage (mm) 
 WH = max(WH-IsolatedWH*(1-RoadWidth/DX),0); 
#***************************************************************************
#**************** kinematic wave calculation for overland flow ************* 
#***************************************************************************
 # calculation of alpha parameter from 
 # Manning's equation (Chow, 1988, p. 288) 
 Alpha=AlphaFact*((max(FlowWidth,DX/100)+2*WH/1000)**AlphaPower); 
 # additional runoff input from rainfall minus interception and surface storage 
 Voladd = RainVol-InterceptionVol-InfilVol-SurfaceStorageVol; 
 Qadd   = Voladd/DT/DXL; 
 # numerical solution for kinematic wave for cell outflow (m3/s) and water level (mm) 
 report Qout = kinematic(LDD,Qout,Qadd,Alpha,Beta,DT,DXL); 
 WH   = if(FlowWidth gt 0.0001,1000*(Alpha*(Qout**Beta))/FlowWidth,0); 
 # Volume of water in each cell (m3) 
 Vol=(Alpha*(Qout**Beta))*DX; 
 # flow velocity (m/s) 
 Vreal=if (Vol gt 1e-8 and WH gt 1e-7, Qout/(FlowWidth*WH/1000),0); #m/s 
 V=max(min(Vreal,Vmax),0); 
#***************************************************************************
#************************   S  E  D  I  M  E  N  T   *********************** 
#***************************************************************************
 # volumetric transport capacity of sediment 
 # from overland flow (cm3 soil)/(cm3 water) 
 # V is flow rate in m/s; formula requires cm/s, thus factor 100 
 # condition Gradient*V*100>CriticalStreamPower 
 # is to prevent not allowed operation 
 TransportCapacity=if(Gradient*V*100 gt CriticalStreamPower,CGovers 
                   *(Gradient*V*100-CriticalStreamPower)**(DGovers),0); 
 TransportCapacity=if(Vol gt 1e-8,TransportCapacity,0); 
 TransportCapacity=min(TransportCapacity,0.32); 
 TransportCapacity=TransportCapacity*2650; 
 # 2650 is the particle density in kg/m3 
 # the unit of TransportCapacity is now in kg/m3 
 # report TrCap=TransportCapacity; 
 ##################################### 
 # Intermediate sediment calculation # 
 ##################################### 
 # Sediment (kg) current input from upstream cells and output to downstream cells 
  Sedout=if(Vol gt 1e-8,if(Vreal*DT lt
F*DX,SedConc*Qout*DT,SedConc*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*(WH/1000)*DT),0);
  Sedin=upstream(LDD,Sedout); 
 # New sediment concentration in cell and upstream cell (kg/m3) 
  SedConc=if(Vol gt 1e-8,Sedst/Vol,0); 
#***************************************************************************
#*************************** Splash detachment ***************************** 
#***************************************************************************
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 # calculation of kinetic energy 
 # LeafDrainageKin is the kinetic energy from leaf drainage (J/m2/mm) 
 # CropHeight is the effective height of the plant canopy (m) 
 # cannot be less than 0 
 LeafDrainageKin=max(15.8*sqrt(CropHeight)-5.87,0); 
 # DirectThroughfallKin is the kinetic energy 
 # from direct throughfall (J/m2/mm) 
 # RainIntensity is the rainfall intensity (mm/h) 
 # cannot be less than 0 
 # prevent the case when RainIntensity equals 0: 10log(0)!! 
 DirectThroughfallKin=if(RainIntensity>0,max(8.95+8.44 
                      *log10(RainIntensity),0),0); 
 # splash detachment 
 # splash is calculated separately for ponded and non ponded areas;
 # the Aggregate Stability map should contain 0 or negative values! 
 # /1000 is to go from grams per timestep to kg per timestep 
 # from Kin = 0 to Kin = 10 the relationship is linear!, 
 # based on field experiments 
 # these formulas are from EUROSEM, but modified and calibrated 
 # for the Limburg soils 
 # NO SPLASH ON STONE COVERED SOILS 
 # water height factor 
 WH0=exp(-1.48*WH); 
 # wet splash area (m2) 
 SplashArea=(WheelWidth+WaterFraction*DX)*DX/1000; 
 # direct rainfall on soil (mm) 
 RainDirectWH=RainWH*(1-VegetatFraction); 
 # factor 0.6 = stemflow 40% ! 
 # this corresponds to an leaf to ground surface angle of 36.87 degrees 
 # the effect of leaf drainage is negligible when CropHeight<0.15 m. 
 # InterceptionWH is already taking VegetatFraction into account
 ThroughfallWH=(RainWH*VegetatFraction-InterceptionWH)*0.6; 
 # 1) splash detachment on ponded areas from direct rainfall 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin gt 10 and AggregateStab gt 0, 
                         (2.82/AggregateStab*DirectThroughfallKin*WH0 
                         +2.96)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea, 
                         DirectThroughfallKin/10*(2.82/AggregateStab 
                         *10*WH0+2.96)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea); 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin gt 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
(0.1033/SoilCohesion*DirectThroughfallKin*WH0+3.58)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea,
                         DirectThroughfallDetach); 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin le 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
 DirectThroughfallKin/10*(0.1033/SoilCohesion*10*WH0+3.58)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea, 
                         DirectThroughfallDetach); 
 # 2) splash detachment on ponded areas from leaf drainage 
 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin gt 10 and AggregateStab gt 0, 
                    (2.82/AggregateStab*LeafDrainageKin*WH0+2.96) 
                    *ThroughfallWH*SplashArea,LeafDrainageKin/10 
                    *(2.82/AggregateStab*10*WH0+2.96)*ThroughfallWH 
                    *SplashArea); 
 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin gt 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
                    (0.1033/SoilCohesion*LeafDrainageKin*WH0+3.58) 
                    *ThroughfallWH*SplashArea,LeafDrainageDetach); 
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 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin le 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
                    LeafDrainageKin/10*(0.1033/SoilCohesion*10*WH0+3.58) 
                    *ThroughfallWH*SplashArea,LeafDrainageDetach); 
 # the types of splash detachment are added 
 RainfallDetachment=DirectThroughfallDetach+LeafDrainageDetach; 
 # 3) splash detachment on non-ponded areas from direct rainfall: WH0 = 1 
 # dry area 
 SplashArea=(1-WaterFraction)*DX*DX/1000; 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin gt 10 and AggregateStab 
                         gt 0,(2.82/AggregateStab*DirectThroughfallKin+2.96) 
                         *RainDirectWH*SplashArea,DirectThroughfallKin/10 
                         *(2.82/AggregateStab*10+2.96)*RainDirectWH 
                         *SplashArea); 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin gt 10 and AggregateStab 
                         le 0,(0.1033/SoilCohesion*DirectThroughfallKin 
                         +3.58)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea, 
                         DirectThroughfallDetach); 
 DirectThroughfallDetach=if(DirectThroughfallKin le 10 and AggregateStab 
                         le 0,DirectThroughfallKin/10*(0.1033/SoilCohesion 
                         *10+3.58)*RainDirectWH*SplashArea, 
                         DirectThroughfallDetach); 
 # 4) splash detachment on non-ponded areas from leaf drainage: WH0 = 1 
 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin gt 10 and AggregateStab gt 0, 
                    (2.82/AggregateStab*LeafDrainageKin+2.96)*ThroughfallWH 
                    *SplashArea,LeafDrainageKin/10*(2.82/AggregateStab*10 
                    +2.96)*ThroughfallWH*SplashArea); 
 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin gt 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
                    (0.1033/SoilCohesion*LeafDrainageKin+3.58)*ThroughfallWH 
                    *SplashArea,LeafDrainageDetach); 
 LeafDrainageDetach=if(LeafDrainageKin le 10 and AggregateStab le 0, 
                    LeafDrainageKin/10*(0.1033/SoilCohesion*10+3.58) 
                    *ThroughfallWH*SplashArea,LeafDrainageDetach); 
 # the types of splash detachment are added (kg) 
 RainfallDetachment+=SplashDelivery*(DirectThroughfallDetach 
                     +LeafDrainageDetach); 
 RainfallDetachment=if(Vol gt 1e-8,RainfallDetachment,0); 
 # report rainadd=RainfallDetachment; 
 ##################################### 
 # Intermediate sediment calculation # 
 ##################################### 
 # Additional Sediment (kg) input from detachment 
 Sedadd=RainfallDetachment; 
 # Sediment concentration (kg/m3) 
 SedConc=if(Vol gt 1e-8,max(Sedst+Sedin-Sedout+Sedadd,0)/Vol,0); 
 #************************************************************************** 
 #***************************** Flow detachment **************************** 
 #************************************************************************** 
 # overland flow detachment 
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 # settling velocity concept according to Stokes' Law and D50 dependent! 
 # SettlingVelocity*DT is max. distance travelled and is compared with WH/1000 
 # Old script linear: SettlingVelocityFactor=if(Vol gt 1e-
8,SettlingVelocity*DT/(WH/1000),1);
 SettlingVelocityFactor=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and WH gt 1e-7,1-exp(-
DT*SettlingVelocity/(WH/1000)),1);
 SettlingVelocityFactor=max(min(SettlingVelocityFactor,1),0); 
 # report SetF=SettlingVelocityFactor; 
 # roadwidthfactor: no flow detachment on roads
 RoadWidthFactor=if(FlowWidth gt 0,1-RoadWidth/DX,0); 
 # detachment by overland flow (kg)
 # cannot be larger than the remaining transport capacity 
 # corrected for roads 
 FlowDetachment=if(TransportCapacity gt SedConc and Vol gt 1e-8, 
                Y*(TransportCapacity-
SedConc)*Vol*SettlingVelocityFactor*RoadWidthFactor,0);
 # report flowadd = FlowDetachment; 
 ##################################### 
 # Intermediate sediment calculation # 
 ##################################### 
 # Additional Sediment (kg) input from detachment 
 Sedadd=RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment; 
 # Sediment concentration (kg/m3) 
 SedConc=if(Vol gt 1e-8,max(Sedst+Sedin-Sedout+Sedadd,0)/Vol,0); 
 #************************************************************************** 
 #***************** Deposition from overland flow (kg) ********************* 
 #************************************************************************** 
 # (positive = supply to the flow; negative = deposition) 
 # deposition cannot be larger than the amount of available sediment 
 FlowDeposition=if(TransportCapacity lt SedConc,(TransportCapacity-
SedConc)*Vol*SettlingVelocityFactor,0);
 FlowDeposition=if(Vol gt 1e-8,max(FlowDeposition,-Sedst),-Sedst);
 # report flowdep = FlowDeposition; 
#***************************************************************************
#******************* Mass balance for sediment and Cs-137 ****************** 
#***************************************************************************
 E_b=if(FlowWidth gt 0.00001,1000*max(RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment,0)/ 
           BulkDens/DX/FlowWidth,1e-8); #erosion (mm) 
 #tu sa porovnava s Actdep z predchadz kroku 
  Totero=if(E_b gt Actdep, Totero+(E_b-Actdep),Totero); 
  C_bgInit=if(not Ploughed,B*Csinit*exp(-B*(ActiveLayer+Totero)),CsTopSoil); 
 # Cs-137 activity concentration in eroded soil layer 
 C_bg=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and E_b gt Actdep+.005 and not Ploughed, 
             (Cbs*Actdep/1000*BulkDens+ Csinit*exp(-B*(ActiveLayer+Totero))* 
             (1-exp(min(-B*(E_b-Actdep),0))))/(BulkDens*(E_b/1000)),
             if(Vol lt 1e-8 and not Ploughed and Actdep lt ActiveLayer/100, C_bg, C_bs 
) );
#For avoiding dividing by small E_b 
  report C_bg=if(E_b lt ActiveLayer/100 and Actdep lt ActiveLayer/100,C_bgInit,
  if(E_b gt ActiveLayer/100,C_bg, Cbs)   ); 
# updating of active soil layer(C_bs)(Bq/kg) after leaching and topsoil mixing 
interaction
  report C_bs=(Cbs*ActiveLayer+ C_bg*E_b) / (ActiveLayer+E_b)/
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             (  1+ (Voladd/sqr(DX)*1000)/(Kdb*(ActiveLayer+E_b)*BulkDens)   );
 C_w=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and SedConc gt 1e-
8,C_bs/Kdb*(1+Kdb*SedConc)/(1+Kds*SedConc),C_bs/Kds);
 report C_s=C_w*Kds;
 D_b=if(FlowWidth gt 0, 1000*(-FlowDeposition)/BulkDens/DX/FlowWidth,0); 
               Actdep=max(0,Actdep-E_b)+ D_b; # #Actdep- celk hrubka sa o eroziu E_b 
znizi -vid dalej
 Totdep=Totdep+D_b; 
 #Sedadd=RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment; 
 # Cs-137 activity concentration suspended solids (Bq) by mixing sediment sources 
 CsSuspMat=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and SedConc gt 1e-9,((Sedst-Sedout)* CsSuspMat+ Sedin*Csup+ 
  Sedadd*C_bs)/(Sedst-Sedout+Sedin+Sedadd),CsSuspMat);#C_s 
 #Protection, CsSuspMat can be maximally equal to xKds/Kdb
 #CsSuspMat=if(CsSuspMat gt CsTopSoil*Kds/Kdb,CsTopSoil*Kds/Kdb,CsSuspMat); 
 # Cs-137 activity concentration in sediment 
 report CsSS=CsSuspMat; #Bq/kg 
 CsWater=CsSuspMat/Kds; 
 #Cs-137 activity concentration in water (Bq/m3) by mixing water sources 
 #Voladd=RainVol-InterceptionVol-InfilVol; 
 #Volout=if(Vol gt 1e-8,if(Vreal*DT lt 
F*DX,Qout*DT,(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*(WH/1000)*DT),0);
 #Volin=upstream(LDD,Volout); 
 #Cswadd=Voladd*C_w; 
 #Cswout=if(Vol gt 1e-8,if(Vreal*DT lt
 #F*DX,CsWater*Qout*DT,CsWater*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*(WH/1000)*DT),0); 
 #Cswin=upstream(LDD,Cswout); 
 #CsWater=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and (Volold+Volin-Volout+Voladd) gt 1e-8, 
 #  max(Cwst+Cswin-Cswout+Cswadd,0)/(Volold+Volin-Volout+Voladd),0); 
 report CsWflux=if(Vreal*DT lt F*DX,CsWater*Qout,CsWater*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*WH/1000); 
#Bq/s
 # Additional Sediment (kg) and Cs-137 (Bq) input from detachment minus deposition
 Sedadd=RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment+FlowDeposition; 
 # Sediment concentration (kg/m3) 
 report SedConc=if(Vol gt 1e-8,max(Sedst+Sedin-Sedout+Sedadd,0)/Vol,0); 
 # Sediment in small water volumes is deposited 
 RestDeposition=SedConc*Vol-max(Sedst+Sedin-Sedout+Sedadd,0); 
 # Update Cs-137 concentration in soil layer (Bq/m2) after erosion and deposition 
  CsSoil=if(Vol gt 1e-8, max(CsSoil- (C_bs*(RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment)+ 
  C_bs/Kdb*Voladd + CsSuspMat*(FlowDeposition+RestDeposition)) /sqr(DX),0 ), 
CsSoil);
 #update of C_bs in top soil after deposition:
  report Cbs= (C_bs*ActiveLayer+ CsSuspMat*D_b)/(ActiveLayer+ D_b); 
  report Cs_soil=CsSoil; 
  #report delC_bs =C_bs-Cbs;
  #report delCSS= CsSS-C_bs; 
 CsConc=CsSuspMat*SedConc; 
 report CsSflux=if(Vreal*DT lt F*DX,CsConc*Qout,CsConc*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*WH/1000); 
#Bq/s
 report CsConc+=CsWater; #Bq/m3 
  report Csflux=if(Vreal*DT lt F*DX,CsConc*Qout,CsConc*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*WH/1000); 
#Bq/s
  # Sediment mass balance (kg) 
  Sedst=SedConc*Vol; 
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  report Sedflux=if(Vreal*DT lt 
F*DX,SedConc*Qout,SedConc*(F*DX/DT)*FlowWidth*WH/1000); #kg/s 
  Csst=CsSuspMat*Sedst; 
  Cwst=CsWater*Vol; 
 # Cs-137 activity concentration on suspended sediment in upstream cells 
  Csup=if(Vol gt 1e-8 and upstream(LDD,Sedst) gt 1e-8, 
         upstream(LDD, Csst)/upstream(LDD,Sedst),0); 
  Volold=Vol; 
#**************************************************************************
#************************ calculate totals & output *********************** 
#**************************************************************************
 # W A T E R 
 # report timeseries with total water discharge at basin outlet and suboutlets (l/s) 
 report DischargeTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),Qout*1000); 
 # water mass balance error (%) 
 CatchmentRunoffVol+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),Qout,0))*DT; 
 RunoffVoltotal=maptotal(Vol); 
 ErrorW=if(RainVoltotal gt 0,100*(RainVoltotal-InterceptionVoltotal-InfilVoltotal- 
        SurfaceStorageVoltotal-CatchmentRunoffVol-RunoffVoltotal)/RainVoltotal,0); 
 report ErrorWTSS=timeoutput(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),ErrorW); 
 report Watloss.tss=CatchmentRunoffVol;#integral outflow from catchmnet, m3 
 # S E D I M E N T 
 # total erosion in catchment after last timestep 
 # conversion to tons/ha 
 Cf=sqr(100)/sqr(DX)/1000; 
 report Eros+=(RainfallDetachment+FlowDetachment)*Cf; 
 # total deposition in catchment after last timestep 
 # conversion to tons/ha 
 report Dep+=(FlowDeposition+RestDeposition)*Cf; 
 # sediment mass balance error (%) 
CatchmentSoilLossQ+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),SedConc*Qout,0))*DT;#kg/catchme
nt
 report SedlosQ.tss=CatchmentSoilLossQ; #time integral of sedConc*Qout from catchmnet, 
kg/cat
 CatchmentSoilLoss+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),Sedflux,0))*DT*Cf; 
 report SedlossF.tss=CatchmentSoilLoss; #time integral of sediment flux from 
catchmnet, t/ha
 SedTrtotal=maptotal(Sedst)*Cf; 
 ErrorS=if(maptotal(Eros) gt 0, 100*(maptotal(Eros)+maptotal(Dep)- 
        CatchmentSoilLoss-SedTrtotal)/maptotal(Eros),0); 
 report ErrorSTSS=timeoutput(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),ErrorS); 
 # report timeseries with total sediment load at basin outlet and suboutlets (kg/s) 
 report SedDischargeTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),SedConc*Qout); 
 # report timeseries with sediment concentration basin outlet and suboutlets (kg/m3) 
 report SedConcTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),SedConc); 
 # C s - 1 3 7 
 # report timeseries with soluble Cs-137 activity concentration (Bq/m3) at basin 
outlet and suboutlets
report CsWConcTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsWater); 
CsWloss+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),CsWater*Qout,0))*DT;#Bq
 report CsWloss.tss =CsWloss;#integral Bq from catchmnet 
# report timeseries with particulate Cs-137 activity concentration (Bq/kg) at basin 
outlet and  suboutlets 
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 #report CsSConcTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsSuspMat); 
 # report timeseries with total Cs-137 activity concentration (Bq/m3) at basin outlet 
and suboutlets 
 report CsTotConcTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsConc); 
 # report timeseries with soluble Cs-137 activity discharge (Bq/s) at basin outlet and 
suboutlets
 report CsWDischTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsWater*Qout); 
 # report timeseries with particulate Cs-137 activity discharge (Bq/s) at basin outlet 
and suboutlets 
 #report CsSDischTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsSuspMat*SedConc*Qout); 
 # report timeseries with total Cs-137 activity discharge (Bq/s) at basin outlet and
suboutlets
 report CsTotDischTSS=timeoutput(nominal(OutFlowPoints),CsConc*Qout);#Bq/s 
 CsCatchmentLossQ+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),CsConc*Qout,0))*DT;#Bq 
 report Cstotlos.tss =CsCatchmentLossQ;#integral Bq from catchmnet 
# Cs-137 mass balance error (%) 
 CatchmentCsLoss+=maptotal(if(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),Csflux,0))*DT; #Bq 
 CsTotal=maptotal(CsSoil*sqr(DX)+Csst+Cwst); #Bq 
 ErrorCs=100* ( (CsTotal+CatchmentCsLoss)/CsTotalInit -1); 
 #report CsFlloss.tss= CatchmentCsLoss;#time integral of Csflux from catchm Bq
 report ErrorCTSS=timeoutput(boolean(OutFlowPoint1),ErrorCs); 
 # ratio of transported Cs 137 from catchment 
 report TraperCs.tss=100*CatchmentCsLoss/CsTotalInit; 
 report CsSorat.tss =100*maptotal(CsSoil*sqr(DX))/CsTotalInit; 
 #report CsRWrat.tss =100*maptotal(Csst+Cwst)/CsTotalInit; 
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